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ARTICLES
GOD, CIVIC VIRTUE, AND THE AMERICAN
WAY: RECONSTRUCTING ENGEL
Corinna Barrett Lain*
If ever a decision embodied the heroic, countermajoritarian function we romantically ascribe to judicial review, it was the 1962 decision that struck dowM
school prczyer-Engel v. Vitale. Engel provoked more outrage, more congressional attempts to overturn it, and more attacks on the Justices than perhaps any
other decision in Supreme Court history. Indeed Engel 's countermajoritarian
narrative is so strong that scholars have largely assumed that the historical record supports our romanticized conception of the case. It does not. Using primary
source materials, this Article reconstructs the story of Engel, then explores the
implications of thl~ reconstructed narrative. Engel is not the countermajoritarian
case it seems, but recognizing that allows us to see Engel for what it is: a remarkably rich account of Supreme Court decisionmaking that furthers a number
of conversations in constitutional law. Engel adds a new strand to a burgeoning
body of scholarship on the power of culture in general, and social movements in
particular, to generate constitutional change. It presents a rare glimpse of the
Justices explicitly engaging in a dialogue with the American public. And it exposes qualitative differences in the forms that popular constitutionalism might ta/re,
with implications for the theory itself In the end, Engel still offers valuable insights about Supreme Court decisionmaking and the role ofjudicial review. They
just aren't the insights we tend to think
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INTRODUCTION

Constitutional lore casts the Supreme Court as a countermajoritarian protector, champion of unpopular minorities against tyrannical majority rule. 1
Over the last several decades, this romanticized conception of the Court has
softened somewhat as empirical work on Supreme Court decisionmaking has
mounted. 2 Today, "underground conventional wisdom" 3 within the legal academy is what political scientists have known, and shown, for almost fifty years:
4
the Supreme Court is a--fundamentally majoritarian institution.

1. The Supreme Court itself has promoted this narrative, most famously in a 1938
footnote, but elsewhere as well. See United States v. Caro\ene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153
n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition ... which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."); see also
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U,S. 227, 241 (1940) ("[C]ourts stand ... as havens of refuge for
those who might otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because
they are non-conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement."). For a famous theory
of judicial review based on this account, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DrSTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ( 1980).
2. Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme
Court? Possibly Yes (but We're Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263, 265 tbL\ (2010)
(summarizing the results of nine quantitative studies from 1993 to 2009 showing the Supreme Court's responsiveness to public opinion).
3. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: How THE COURTS SERVE
AMERJCA, at xii (2006).
4. For classic =pirical studies establishing the Supreme Court's majoritarian
decisionmaking proclivities, see, for example, Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 1. PUB. L. 279 (1957); and David G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Decision Making in the
Post-New Deal Period, 47 J. POL. 652 (1985). For more recent empirical work, see Epstein
& Martin, supr~ note 2.
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For those who study Supreme Court decisionmaking and the role of judicial rcvic·.v, the question then becomes how to understand the Court when it
deviates from the general rule. If the Supreme Court is mainly majoritarian,
what can we learn from when it is not? The answer, as Barry Friedman has recognized, is "remarkably impoverished." 5
Against this backdrop, Engel v. Vitale 6 ~the 1962 decision that struck
dolNil school prayer~stands as a conspicuous case for renewed scholarly attention. Engel started with a want ad. 7 A parent was looking for others to join him
in challenging a New York school board's decision to begin the school day
with a short ecumenical prayer: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers
and our Country." 8 Steven Engel answered the ad, as did the parents of a number of other children of varying religious backgrounds. 9 They lost in the trial
court. 10 They appealed, and lost again. 11 And in New York's highest appellate
court, they lost yet again. 12 Then the Supreme Court granted certiorari and invalidated the prayer under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. 13 The
nation freaked.
Within the academy, Engel is wide1)' regarded as one of the most unpopular decisions in Supreme Court history, 1 and for seemingly good reason. Engel

5. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTTTUTlON 3 73
(2009).
6. 370 U.S. 421 ( 1962).
7, See CBS Reports: Stonn over rhe Supreme Court Part//; The School Prayer Case
(CBS television broadcast Mar. 13, 1963) [hereinafter CBS Reports: The School Prayer

Case].
8. Engel, 370 U.S. at 422 (internal quotation marks omitted). Students who wished to
leave the room were allowed to do so, although the prayer was so short that they generally
did not bother. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
9 . .Around fifty people initially answered the ad, but many dropped out, leaving ten
children and their parents as the original plaintiffs in the case. Engel was Jewish, but the
plaintiffs also included a Unitarian, a member of the Society for Ethical Culture, and a nonbeliever. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 423; CBS Reports: The School Prayer Case, supra note 7.
10. See Engel v. Vitale, 191N.Y.S.2d453, 496 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
11. See Engel v. Vitale, 206 N.Y.S.2d 183, 183-84 (App. Div. 1960) (per curiam).
12. See Engel v. Vitale, 176 N.E.2d 579, 582 (N.Y. 1961).
13. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 424. For a theory of why the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case, see note 383 and accompanying text below.
14. See BRUCE J. DlERENF!ELD, THE BATTLE OVER Sc1moL PRAYER: How ENGEL v.
VITALE CHANGED AMERICA 145 (2007) ("Constitutional experts maintain that Engel was 'a
wildly unpopular decision,' engendering more public hostility than almost any previous
opinion in the Court's history ... .''); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARRE!N COURT AND
AMERICAN POLITICS 187 (2d prtg. 2001) ("[A] later study found more widespread opposition
to Engel than lo any other case."); RODNEY K. SMITH, PUBLIC PRAYER AND THE
CONSTITUTION: A CASE STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 17 5 ( 1987) ("Public furor which was without equal in any prior case before the Supreme Court arose after the Engel decision was announced.").
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provoked more outrage than Dred Scott v. Sandford. 15 It infuriated more areas
of the country than Brown v. Board of Education. 16 It inspired more congressional attempts to nullify it and impassioned vows to evade it than Roe v.
Wade. 17 And it was intensely unpopular with the American public. The Supreme Court received more mail on Engel than it had ever received on a single
case-around 5000 letters, "mostly negative," in the first month after the decision 18-and a Gallup poll taken shortly after the decision registered disapproval of the ruling at seventy-nine percent. 19 The Justices had misbehaved before,
but "never in the wildest of their excesses" had they gone as far as they did in
Engel. 20 To the people and their representatives, Engel was more than a misreading of the Establishment Clause. It was an affront to God, civic virtue, and
the American way.
Indeed, Engel's countermajoritarian narrative is so strong that the tension
between minority rights and majority rule was explicit in the framing of the

15. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); see DIERENFIELD, supra note 14, at vii (noting that
Engel was "greeted with more shock and criticism than Dred Scott v. Sandford''). Given the
vastly different historical time frames, the comparison is a difficult one; but Dred Scott is
(like the other cases mentioned here) a standard-bearer of counterrnajoritarianism, so I think
the comparison worthy-and valid. See irifra Part II.A (discussing the reaction to Engel,
which included public denunciations, picketing, billboards, letter-writing campaigns, editorials, resolutions, pay retaliation, legislation, vows of defiance, noncompliance, and calls to
amend the Constitution, impeach the Justices, strip their jurisdiction, buy them Bibles, and
inscribe the words "In God We Trust" above their bench).
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE
PRNATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 425 (Del Dickson
ed., 2001) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE] (comparing Engel to Brown, and
noting that "this time the hostility was not confined to one region of the country-although
southerners were more angry than most" (italics omitted)); The Court Decision-and the
School Prayer Furor, NEWSWEEK, July 9, 1962, at 43, 44 (reporting on the "swell of indignation, astonishment, and bewilderment that swept across the nation" in the wake of Engel).
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see ROBERTS. ALLEY, SCHOOL PRAYER: THE COURT, THE
CONGRESS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 107 (1994) ("Of all the Court rulings of this century
none has sparked more action in Congress than Engel."); DrERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 150
("Nearly one thousand constitutional amendments have been proposed to overturn the regents' prayer ruling."); Nation Chooses Sides in Fight over Prayer, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., May 18, 1964, at 63, 63 ("Fifteen States have refused to discontinue prayer and Bible
reading in their schools.").
18. Bruce J. Dicrenfield, Engel v. Vitale, in THE PUBLIC DEBATE OVER CONTROVERSIAL
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 215, 220 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2006); see also Mail Pours into
Court on its Prayer Decision, N. Y. TIMES, June 29, 1962, at 11 (noting that mail on Engel
"was reported to be the largest in the tribunal's history").
19. See 3 GEORGE H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLlC OPINION 1935-1971, at 1779
(1972) (reporting results of a July 26-31, 1962, survey asking, "Do you approve or disapprove of religious observances in public schools?"). For subsequent polling data, sec note
271 below.
20. See Opinion of the Week: Prayers in School, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1962, § 4, at 9
(quoting Senator Herman Talmadge of Georgia).
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case. It was in the parties' arguments. 21 It was in the public discourse. 22 And it
was in fastice Black's delivery of the decision itself. 2
Little wonder, then, that as scholars today debate the nature of Supreme
Court decisionmaking, Engel is-as it has been for fifty years-a go-to case.
For some, it is proof of the Supreme Court's staunchly countermajoritarian ca24
pacity. For others, it is the rare exception to a reliably majoritarian Supreme
25
Court. Either way, Engel stands as a sterling example of countermajoritarian
decisionmaking, a classic case of judicial bravery in the face of public sentiment the opposite way.

21. See, e.g., Brief of lntervenors-Respondents at 45, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962) (No. 468), 1962 WL 115863 ("Petitioners seek, under the cloak of the First Amendment, to coerce the vast majority into subservience to their demands." (holding omitted));
Oral Argument at 43:55, Engel, 370 U.S. 421 (No. 468), available at http://www.oyez.org
/cases/1960-1969/1961/1961_468 ("[Respondents] boldly argue that the majority should
control in this particular instance, and [that] this is a case where the minority is imposing its
views upon the majority. Of course, our answer to that is simple. We say that the Constitution-the very purpose of the Constitution is to protect the minority against the majority.").
22. See Editorial, Prayer Is Personal, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1962, at 34 ("Doubtless
those who oppose school prayers are a minority. But the Constitution was designed precisely
to protect minorities .... "); infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text (discussing criticism
of Engel for subjecting majority will to minority rule).
23. See Anthony Lewis, Supreme Court Outlaws Official School Prayers in Regents
Case Decision: Ruling Is 6 to I, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1962, at I (reporting Justice Black's
"extemporaneous comments" from the bench while announcing Engel, including the comment that "[i] f there is any one thing clear in the First Amendment, it is that the right of the
people to pray in their own way is not to be controlled by the election returns" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
24. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, A (Modest) Separation of Powers Success Story, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REY. 1647, 1670-71 (2012) ("For example, the Warren Court's decisions on
issues like school prayer ... were extremely unpopular .... Thus, it appears that federal
courts do have some leeway to ... protect 'unpopular' constitutional values."); Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124
HARV. L. REV. 657, 736 (2011) ("Real questions about the viability of judicial power arise
only when courts act counter to the interests of the national political branches or popular majorities. These cases do exist: Supreme Court decisions invalidating school prayer ... have
been unpopular with majorities of the public."); Richard H. Pildes, ls the Supreme Court a
"Majoritarian" Institution?, 2010 Sur. CT. REV. 103, 125 & n.77 (citing "the Court's highly
unpopular school-prayer decisions of the 1960s" as a counterexample to claims that the Supreme Court is constrained by political and/or popular majorities).
25. See, e.g,, FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 263-66 (discussing Engel within the larger
historical context of alignment of the Justices with popular opinion); Lori A. Ringhand, In
Defense ofIdeology: A Principled Approach to the Supreme Court Confirmation Process, 18
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 131, 135 n.19 (2009) ("While some Supreme Court decisions almost certainly are genuinely countcrmajoritarian (the flag burning decisions and much of the
Court's current school prayer jurisprudence probably fall into this group), such cases appear
to be rare."); Michael J. K.lannan, Rethinking the History of American Freedom, 42 WM. &
MARYL. REY. 265, 281 (2000) (book review) ("[N]one of this is to deny that occasionally the
Supreme Court does strike blows in defense of freedoms that do not enjoy majoritarian support. Clearly, the Court's decisions invalidating school prayer ... have not commanded majority support.").
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Perhaps because Engel's countennajoritarian narrative is so strong, few
scholars have paused to consider whether the case in fact tells the story of Supreme Court decisionmaking for which it is famous. Thus far, only one law review article has dedicated its pages to the larger sociopolitical context in which
Engel was decided, and even there Engel is but a piece of a larger Establishment Clause history. 26 Still lacking is a robust account of the decisionmaking
in Engel: how larger sociopolitical forces influenced the case and its timing,
what the Justices thought when they decided it, why the nation reacted as it did,
and ultimately, what the case says about the Supreme Court's
countermajoritarian capacity. My aim is to provide such an account.
Using primary source materials, this Article reconstructs the story of Engel,
providing a dramatically different account of the case than that which appears
in the conventional script. The contribution is twofold. First, this Article challenges the prevailing view of Engel as proof of the Supreme Court's
countermajoritarian capacity. On the surface, Engel exudes judicial bravery, but
closer examination shows that to be a fai;ade. To the extent the Justices in Engel played a countermajoritarian role at all, they did so unwittingly. Indeed, all
indications are that if the Justices had known just how unpopular Engel would
be, they would not have taken the case in the first place.
Second, this Article brings to light what the surface appeal of Engel's
countermajoritarian narrative has eclipsed-a remarkably rich account of Supreme Court decisionmaking that furthers a number of conversations in constitutional law. Engel is a testament to the power of the 1950s ecumenical movement in generating constitutional change, adding a new thread to a burgeoning
body of scholarship in the "court and culture" literature. It shows the Justices
explicitly engaging in a dialogue with the American public, revealing a rare
"strong form" of the dialogic function of judicial review. It illustrates the variety of forms that popular constitutionalism might take, offering an opportunity to
think about qualitative differences in the way democratic dissent fosters constitutional discourse. And along the way it illuminates issues that are not at the
forefront of conversations in constitutional law, but perhaps should be: how the
media filters our perception of judicial review, what the support of highly educated cultural elites might say about an issue, and the ways in which messaging

26. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 280-81, 318-27 (2001). Three others offer substantial contributions that merit mention here. See Thomas C. Berg, The Story of the School Prayer Decisions: Civil Religion Under Assault, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 193, 196 (Richard w.
Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012) (telling a similar, albeit limited, story of Engel);
Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1, 46-62 (1996) (outlining the contours ofa historical understanding of the Establishment Clause and stating the need for legal scholarship in this area); Steven D. Smith, Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the School Prayer Decisions, 38 PEPP.
L. REv. 945, 1015-16 (2011) (discussing Engel's cultural backdrop as part of a larger discussion about its transfonnative significance in establishing a secularist constitutional conception of America).
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can matter. Engel offers a wealth of insights into Supreme Court
decisionmaking and the role of judicial review, but only once we have a robust
understanding of what happened in the case.
Before proceeding, a point of clarification merits mention. This Article is
not concerned with whether Engel was correctly decided; it is concerned with
why the Justices decided it. Nor is this Article concerned with doctrinal developments since Engel, at least after 1963. 27 I take Engel for the case it was, and
its broader implications for what contemporary observers understood them to
be. All that is to reiterate that this Article is about understanding the Justices'
decisionmaking in Engel, and explaining why, if the understanding I offer is
right, it was obscured by what happened in the aftermath of the case. Only by
understanding the decisionmaking in Engel can we begin to understand what its
contributions to constitutional theory are, and aren't.
The discussion proceeds as follows. Part I shows how history shaped Engel, tracing the major historical developments in the school prayer controversy,
situating the case against its larger sociopolitical backdrop, and examining the
Justices' decisionmaking in the case. Part II turns to the aftermath of Engel, detailing the events that occurred in Engel's wake, explaining why the nation reacted as it did, and presenting the Supreme Court's 1963 Bible reading decision
in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp 28 as an important part of
Engel's narrative. Part lll discusses the implications of this reconstructed account, rejecting the heroic, countennajoritarian narrative for which Engel is
famous and exploring the vastly underappreciated contributions it makes to a
number of other conversations in constitutional law. In the end, Engel is as important and instructive as it always was-just not for the reasons conventional
wisdom would have us think.
I.

How HISTORY SHAPED ENGEL

To understand Engel, one must first understand what happened before it.
This Part aims to provide that understanding, showing how history shaped Engel in various ways. 29 First, I explain how the controversy over school prayer
began. Then I show how the rise of religious pluralism made school prayer an
intractable problem by the mid-twentieth century, and how Cold War religiosity kept the ruling at bay until 1962. I conclude with an inside look at the Justices' decisionmaking in Engel, which seemed to them a relatively easy, uncontroversial case.
27. I do consider the Supreme Court's ruling in School District of Abington Township
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), but only because it sheds light on the heroic,
countcrmajoritarian narrative canonized in Engel. See infra Part 11.D.
28. 374 U.S. at 205, 207 (invalidating Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer
in public schools).
29. The account is necessarily simplistic. Religious and other changes over several
hundred years defy distillation without some glossing over of the nuances, crosscurrents, and
complications along the way.
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A. In the Beginning

In the beginning, school prayer was not controversial. The colonists may
have come to the New World to escape an established religion, but that did not
mean they were against religious establishment per se. To the contrary, most of
America's earliest settlers were staunch supporters of state-sponsored religion;
they just wanted it to be theirs. 30 Schools played an integral part in this endeavor, as they were the place where children learned to read religious doctrine. 31 Thus, from the start, children in the colonies practiced religious observances in school. Indeed, that was the very point.
America's independence and adoption of the First Amendment had no effect on this arrangement, 32 but immigration in the 1830s and 1840s did. Catholics and new strands of Protestants streamed into America, placing strain on the
communities already in place. 33 Schools seemed an ideal place to "American-

30. Nine of the thirteen original colonies had an established church. See LEONARD W.
LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT I, 5 (1994) (discussing establishments of religion in the colonies); Michael W. McConnell, Establishment at
the Founding, in No ESTABLISHMENT Of RELIGION: AMERICA'S ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 45, 45-47 (T. Jeremy Gunn & John Witte, Jr. eds., 2012) [hereinafter No
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION] (same).
31. See DONALD E. BOLES, THE BIBLE, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SCIIOOLS 6 (3d ed.
1965) ("[T]he motivating force behind public education in the American Colonies was to
enable the students to read the Bible and to become better versed in Protestant religious
dogma."); STEVEN K. GREEN, THE BIBLE, THE SCHOOL, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CLASH
THAT SHAPED MODERN CHURCH-STATE DOCTRINE 13 (2012) (noting that America's earliest
schools were "predominately religious (i.e., Protestant), with a heavy emphasis on reading
religious texts and memorizing religious doctrine"); STEPHEN D. SoWMON, ELLERY'S
PROTEST: How ONE YOUNG MAN DEFIED TRAD!TION & SPARKED THE BATTLE OVER SCHOOL
PRAYER 99-101 (2007) ("Most of the colonial and early nineteenth-century schools recognized religion as a primary goal of learning. At the very least, children had to become literate
in order to read the Bible and learn their prayers."). As Michael McConnell notes, by the
1780s, religious establishment was less about theology and more about the role ofreligion in
preserving morals for the good of society. McConnell, supra note 30, at 59-62. This civic
justification-the inculcation of morals-became the central justification for religious teaching in schools as well. For a discussion of the prayer in Engel as an example of that phenomenon, see note 95 and accompanying text below (noting the prayer's stated purpose as aiding
the spiritual and moral development of children in public schools).
32. The First Amendment reads, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion"; it says nothing about the states. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. fudced, debates in the First Congress make clear that the First Amendment's Establishment Clause was
intended only as a limit on the federal government, leaving the states to do as they pleased.
See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the
Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1088-89 (1995) ("[T]he original Establishment Clause was intended to prohibit federal power over the subject of religion, reserving the same to the states. In this way, the original Establishment Clause expressed the principle of federalism: The federal government could neither establish religion at the federal
level, nor disestablish religion in the states."); id at 1090-92 (citing debates in the state ratifying conventions and the First Congress to prove the point).
33. See BOLES, supra note 31, at 23 (discussing immigration in the 1830s and 1840s).
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ize" these immigrants, 34 but there was a hitch: the religious instruction was
sect-specific, alienating the newcomers. 35 The renowned Horace Mann, America's first state secretary of education and founder of our public school system, 36 had a solution. Keep religion in and differences out, he reasoned, by
teaching basic Christianity-only those features that all denominations had in
common. 37
Thus began the so-called "nonsectarian" approach to religion in public
schools. 38 Allow the Bible "to speak for itself," Mann famously quipped. 39
Schools could accommodate different denominations by reducing religious instruction to two components: Bible reading without commentary and school
prayer. 40
For Protestants, Bible reading and school prayer-typically the Lord's
Prayer, itself a form of Bible reading~worked well enough. 41 But such prac34. See SAMUEL WrNDSOR BROWN, THE StiCULARIZATfON OF AMERICAN EDUCAnON:
As SHOWN BY STATE LEGISLATION, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATE SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS 2 (Russell & Russell 1967) (1912) (discussing the importance of education as a means of "Americanizing the diverse racial and cultural elements composing our
population"). For a slightly darker articulation of the point, see Thomas C. Berg, Disestablishment from Blaine to Everson: Federalism, School Wars, and the Emerging Modern State,
in No ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGLON, supra note 30, at 307, 315 ("The proponents ofcommon
schools generally viewed Catholicism as a threat, seeing it as full of theological superstitions
and, because of its hierarchical structure and theology, as antidemocratic. The common, or
public, schools sought to 'Americanize' the immigrants and, by educating children of
Protestant denominations together, strengthen values of democracy and individual freedom
to which Protestantism was thought to be crucial.").
35. See BOLES, supra note 31, at 23-25; BROWN, supra note 34, at 2.
36. See JOAN DELFATTORE, THE FOURTH R: CONFLICTS OYER RELIGION IN AMERICA'S
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 14 (2004); see also BOLES, supra note 31, at 23 (describing Horace Mann
as "the father of the public school system in America").
37. See BOLES, supra note 31, at 24-27; Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 26, at 297-98.
38. See DELFATTORE, supra note 36, at 14 ("[T]he approach that soon became dominant in many states was the establishment of schools deemed 'nonsectarian' at the time, although by today's standards they would be better described as pan-Protestant."); JOHN
HERBERT LAUBACH, SCHOOL PRAYERS: CONGRESS, THE COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC 78 (1969)
("The concept of nonsectarianism was regarded as synonymous with 'common core religion,' 'common denominator religion,' 'civil or civic religion,' and 'public school religion."'). For a history of the common (i.e., public) school movement, see generally CARLF.
KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1780-1860
(1983).
39. See HORACE MANN, Report for 1848, in 3 LIFE AND WORKS OF MORACE MANN:
ANNUAL REPORTS ON EDUCATION 640, 729-30 (Ivlary Mann ed., Boston, Horace B. Fuller
1868) (emphasis omitted).
40. See SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 5, 131.
41. See id. (discussing recitation of the Lord's Prayer and Bible reading as the core of
nonsectarian religious practices in school); id. at 160 ("Reading the Bible without comment
had been a brilliant innovation in the 1840s by Horace Mann, ... who pleased various
Protestant factions by including the Bible in the curriculum while avoiding the commentary
that had caused bitter divisions in the past."). But see Douglas Laycock, "Noncoercive"
Support for Religion: Another False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L.
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tices were not "nonsectarian" for everyone. Catholics used the Douay version
of the Bible; schools (and Protestants) used the King James. 42 Catholics
thought Bible reading required the guiding hand of clergy; schools (and
Protestants) thought the Bible could speak for itself. 43
Catholics complained bitterly that so-called "nonsectarian" religious observances weren't. Protestants had their schools, they argued, so Catholics
should have theirs-complete with government funding. 44 The argument fell
flat. But the claim itself fed nativist fears and reprisals, adding to the tension
already mounting as Catholics resisted religious observances in school as best
they could. 45 Children were severely beaten, priests tarred and feathered. 46 Rioting in Cincinnati and Philadelphia left homes burned and dozens dead. 47
In the end, the notorious "Bible Wars" 48 only hardened nativist sentiment,
inciting a drive for a constitutional amendment to "[k]eep the church and state
forever separated" by prohibiting the use of public money for sectarian
schools. 49 The Blaine Amendment failed (barely), 50 but states passed "Baby

REV. 3 7, 51 (1991) (noting that the nonsectarian approach "was not entirely satisfactory even
among Protestants").
42. See Laycock, supra note 41, at 51 ("Catholics used the Douay translation of the
Bible, and objected to reading the King James translation, which they called 'the Protestant
Bible."'); infra note 43.
43. See DELP ATIORE, supra note 36, at 20-21 ("The [Catholic] Church defines itself as
the only true interpreter of the Bible, and the Catholic translation, known as the Douay Version, includes footnotes and commentary giving the Church's explanation of certain
texts .... [T]he bishops saw [Bible reading without commentary] as hostile to the Church's
assertion that even adults, let alone children, arc incompetent to interpret the Bible for themselves.").
44. See BROWN, supra note 34, at 157 (describing the view of "[t]hose who advocate
religious, sectarian schools" that "in educating the youth in such schools they are rendering
to the state a distinct service, and are relieving the state of an obligation and a burden, and
for this reason are entitled to stale assistance").
45. See DIERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 19-20 {"It was the Catholic drive for government funding of these schools that inflamed public opinion more than any other religious
issue in the nineteenth century.").
46. See DELFAITORt:, supra note 36, at 43-49 (discussing incidents).
47. For an in-depth discussion, see MICHAEL FELDBERG, THE PHILADELPHIA RIOTS OF
1844: A STUDY OF ETHNIC CONFLICT (1975); and GREEN, supra note 31, at 93-129 (discussing the Cincinnati "Bible War" of 1869-1873).
48. See SUSAN DUDLEY GoL.D, ENGEL v. VITALE: PRAYER IN THE SCl·IOOLS 49 (2006)
(discussing the tenn's origin in newspapers reporting on the Cincinnati riots).
49. BOI.ES, supra note 31, at 30-32 {discussing the Blaine Amendment of 1876 and
quoting President Grant's 1875 speech proposing it). For an argument that the Blaine
Amendment, which also sought to apply the First Amendment to the states, was more a nativist political ploy than a proposed change to contemporary understandings of church-state
relations, see Steven K. Green, The "Second Disestablishment": The Evolution of Nineteenth-Century Understandings of Separation of Church and State, in No ESTABLISHMENT OF
RELIGION, supra note 30, at 280, 298-99 (noting that the states had already fonnally disestablished religion by 1876, so incorporation would have changed nothing, and seventeen states
had already taken a no-funding stance toward parochial schools).
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Blaine" amendments in its wake, 51 and Congress required newly admitted
states to do the same. 52 \Vhcn Catholics pointed out that public money was already going to sectarian schools, they were met with a single response: they
were wrong. 53
By 1890, the principle of separation of church and state had become popularized over the school-funding controversy, but it was generally thought not to
apply to "nonsectarian" exercises like Bible reading and school prayer. 54 The
principle was, to borrow from historian Bruce Dierenfield, "soft on prayer,
tough on money" when applied to public schools. 55 Catholics continued to
complain, but not much changed until the dissenters became too loud, and numerous, to ignore. 56
B. The Rise ofReligious Pluralism
From the start, Protestantism had been the dominant cultural conception of
America's religious identity, the nation's de facto religious establishment after

50. See BOLES, supra note 31, at 31 (noting the Blaine Amendment's passage in the
House by a vote of 180 to 7); GREEN, supra note 31, at 220 (noting that the Blaine Amendment came four votes short of the necessary two-thirds in the Senate).
51. Seventeen states ~!ready had no-funding provisions in their constitutions by the
time the Blaine Amendment was proposed in 1876, and another twenty-one states would
adopt such provisions after 1876. Green, supra note 49, at 299; see Klarman, supra note 26,
at 53; see also BROWN, supra note 34, at 57-67 (listing twenty-nine state statutes enacted
since 1850 forbidding sectarian religious instruction in publicly funded schools); id at 10319 (listing forty-six state constitutional provisions forbidding the same). For a primer on the
history, language, and operation of state Blaine Amendments, see Kyle Duncan, Secularism's Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious Persecution, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 493
(2003).
52. See BOLES, supra note 31, at 32 (discussing federal legislation requiring new states
to adopt irrevocable ordinances that provided "for the establishment and maintenance of a
system of public schools which shall be open to all the children of said state and free from
sectarian control" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
53. See NOAH FELDMAN, DlVIDED BY Goo: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROALEMAND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT 85 (2005) ("Catholic objections that nonsectarianism
did not include them were met with little more than the naked insistence that it did."),
54. The Senate version of the Blaine Amendment made this point explicitly. See 4
CONG. REC. 5453 (1876) ("This article shall not be construed to prohibit the reading of the
Bible in any school or institution, .. .");see also BOLES, supra note 31, at 48 ("The majority
of states ... tended to regard Rib le reading without comment, as nonsectarian religious or
moral instruction."); Green, supra note 49, at 293-94 (discussing popularization of the idea
of separation of church and state).
55. DIERENFIELD, supra note l 4, at 31.
56. Only two state courts ruled against Bible reading and/or school prayer prior to
1910. See Bd. of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 238, 241-43 (1872) {upholding an 1869
decision by the Cincinnati school board to abolish Bible reading ~d school prayer in public
schools); State ex rel. Weiss v. Dist. Bd., 44 N.W. 967, 976 (Wis. 1890) {striking down Bible reading in public schools under the state constitution).
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formal disestablishment. 57 That conception changed sometime between 1880
and 1930, when approximately 27 million newcomers arrived on America's
shores. 58
The influx of Catholics alone was staggering. In 1850, the Catholic population in the United States was around 1.6 million. 59 By 1900, it was 12 miJJion,
and by 1930, it was 24 million. 60 By the mid-1950s, the Catholic population
was more than 31 million, and Catholicism was the single largest denomination
in the United States. 61
That said, the impact of Catholics on America's sociopolitical landscape
was not just about the numbers. Catholic immigrants assimilated rapidly, coming into their own by the 1920s and 1930s with substantial social and economic
clout. 62 With that clout came political power as well-power to decide elections, power to hold cabinet positions, and power to secure state aid for parochial schools on matters such as textbooks and bus transportation. 63
These developments, in turn, led to a second spike in Catholic-Protestant
tensions by the late 1940s 64-this time a reflection of Protestant "status anxiety" over Catholic power in a pre-Vatican II world. 65 Once again, the tension
galvanized popular support for the separation of church and state. 66 It was dur-

57. Fonnal disestablishment ofreligion occurred in the states between 1776 and 1883;
this is what Steven Green calls the "first disestablishment." The transformation he calls the
"second disestablishment" is the subject of this Part-the fall of the de facto Protestant establishment that remained. See Green, supra note 49, at 280-84 (discussing both). For an excellent discussion of the second disestablishment, see generally STEVEN K. GREEN, THE
SECOND DISESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH AND STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2010).
58. SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 127.
59. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 26, at 299.
60. Id. at 299-300. Measured in percentage terms, Catholics went from around 5% of
the total population in 1850 to around 17% by 1906; they would remain at 16% for the next
two decades. ROGER FrNKE & RODNEY STARK, THE CHURCHING OF AMERICA, 1776-1990:
WINNERS AND LOSERS IN OUR RELIGIOUS ECONOMY 112-13 (1992).
61. See Six out of Ten, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 30, 1954, at 57, 57.
62. As Michael Klarman has discussed, World War I and the integration and growth
that followed in the interwar period directly contributed to this phenomenon. See Kl=n,
supra note 26, at 50-53.
63. By 1947, twenty-two states authorized the public funding of bus transportation to
parochial schools. Id. at 52-54 (discussing various manifestations of political power).
64. See Berg, supra note 34, at 333-34. For a famously nativist response, see PAUL
BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER (1949).
65. Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 LOY.
u. CHI. L.J. 121, 132-38 (2001) (quoting RICHARD E. MORGAN, THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS
CONFLICT: CHURCH AND STATE JN AMERICA 27 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(discussing the reasons for heightened anti-Catholic fears in the 1940s, including the Catholic Church's stance on various issues prior to the announcement of the Second Vatican
Council in 1959); see Berg, supra note 34, al 334 (same).
66. See JOHN T. MCGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERJCAN FREEDOM: A HISTORY 168
(2003) (discussing "mid-twentieth-century fears of Catholic power" and their influence on
"postwar American liberalism," which "included the insistence that religion, as an entirely
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ing this time that the Supreme Court incorporated the Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protections, constitutionalizing the
"wall of separation between church and State" that had come to epitomize
proper church-state relations (and the standard response to Catholic demands)
for over a hundred years. 67
Compared to Catholics, Jews constituted a relatively tiny portion of the
population in the United States-just 0.5% in the 1880s and 3% by 1930 68but they, too, were quick to assimilate and establish themselves in positions of
influence and power. 69 Then came the Holocaust. Americans saw the unspeakable atrocities of extreme anti-Semitism and made a sharp ideological tum. 70
American anti-Semitism, which had been rampant in the 1920s and 1930s (itself a response to rising Jewish influence and power) fell dramatically. 71 And
Jewish claims of religious freedom "gained special resonance" with the American public. 72 Jews may not have had the numbers, but as John Jeffries and Jim
Ryan put the point, they "laid an equal claim to America's conscience." 73
The nation's newfound sensitivity to Jewish claims of religious freedom
likewise posed a problem for religious observances in public schools, which
alienated Jews even more than Catholics. 74 Jews did not recognize the New

private matter, must be separated from the state"); Berg, supra note 65, at 122, 124-26, 14748 (discussing the best-seller status and rave reviews of Paul Blanshard's book, BLANSHARD,
supra note 64, and popular support for the separation of church and state as a response to the
threat of Catholic power); Sarah Barringer Gordon, "Free" Religion and "Captive" Schools:
Protestants, Catholics, and Education, 1945-1965, 56 DEPAUL L. R.Ev. 1177, 1178-79, l 192,
1205 (2007) (discussing how the discoveiy of "captive schools" in the late 1940s-schools
that were public but infused with parochial markings, often with nuns teaching in full habit-galvanized Protestant politicism in support of the separation of church and state).
67. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 15-18 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)) (internal quotation mark omitted) (incorporating the Establishment Clause and endorsing a strong separation of church and state while upholding public funding of bus transportation to parochial schools); see Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd.
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 205-06, 212 (1948) (invalidating an early-release program for religious instruction on school grollllds). As Thomas Berg has explained, disestablishment had
been viewed as a fundamental right since the antebellum period, so incorporation had little
immediate effect and was treated by the Justices in Everson as almost a given. See Berg, supra note 34, at 307-12.
68. Klarman, supra note 26, at 49. In terms of sheer numbers, the Jewish population in
the United States was less than 250,000 in the 1880s, and just over 4.2 million in 1927. Id.
69. See id. at 51-53 (discussing the economic strides of the Jewish population and the
concomitant social and political gains).
70. See id. at 54-56 (discussing Americans' ideological tum in response to Nazi antiSemitism).
71. See id.
72. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 26, at 308.
73. Id.
74. See SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 158 (quoting a rabbi as stating in the Schempp trial, "I don't want to step on anybody's toes but the idea of God having a son is, from the
viewpoint of Jewish faith, practically blasphemous" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Testament, which meant they did not recognize the Lord's Prayer. 75 In fact,
they did not recognize much of anything about Horace Mann's compromise
approach to Christianity-they weren't Christian.
By the mid-twentieth century, Protestants could no longer claim a preeminent position in the nation's faith hierarchy; the reign of Protestantism as
America's de facto religious establishment had come to an end. 76 In its place,
the "three great faiths"-Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism-emerged as
the dominant religious identities in America, 77 and even they had to make
room. By the mid-1950s, eighteen religious denominations had over a million
members, 78 while eighty-three had more than 50,000 members. 79 Pluralism
reigned.
With the rise of religious pluralism came two sociopolitical responses. One
was an interest in religious toleration, accommodation, and standardization.
This was the 1950s ecumenical movement, the same force that produced the
National Council of Churches and numerous other interdenominational organizations during this time. 80 "Modem man .... feels that people should have denominational connections, but also a deep sense of religious give-and-take for
the beliefs of others," wrote Better Homes and Gardens in 1956, adding that
the concept of"ecumenicity, which means universality, is now in operation." 81
75. See ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURR~NT

FICTION 162 (1982) ("The 'Lord's Prayer' is distinctively a Christian prayer, the
most commonly used recitation of which is found in the New Testament Gospel attributed to
Matthew.").
76. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 26, at 297; Klarman, supra note 26, at 56-58.
77. See WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN
REUGIOUS SOCIOLOGY 53-54 (1955); RICHARD E. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND
RELIGION 125 (1972) ("[TJhe mid-1940's was increasingly referred to as a distillation of
'Three Great Faiths."'). For a discussion of the term "Judea-Christian" as the "new national
creed" by the early 1950s, see MARK SILK, SPIRITUAL POLITICS: RELIGION AND AMERICA
SINCE WORLD WARII, at 40-53 (1988).
78. Six out of Ten, supra note 61, at 57.
79. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (l 963) (noting census
data); see also FINKE & STARK, supra note 60, at 199 (noting the existence of 258 separate
church denominations in America as of 1959).
80. See Roswell P. Barnes, The Ecumenical Movement, 332 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. SCI. 135, 136 (1960) ("[T]he ecumenical movement is the trend toward unity among
the Christians ofthc world .... The movement is much broader than its organized manifestations."); Marcus Bach, Whal 's Happening on Church Street, US.A.?, BETTER HOMES &
GARDENS, Oct. 1956, at 74, 154 (discussing the thirty-denomination National Council of the
Churches of Christ, sixty-denomination National Association of Evangelicals, and over-fiftydenomination American Council of Christian Churches); The Spirit: A Time to Be Stern,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 14, 1959, at 121, 122 (predicting that "the ecumenical movement will continue to flourish"). For additional contemporary discussions of the ecumenical movement,
see generally THE ECUMENICAL ERA IN CHURCH AND SOCIETY: A SYMPOSIUM IN HONOR OF
JOHN A. MACKAY (Edward J. Jurji ed., 1959); and ROBERT LEE, THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF
CHURCH UNITY: AN INTERPRETATION OF UNITIVE MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM
(1960).
81. Bach, supra note 80, at 154 (emphasis omitted).
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What the ecumenical movement brought was what religious pluralism arguably
required: building bridges between religions rather than disparaging differences.
Naturally, not everyone agreed. While ecumenicals celebrated being "interreligious in the best American tradition," 82 traditionalists lamented the ecumenical movement as a step toward civic religion-"religion-in-general, superficial
and syncretistic, destructive of the profounder elements of faith." 83 Some things
were simply too important for give-and-take.
The second sociopolitical response, which was fueled in part by dissatisfaction with the first, was public secularism-a natural extension of the principle of separation of church and state that had long been in play. This sort of
secularism was neither anti-Catholic nor antireligious. It was instead a view
that the perils of religious pluralism were best navigated by creating room:
move religion out of shared space, where it was sure to offend, and into the private sphere, where its expression was most sincere and its practice least encumbered by the need to accommodate others. 84
Naturally, this separatist response also assuaged lingering fears about
Catholic power. John F. Kennedy's successful 1960 presidential campaign was
a testament to this power, along with the need to assure the public that it would
not be put to Catholic use. In a 1960 speech, Kennedy put the matter to rest using the principle Americans had come to know and trust:
I believe in an America where the separation of church and state is absolute ....
1 believe in an America that is officially neither Catholic, Protestant nor
Jewish ... -where no religious body seeks to impose its will directly or indirectly upon the general populace ....

. . . No rd~~ious group should be given special preference or advantage by
the state ....

In a land where pluralism reigned, Kennedy and others believed that the best
stance the state could take toward religion was no stance at all.
The same two responses--ecumenicalism and public secularism-were also playing out in America's public schools, where the pressures of religious
pluralism made even "lowest common denominator" Protestant practices deeply problematic. By 1962, when the Supreme Court decided Engel, 9 states no

82. Id.

83. Perils ofFreedom, TIME, Aug. 4, 1958, at 53, 53 (internal quotation mark omitted)
(quoting William Lee Miller, a Presbyterian and a professor of divinity at Yale).
84. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 26, at 28 l, 308-11.
85. Senator John F. Kennedy, Speech to Protestant Ministers and Laymen

(Sept. 12, 1960), reprinted in Both Sides of the "Catholic Issue," U.S. NEWS &
Sept. 26, 1960, at 74, 79.
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longer allowed religious observances in public schools, 86 and where allowed, 87
the practice in large parts of the country had already died out on its own. 88
Even the 12 states that required school religious observances in 1962 presented
a complicated picture. In almost all of those states-11 of the 12-legislation
requiring religious observances was passed in an apparent (and sometimes explicit) attempt to entrench such practices before the pressures of religious diversity led school boards to abandon them. 89 The status quo was on its heels.
The regional variance was just as one might expect. In the South, 89% of
public school districts practiced religious observances prior to Engel, no surprise for a region known as the Bible Belt. 90 And in the Northeast, 80% of public school districts did so-again no surprise given the region's deeply religious
colonial customs. 91
Outside these two areas of the country, however, a different baseline prevailed. In the Midwest, only 26% of public school districts practiced religious
observances, while in the West, only 9% did so. 92 Indeed, a number of commentators in the 1950s and early 1960s described America's schools as largely
secularist, "even militantly so." 93 In parts of the country, they were wrong
about that. But in much of the country, they were right.
86. See DELfATTORE, supra note 36, at 53 (listing the states that had already forbidden
religious observances in school at the time of Engel as Alaska, Arizona, California, Illinois,
Louisiana, Nebraska, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
87. In 1962, 25 states allowed Bible reading either officially or through silence on the
subject. See SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 129-30.
88. See BRUCE T. MURRAY, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: THE FIRST AMENDMENT
IN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORAR y PERSPECTIVE 98 (2008) ("But as immigration continued,
pressure from the increasingly diverse population mounted on public schools, and administrators voluntarily began eliminating Bible study."); Berg, supra note 26, at 196 ("But
recognition was also growing that such exercises were religiously partial, which occasionally
led courts to invalidate them-and more often led school districts to discontinue them.").
89. See SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 129-30 (discussing Pennsylvania's 1913 mandatory Bible reading statute, passed "to preserve at least this last remnant of religion in the
schools against the tide of immigrants," and the similar state statutes that followed "to enshrine the practice in law before local school boards could do away with it under the pressure
of religious diversity"). As one supporter of legislation supporting mandatory Bible reading
stated, "[W]e are seeking no change. We are resisting a change which amounts to a revolution." GREEN, supra note 31, at 237-38 (internal quotation mark omitted) (concluding that
"[w]itnesses and observers alike understood the proposal for what it was: an effort not simply to forestall the secularization of public education but to reverse it").
90. SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 130; see also H. Frank Way, Jr., Survey Research on
Judicial Decisions: The Prayer and Bible Reading Cases, 21 W. POL. Q. 189, 199 (1968)
(discussing regional variances).
91. SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 130; see also Way, supra note 90, at 199.
92. SOLOMON, supra note 3 1, at 13 0.
93. Will Herberg, The Sectarian Conflict over Church & State: A Divisive Threat to
Our Democracy?, 14 COMMENTARY 450, 451 (1952) ("[P]ublic school education ... is no
longer religious, neither Catholic, nor Protestant, nor Jewish; it is, by and large, secularist,
even militantly so."); see also VIRGIL c. BLUM, FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN EDUCATION 109
(1958) ("The state is imposing the secularist religion upon all public school children.");
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Where religious observances remained in America's schools, the ecumenical movement began watering down what was left. The ~chool prayer at issue
in Engel-called the "Regents' Prayer" for the New York Board of Regents
that adopted it 94-provides a rich example of this phenomenon. The Regents'
Prayer was the product of an interdenominational committee whose mission
was to draft a nonsectarian, ecumenical prayer to support the spiritual and moral development of children in New York's public schools. 95 At just twenty-two
words, it is worth repeating in full: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our
teachers and our Country." 96
When the Regents' Prayer was proposed in 1951, critics called it "an empty formality with little, if any, spiritual significance," a pra~er so devoid of content that it might just work against the inculcation of faith. 7 Echoing the point,
Yale Law School professor Louis Pollak later blasted the Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari in Engel, writing in the Harvard Law Review in 1963:
New York's attempt to write a prayer had produced such a pathetically vacuous assertion of piety as hardly to rise to the dignity of a religious exercise.
The Court might very reasonably have decided to save its scarce ammunition
for a ~rayer that soared, rather than squander it on New York's clay-footed pigeon. 8

Robert Coughlan, Religion and the Schools, LIFE, June 16, 1961, at 110, 121 {"Bible-reading
has disappeared from a majority of the public schools. For practical purposes the secularization of the American public school is very far advanced."); Engel v Vitale, NEW REPUBLIC,
July 9, 1962, at 3, 4 ("By and large public schools have in recent years tried to be not only
non-denominational but secular.").
94. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422-23 (1962).
95. See id.; DELFATIORE, supra note 36, at 69 ("[T}he New York State Board of Regents, which oversees public education in that state, appointed a committee of Protestant,
Catholic, and Jewish clergy to compose a prayer .... [T]he Regents asked the committee to
be sure that the prayer was devoid of sectarian doctrine and entirely inoffensive.").
96. Engel, 370 U.S. at 422 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Editorial, Prayers in Public Schools Opposed, 69 CHRJSTIAN CENTURY 35, 35
(1952) ("[A Jn observance of this sort is likely to deteriorate quickly into an empty formality
with little, if any, spiritual significance. Prescribed forms of this sort ... can actually work
against the inculcation of vital religion."); see also Parochial Puzzle, TIME, May 18, 1959, at
80, 83 (quoting a critic as stating, "I consider religion to be much too important in hum.an
history to see it reduced to a patriotic exercise in the classroom" (internal quotation marks
omitted)); "To Stand as a Guarantee," TIME, July 6, 1962, at 7, 7 {discussing denouncements of the Regents' Prayer when it was adopted, including the claim that it was "an abomination" because it did not mention Christ (internal quotation marks omitted)). As one theologian stated, "A prayer which is the product of a blind, sentimental enthusiasm and
therefore conceals or smoothes over differences in themselves divisive is indefensible ....
To portray God, in prayer, as the good-natured old man accessible to all on any terms is to
bely the Father of our Lord, Jesus Christ." To Pray or Not to Pray, TIME, Aug. 8, 1960, at
63, 63 (internal quotation mark omitted).
98. Louis H. Pollak, The Supreme Courl 1962 Term-Foreword: Public Prayers in
Public Schools, 77 HARV. L. REv. 62, 63 (1963 ).
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Students had said that school prayer was like "peeing-you just do it; it has no
meaning." 99 And ecumenical "to whom it marr concern" recitations like the
Regents' Prayer in Engel were making it worse. 00
In short, the rise of religious pluralism made school prayer an intractable
problem by 1962. Mid-twentieth-century America had too many religions to
devise a prayer that would suit everyone-and the harder one tried, the closer
one came to a perfunctory ritual that was more trouble than it was worth. As a
state-sponsored religious exercise, school prayer had become (to borrow from a
1970s tune) "too much, too little, too late." 101
C. The Fall cf Cold War Religiosity
Thus far, I have framed Engel in light of the religious diversity that marked
mid-twentieth-century America. But at the same time that pluralism was making its mark on the sociopolitical landscape, another force was making a mark
of its own: the Cold War. The Cold War figures prominently in the story of Engel in two ways. First, the Cold War replaced concerns about Catholic power
with concerns about Communist power, easing interfaith tensions at home. 102
Indeed, Cold War nationalism is almost certainly what gave rise to the ecumenical movement in the first place. 103 Second, and the focus of the discussion
99. DJER£NFIELD, supra note 14, at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Ellory Schempp); see also id at 95 (quoting Steven Engel as being opposed to the prayer
because "[i]t's sacred, and when you rattle these things off and they have no meaning to it at
all, I mean, you vitiate the value ofreligion" (internal quotation mark omitted)).
100. Id. at 130 (referring to Justice Black's view of the Regents' Prayer as "a bland entreaty addressed 'to whom it may concern"').
101. The phrase is common, but at the risk of revealing my nerdy penchant for 1970s
music, I confess that it was the 1978 duet by Johnny Mathis and Deniece Williams that
brought it to mind. If church leaders had written a farewell ballad to school prayer, the opening lines to this 1978 hit are just what they would have said. For those too young (sadly) to
know what I am talking about, see Chinazo2007, Johnny Mathis & Deniece Williams-Too
Much Too Little Too Late, YouTUBE (Apr. 18, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IM
39ylKoSo4. See also DELFATIORE, supra note 36, at 71 (noting "competing assertions that
the Regents' Prayer included too much doctrine to be nonsectarian and too little to be meaningful").
102. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STILE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 80 (1965) ("(l]n the grand ecumenicism of their anti-Communist passion they
welcome all allies. They are particularly happy to have made tenns with the Catholics .... That the Whore of Babylon now sits in Moscow, not Rome, is to their incalculable
advantage, for they have been able to turn a powerful domestic foe, the Church, into an ally ....").
103. It is hard to imagine that the ecumenical movement's timing in the 1950s was mere
fortuity. What does society do when religion is of utmost importance, but pluralism reigns?
It finds a way to make room, which is what the ecumenical movement was all about. For an
illustration of this phenomenon, see President-elect Eisenhower's famous statement from
1952, "[O]ur fonn of government has no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious
faith, and I don't care what it is." President-Elect Dwight D. Eisenhower, Eisenhower Address (Dec. 22, 1952), reprinted in N.Y. HERAW TRrn., Dec. 23, 1952, at 8.
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here, the Cold War brought with it a surge in religiosity, rendering anything religious virtually unassailable for almost a decade.
By the early 1950s, the Cold War was cold indeed. McCarthyism gripped
the country, triggering a Red Scare as intense fears of Communist control and
influence dominated the American psyche. 104 Obsessed with distinguishing
themselves from "godless communism," 105 Americans flocked to the one thing
that proved democracy different, as well as right and true-religion.
Religion was the place where American patriotism played out in the
1950s. 106 It was the embodiment of American identity, proof positive of democracy's virtue. As one magazine ~ut the point, "Religion in America is an
endorsement of the American way." 1 7
And what an endorsement it was. In the mid- l 950s, Congress adopted "In
God we trust" as the national motto, 108 instituted a national daJ' of prayer, 109
and added the words "under God" to the Pledge of Allegiance. 11 The President
held prayer breakfasts. 111 Church membership soared. 112 And school prayer

104. For a primer on McCarthyism and American anti-Communism more generally, see
ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: McCARTHYISM IN AMERICA (1998).
105. Thomas Aiello, Constructing "Godless Communism": Religion, Politics, and
Popular Culture, 1954-1960, AMERICANA: J. AM. POPULAR CULTURE (1900-PRESENT)
(Spring 2005), http://www.americanpopularculture.com/jouma1Jarticles/spring_2005/aiello
.htm; see also DtERENFlELD, supra note 14, at 68 (noting that the governor of New York,
Thomas Dewey, "quickly endorsed" the Regents' Prayer "as an essential means of defeating
'the slave world of godless communism'"); FRANK J. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF CHURCH AND STATE 13 (1976) ("[T]he enemy came to be
known-positively, if a bit redundantly-as 'godless atheistic communism.'").
106. See DELF'ATTORE, supra note 36, at 68 ("Since the Soviet Union was closely identified with atheism while most Americans considered themselves a religious people, belief in
God came to symbolize the difference between democracy and totalitarianism.");
DlERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 64-65 ("For many Americans, the best defense against Soviet
aggression was not political, economic, or even military mobilization, but open expression of
religious conviction."). For a vivid example of how Cold War religiosity drove foreign policy decisions, at times with disastrous results, see SETH JACOBS, AMERICA'S MIRACLE MAN IN
VIETNAM: NGO DINH DIEM, RELIGION, RACE, AND U.S. INTERVENTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA,
1950-1957 (2004).
107. Bach, supra note 80, at 74; see also SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF
THE LAW: RELIGIOUS VOICES AND THE CONSTITUTION lN MODERN AMERICA 54 (2010) ("By
the 1950s, the 'American Way' was anchored firmly to the three great religious groups in
America.").
108. See Act ofJuly 30, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-851, 70 Stat. 732 (codified as amended at
36 U.S.C. § 302 (2013)).
109. See Act of Apr. 17, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-324, 66 Stat. 64 (codified as amended at
36 u.s.c. § 119).
11 O. See Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 Stat. 234 (codified as amended at
4 U.S.C. § 4 (2013)). President Eisenhower signed the bill on June 14, 1954--Flag Day.
GORDON, supra note 107, at 47.
J 11. See Smith, supra note 26, at 951. The National Prayer Breakfast "has taken place
since 1953 and every U.S. president since Dwight D. Eisenhower has participated in the
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was conducted in new, previously secular areas of the country. 113 Religious
books became best sellers-including l 952's Revised Standard Version of the
Bible 114-and "Dial-a-Prayer" became so popular that telephone companies
had to add extra lines. 115 In 1954, Ideal Toy Company announced a new product in response to "the resurgence of religious feeling and practice in America
today": a doll with jointed knees so it could pray. 116 In the mid-l 950s, a whopping ninety-six percent of Americans professed to have faith in God, rendering
religion not just a belief but a national phenomenon as well. 117
Given the surge in Cold War religiosity, it is hard to imagine the Supreme
Court invalidating school prayer in the 1950s, or any other religious practice
for that matter-and it didn't. From 1953 to 1961, the Court did not decide a
single First Amendment case in the area of religion. 118 Indeed, the Justices
passed by o~portunities to strike down school religious observances in 1952
and 1954, 11 when doing so would have taken real judicial courage. Prior to
Engel, the Court's last word on religion in school was 1952's Zorach v.
Clauson, which upheld early-release programs for off-site religious study. 120
Ironically, it was Justice Douglas, a staunch supporter of the separation of
church and state, who penned the opinion's famous line, "We are a religious

breakfast." Macon Phillips, "This Is My Hape. This Is My Prayer.," WHITE HOUSE BLOG
(Feb. 5, 2009, 12:08 PM EST), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog_post/this_is_my_prayer.
112. Mighty Wave over the US., LIFE, Dec. 26, 1955, at 46, 46-4 7 ("Nearly I 00 million
Americans-three of every five-belong[] to some Christian church."); Task far the
Churches, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 5, 1959, at 65, 65 (noting that church attendance in 1958 was at
an "all-time high" of "50.5 million adults in an average week"); Jonah B. Wise, Survey of a
Half Century of Religion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1954, § 6 (Magazine), at 17 (comparing the
percentage of the population having membership in religious institutions over the first sever·
al decades of the twentieth century and noting the midcentury spike).
113. See SoRAUF, supra note 105, at 14.
114. See Eugene Carson Blake, Is the Religious Boom a Spiritual Bust?, LoOK, Sept.
20, 1955, at 27, 29 ("More than one million copies of the Revised Standard Version of the
Bible were sold in its first three months of publication."); see also SORAUF, supra note 105,
at 13 (noting that four of 1953's top ten sellers were religious books and that seven religious
leaders graced the cover of Time magazine between 1951 and 1954).
115. See Dial a Prayer, NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1955, at 23, 23.
116. Words & Works, TlME, Sept. 20, 1954, at 65, 65 (internal quotation marks omit·
ted).
117. See DIERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 65 (discussing the results of a 195 7 Gallup poll
and its breakdown offonnal religious affiliations between Protestants, Catholics, and Jews);
Blake, supra note 114, at 29 ("'I've got religion' has become a national phenomenon.").
118. See LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 39.
119. See Gideons Int'! v. Tudor, 348 U.S. 816 (1954), denying cert. to Tudor v. Bd. of
Educ., 100 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1953); Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1952)
(dismissing appeal for lack of standing because by the time the case reached the Supreme
Court, the plaintiff's child had graduated, leaving only taxpayer status as a basis for standing, which the Court held was insufficient).
120. 343 U.S. 306, 311-12 (1952).
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people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." 121 In the early to mid·
1950s, that was aii one needed to say.
But the world was a different place by 1962. The Cold War continued with
the Berlin crisis, the Bay of Pigs invasion, and, after Engel, the Cuban Missile
Crisis, 122 but by the late 1950s, McCarthyism was dead (as was McCarthy
himself) 123 and religiosity had peaked. Contemporary commentators pegged
1958 as the year that Cold War religiosity began to wane, 124 and the difference
was palpable. In 1955, Newsweek had reported on the resurgence of religiosity
in America, noting that "[a]n attack on religion is regarded by most Americans
as an attack on the basic values by which the nation lives." 125 In 1959, the
same magazine reported on the reemergence of religious criticism in America,
noting that "[r]eligion always grows fat and vulgar and obscene when its
strength is unquestioned." 126 By 1962, commentators were questioning whether there had been a religious revival at all, surmising that religion had just been
a proxy for anti·Communist sentiment. 127 Whatever it was, it was on the decline by the late 1950s, giving the Justices what they needed most to take an·
other First Amendment religion case--room.

D. For the Justices, a Relatively Easy Case
For engendering so much controversy, Engel was remarkably uncontroversial among the Justices who decided it. The Supreme Court was down two
members at the time-Justice Frankfurter had collapsed just days after oral arguments in the case, and Justice White, who had been nominated to fill Justice

121. Id. at 313. The irony did not go unnoticed. See id. at 325 (Jackson, J., dissenting)
("Today's judgment will be more interesting to students of psychology and of the judicial
processes than to students of constitutional law."). For Justice Douglas's expression of his
staunchly separatist views in Engel, see notes 227-29 and accompanying text below.
122. See generally MARTIN WALKER, THE COLD WAR: A HISTORY (1993). The Cuban
Missile Crisis occurred in October 1962. See id at 171. Engel was decided in June.
123. The Senate censured McCarthy in December 1954. See McCARTHYISM: THE
GREAT AMERICAN RED SCARE 178, 179-80 (Albert Fried ed., 1997) (discussing McCarthy's
censure in 1954 and death in 1957).
124. See Task for the Churches, supra note 112, at 65 (describing 1958 as "the year
when 'the "revival of religion" had begun to wane"' (quoting Editorial, The Year the Revival
Passed Crest, 75 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1499, 1499 (1958))).
125. Americans and Religion: State of the New Revival as Billy Graham, Niebuhr, and
laFarge See It, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 26, 1955, at 44, 44.
126. See Task/or the Churches, supra note 112, at 65 (quoting Editorial, supra note
124, at 1500).
127. See, e.g., Editorial, Keeping the Pews Filled, 192 NATION 491, 491 (1961) ("There
has not been a religious or spiritual revival; more people have attended church merely because it was the correct thing to do, showed one's opposition to atheistic communism, and
gave one a certain social status.").
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Whittaker's open seat, had not yet been confirmed. 128 But the Court in Engel
had little trouble deciding the case without them. The Justices voted to strike
down the prayer 6 to 1, and even Justice Stewart, the lone dissenter, was initially undecided. 129 Conservative Justices Harlan and Clark both voted with the
majority in Engel, and Justice Frankfurter, who led the conservative bloc, had
stated his intention to vote that way as well. 130 With even the conservatives in
agreement, the Justices did not need a full bench to strike down school prayer.
As far as Supreme Court controversies went, Engel was a relatively easy case.
Granted, the vote in Engel could have disguised a much more difficult
decisionmaking process, but notes from the Supreme Court's conference discussions indicate that this was not the case. Engel required little discussion in
conference, which began with Chief Justice Warren noting that the state had
"practically conceded" a violation of the Establishment Clause. 131 No one was
denying that the Regents' Prayer was a religious exercise-it was prayer, after
all-and no one was denying that the state wrote it. 132 School officials were
telling children what to prar, where, and when; even the name of the prayer
bore the mark of the state. 13 The Court's prior Establishment Clause decisions
had not been a model of clarity, 134 but they did not need to be to decide Engel.
Whatever else the Establishment Clause prohibited, it at least prohibited the
state from drafting a prayer and asking schoolchildren to pray it.

128. See SAM DUKER, THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND RELIGION: THE LEGAL CONTEXT 158
(1966); see also Gow, supra note 48, at 81 ("On April 5, two days after the arguments had
been heard, Frankfurter collapsed at his desk and was rushed to the hospital. After a lengthy
leave of absence, ... [he] resigned from the Court in August of that year.").
129. See SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note I 6, at 424 (noting that all the Justices in conference voted to reverse except for Justice Stewart, who stated, "I am still in
doubt, and am not at rest").
130. See id
131. Id (quoting Chief Justice Warren in conference).
132. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962) ("The nature of such a prayer has
always been religious, none of the respondents has denied this ... .");Engel v Vitale, supra
note 93, at 4 ("Once having decided to hear Engel v Vitale it is difficult to see how the Court
could have reached a substantially different decision. The case posed the clear-cut issue of a
prayer drafted by a state government and prescribed by certain local bodies.").
133. See DTERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 91 (quoting one of the plaintiffs in Engel as
saying, "My basic feeling was that if the state could tell us what to pray and when to pray
and how to pray, that there was no stopping").
134. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311-12, 315 (1952) (upholding an carlyrelease program for off-site religious study); Illinois ex rel. McCotlum v. Bd. of Educ., 333
U.S. 203, 209-10 (1948) (invalidating an early-release program for religious instruction on
school grounds); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1947) (endorsing strong separation of church and state while upholding public funding of bus transportation to parochial
schools); see also WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: AMERICA'S FOUNDATION IN
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 196-200 (2003) (discussing the incoherence that marked the Supreme
Court's three Establishment Clause cases prior to Engel and likening Justice Douglas's position in particular to "the homeward journey of a New Year's Eve reveler").
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This is not to say there were no arguments the other way. The state had argued that children could be excused from the prayer-and they could, more or
less 135-but the Justices found the claim inapposite. The problem in Engel was
that the state had written the prayer, and excusing those who objected did nothing to change that fact. 136 Similarly, the Justices rejected the claim that invalidating the Regents' Prayer would deny the free exercise rights of those who
wanted to pray. 137 If students wanted to pray, they could pray, the Justices
maintained. What the Establishment Clause forbid was using the arm of the
state to help. 138
If any aspect of Engel was difficult, it was the implications of the case.
God's name was on the nation's coins and paper money, in the Pledge of Allegiance, and at the start of new sessions in court-including the U.S. SuEreme
Court. 139 Justice Douglas struggled with these line-drawing difficulties, 40 but
among the Justices in the majority, he appears to have been the only one. It was
one thing to "speak of God with reverence," Chief Justice Warren reasoned in
conference, and quite another to recite a state-composed prayer in school. 141 At

135. See Brief for Petitioners at 23-24, 31-32, Engel, 370 U.S. 421 (No. 468), 1962 WL
115797 (arguing that because the prayer was only twenty-two words long, nonparticipating
students usually stayed in the classroom; indeed, the prayer was about over by the time those
who wanted to leave reached the door); Anthony Lewis, The Prayer Decision, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 1962, at 17 ("[S]tudents could be excused from participating only at the risk of labeling themselves nonconfonnists-'pariahs,' as the complaining parents put it."); see also
Editorial, Religious Neutrality, WASH. POST, June 18, 1963, at Al6 (noting in the wake of
Schempp that "even though individual children may be excused from the observance if they
are willing to undergo the embarrassment of such nonconformity, the practice entails an inescapable element of coercion").
136. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 430. Excusal mattered in the free speech context, see W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943), but Engel was not a case
about free speech-it was about state-sponsored religion. See Oral Argument, supra note 21,
at 42: 17 (distinguishing Barnette during oral arguments in Engel).
137. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 433-34 ("It has been argued that to apply the Constitution in
such a way as to prohibit state laws respecting an establishment ofrcligious services in public schools is to indicate a hostility toward religion or toward prayer. Nothing, of course,
could be more wrong.").
138. See id.; see also Sch. Dist of Abington T\.VJJ. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226
(1963) ("While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the
rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery
of the State to practice its beliefs.").
139. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 446, 449 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
140. See Memorandum from Justice William 0. Douglas to Justice Hugo L. Black
(June 11, 1962) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) ("If, however, we would strike
down a New York requirement that public school teachers open each day with prayer, I think
we could not consistently open each of our sessions with prayer. That's the kernel of my
problem."). All sources in this Article cited to the Hugo Lafayette Black Papers or the Earl
Warren Papers are on file with the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress.
141. See SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 16, at 424 (quoting Chief Justice
Warren in conference as saying, "The fact that we speak of God with reverence does not
mean that we can take the prayer into the school"); see also ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A
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some point, there would be hard cases, but neither patriotic references to God
on the one hand, nor state-composed school prayer on the other, were among
them.
The ease with which the Justices decided the case came through in the Engel opinion. "There can be no doubt;' key passages befan, with the words "of
course" sprinkled here and there for good measure. 14 To the Justices in the
majority, Engel was self-evident, a matter of constitutional common sense.
That is why, as the Court would later explain, its opinion in Engel did not cite a
single case. 143
But the fact that the Justices saw Engel as a relatively easy case under the
law does not mean that the law was all, or even most, of what was driving it.
Shortly before Engel was announced, Justice Black gave a candid account of
his jurisprudential views in what the press called "one of the most remarkable
interviews in judicial history." 144 As to the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause, Justice Black said this:
I have to be honest about it. I confess not only that I think the Amendment
means what it says but also that I may be slightly influenced by the fact that I
do not think Congress should make any law with respect to these subjects .
. . . [B]eing a rather backward country fellow, I understand it to mean what
the words say. 145

Justice Black's wife later recounted that separation of church and state was an
issue her husband "felt deeply and passionately about" 146-an ideological
commitment he forged largely from growing up in rural Alabama and experi-

BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 387 (1997) ("1n Warren's mind, it was one thing to invoke
God's benevolence, and another to compel that prayer.").
142. See, e.g., 370 U.S. at 424 ("There can, of course, be no doubt that New York's
program of daily classroom invocation of God's blessings as prescribed in the Regents'
prayer is a religious activity."); id. at 430 ("There can be no doubt that New York's state
prayer program officially establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' pray·
er."); id at 433-34 (addressing the claim that striking down the Regents' Prayer would signal
hostility toward religion with the answer that "[n]othing, of course, could be more wrong");
id at 435 n.21 ("There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent
with the fact that school children and others are officially encouraged to express love for our
country by reciting historical documents such as the Declaration oflndcpendence which con·
tain references to the Deity .... ").
143. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 220-21 (noting that the principles underlying Engel
"were so universally recognized that the Court, without the citation ofa single case," issued
its ruling).
144. James E. Clayton, Black Answers Critics of 1st Amendment View, L.A. TIMES,
June 25, 1962, at 16.
145. Interview by Edmond Cahn with Justice Hugo L. Black in N.Y., N.Y. (Apr. 14,
1962), in Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public interview, 37 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 549, 553-54 (1962).
146. HUGO L BLACK & ELIZABETH BLACK, MR. JUSTICE AND MRS. BLACK: THE MEMOIRS OF HUGO L. BLACK AND ELIZABETH BLACK 95 (1986).
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encing firsthand the awesome power of the church in Southern society. 147
"Prayer ought to be a private thing," Justice Black told his son. 148 It was, to
borrow from the opinion in the case, "too personal, too sacred, too holy" for the
state to draft and ask others to recite. 149
Whether the rest of the Justices in Engel-most of whom were religious, 150 and some of whom were anti-Catholic 151 -were also moved by their
individual views of proper church-state relations (at least at a conscious level)
is hard to say. We do know from an early draft of the Engel opinion that the
Justices in the majority were thinking about school prayer in practical, as well
as legal, terms. Even seemingly all-inclusive prayers were impossibly problematic, the draft stated, explaining:
This case itself shows beyond doubt that New York has not succeeded and
cannot succeed in writing an official prayer satisfactory to everybody in the
State. Non-believers in the State, as one of the petitioners here is shown to be,
certainly cannot conscientiously participate in the prayer. And many devoutly
religious people, as other of these petitioners are shown to be, are deeply offended by the practice of publicly reciting a memorized state prayer under the
circumstances prevailing in a public school classroom even though they
strongly believe that everything stated in the prayer is true. 152

The state would never please everyone, the Justices had come to conclude; the
best it could do was to get out of the business of trying.
The same view permeated the cultural backdrop against which Engel was
decided. Writing in 1963, Newsweek reported that when the Supreme Court decided Engel, "[t]wo points were widely agreed upon: (1) fostering religion in
the young is properly the job of church and home and (2) religious observances
which are perfunctory or so watered down as to be offensive to no one are a
waste of time for everyone." 153 Perhaps Newsweek was wrong in that regard,

147. Barbara A. Peny, Justice Hugo Black and the "Wall of Separation Between
Church and State," 31 J. CHURCH & ST. 55, 56-59 (1989) (discussing Justice Black's religious background and the role it played in shaping his attitudes about religion); see also
DIERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 49 (noting that Justice Black "never forgot how harmful and
humiliating religion could be, especially when a local congregation publicly expelled his father and two uncles for imbibing alcohol").
148. HUGO BLACK, JR., MY FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE 176 (1975).
149. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1962).
150. See EARL wARR EN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 316 (1977} ("The majority of
us on the Court were religious people, yet we found it unconstitutional that any state agency
should impose a religious exercise on persons who were by law free to practice religion or
not without state interference.").
151. See Berg, supra note 65, at 129 (discussing the anti-Catholic views of Justices
Black and Douglas).
152. Hugo L. Black, Draft Opinion at 4-5, Engel v. Vitale, No. 468 (June 25, 1962)
(Hugo Lafayette Black Papers, Box 354); see also Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Arthur J. Freund (Aug. 10, 1962) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 358} ("This experience
illustrates the simple truth that it is impossible to find a single prayer that will give full satisfaction to several conflicting religious groups.").
153. Church and State, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 1963, at48, 48.
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but there is reason to think not. Critics lamented Engel as the product of a
"broad public consensus" that religion was a private matter, 154 and chastised
the Supreme Court for forcing by judicial fiat what the country was already in
the process of doing on its own. 155 Even the Board of Regents had issued a
statement when it adopted the Regents' Prayer that read, "Formal religion is not
to be injected into the public school. It is a matter for the church and the home,
for the religious leaders and the parents of each child." 156 The principle of public secularism had gained widespread acceptance by 1962; it is hard to imagine
the Justices not being impacted by those views.
That leaves one final, but critically important, point about where the Justices were coming from in Engel-their utter unawareness of just how unpopular
the ruling would be. By all accounts, the Justices were surprised by the hostile
reaction to Engel. 157 Indeed, they found it difficult to fathom how the public
could disagree. In a letter to his niece just days after Engel, Justice Black wrote:
The basic premise of the First Amendment is that people must be left to
say their prayers in their own way, and to their own God, without express or
explicit coercion from any political office holder. There are not many people
with religion and intelligence who will think this constitutional principle
158
wrong on mature second thought

154. School Prayer Ban Scored at Red Mass, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1962, at 36 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting a Jesuit priest). Not surprisingly, this view was widely
shared by supporters of the decision as well. See Editorial, In Behalf of Religion, WASH.
POST, June 26, 1962, at A12 ("But religious faith is best inculcated in the home or in places
consecrated to religion."); Editorial, supra note 22.
155. See Editorial, Unrealistic and Unwise, CATH. STAR HERALD, June 21, 1963, at 6
(Hugo Lafayette Black Papers, Box 355) ("[R]eligious practices have been eliminated more
and more over the years. The evidence has been clear that the 'trickling stream' was drying
up rather than building up into a potential torrent. Justices should judge with an eye on the
times as well as on the lawbooks.").
156. Brief of lntervenors-Respondents, supra note 21, at 5 (internal quotation mark
omitted).
157. See CRAY, supra note 141, at 387 ("Certainly the brethren were unprepared for the
public outcry that the School Prayer Case provoked."); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF:
EARL WARREN AND Hts SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 442 (1983) ("Even after
all the abuse they had taken during the past decade, Warren and the Justices were both surprised and pained by the reaction to their decision."); Anthony Lewis, Op-Ed., Public Mood
Plays Big Role in Court Rulings, N. Y. TIMES, June 23, 1963, § 4, at 4 ("When the prayer
case came along last June few observers expected it to touch a raw nerve in the American
politic. The Justices themselves treated it briefly with little of the aura that tends to surround
a 'great case."'); see also infra notes 262-68 and accompanying text (discussing comments
by several Justices that Engel had been grossly misunderstood).
158. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK; A BIOGRAPHY 523-24 (1994) (reproducing in
part a letter to Hazel Davis). The same sentiment was shared by several school-age boys,
whose history teacher wrote to Justice Black to share that "[iJn our class discussion [the students] stated over and over again that they could not understand why something so selfevident needed to have the Supreme Court hand down a decision." Letter from Gordon Reid
to Justice Hugo L. Black (Nov. 21, 1962) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354).
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Justice Black expressed the same sentiment (albeit in a slightly more acerbic
tone) when responding to hate mail on Engel. In letter after letter, he sent a curt
response like this one:
Your letter indicates to me that you have probably not read [the Engel] opinion and for that reason I am sending a copy of it to you. After you have read it,
I would appreciate your writing me what is said in that opinion, if anything,
. h wh"1ch you d"18agree. 159
wit

Nowhere in the conference notes is there any indication that the Justices in Engel anticipated the possibility of negative public reaction to their ruling, as was
the case in Brown v. Board of Education before it, 160 or Schempp the following
year. 161 To the contrary, one almost gets the sense that the Justices thought
they would be applauded for the decision, as had been the case when they protected the free speech rights of religious dissenters in 1943. 162 Engel's confi-

159. Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to A.E. Shafer (June 4, 1964) (Hugo LaFayette
Black Papers, Box 354); see also Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Macy Blanton (July
3, 1962) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 357) ("In order that you may see for yourself
what the Supreme Court decided and what it did not decide, lam sending you [a] copy of the
opinion."); Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Mrs. James Burson (Mar. 20, 1963) (Hugo
LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) ("I would suggest that you might get a new insight into
the problem about which you wrote me by reading the Court's opinion in that case, a copy of
which you will find enclosed. After you have read the full opinion of the Court and the notes
I would be glad to have you write me stating with which particular part of the opinion you
disagree."); Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to John W. Davis (Sept. 10, 1963) (Hugo
LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) ("After you have taken time out of your own busy sched- ulc to read these opinions, I shall be very happy to hear from you again."); Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Cornelia 0. Edington (July 26, 1962) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers,
Box 354) ("I believe that if you will read the Court's opinion I am sending you in the Regents' case ... you, like many others who have expressed themselves about the latest opinion, will understand it much better than you have up to this time."); Letter from Justice Hugo
L. Black to R.L. Flowers (May l 8, 1964) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) ("Since
your letter seems to be based in part upon what you think that case decided, I would like to
suggest that you read it."); Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Jane Wasson & Faye Jernigan (July 17, 1962) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 358) ("In your letter you referred to
the decision as one in which the Court declared 'the use of prayers in public schools unconstitutional.' In order that you may understand what the Court did. hold, I am sending you a
copy of the opinion and would like to request that both of you read every word in it, including the footnotes.").
160. See SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 16, at 648 (reproducing conference notes in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 482 (1954), including discussion of
possible violence following a ruling holding segregation unlawful).
161. See id. at 426 (reproducing conference notes in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 3 74 U.S. 203 ( 1963 ), including discussion of the need for the public to be
reassured).
162. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629, 642 (1943) (invalidating a compulsory flag salute in a challenge by Jehovah's Witnesses); GORDON, supra note
107, at 46 ("Barnette was greeted with widespread praise."); see a/so Philip B. Kurland, The
Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, SignifYing . .. , " 1962 SUP. Cr. REV. l, 33
("It is hard to believe that many who now find this notion [that religion should not be in
school] unpalatable will not soon, or eventually, be applauding it.")-
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dent tone. The sense that there was no need to cite precedent. Even Justice
Black's comment from the bench while delivering Engel-"[T]he right of the
people to pray in their own way is not to be controlled by the election retums"-bore an uncanny resemblance to West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette's famous line. 163
How the South would have figured into the Justices' expectations is hard to
say. One would think that the Justices would have known that a region referred
to as the Bible Belt would not take kindly to their decision, particularly in the
wake of Brown. 164 And maybe that was true, but the Justices figured they had
enough support elsewhere, or just didn't respect the South enough at that time
to care. 165
Yet it is also possible that the Justices did not think the South had a dog in
the fight. The petitioners had pointed out that the Regents' Prayer was sui generis; there was not another state-composed prayer in the country. 166 And the Justices knew that the pious hated the Regents' Prayer as much as religious dissenters did. 167 In the end, the Justices may have viewed the South as
inapposite. The Regents' Prayer was progressive, and progressive prayer was
not what the South was about.
Either way, this much was true: Engel was for the Justices a relatively easy
case. From the facts, to the law, to the practical considerations and cultural
cues-all of the Justices' data points were pointing the same way. And that tells
us something else too. Regardless of what they thought about the South, the
Justices were utterly unprepared for what happened next.

163. Compare Lewis, supra note 23 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Justice
Black's comments from the bench while announcing the Engel opinion), with Barnette, 319
U.S. at 638 ("[F)undamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.").
164. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (noting that 89% of school districts in
the South practiced religious observances).
165. See POWE, supra note 14, at 204-05 ("[T)he Court could more than balance any
opposition to its actions [in Enge!J by active support of the most prominent politician in the
United States-John Kennedy."); cf Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court 1963 TermForeword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of
the Government," 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 176 (1964) ("The Court has been most fortunate in
the enemies that it has made, for it is difficult not to help to resist attack from racists, from
the John Birch Society and its ilk, and from religious zealots who insist that the Court adhere
to the truth as they know it.").
166. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 135, at 15 ("Petitioners do not believe that
there is any prayer in use in the public schools of any State in this country which, like the
prayer involved in this case, has been composed by State officials for use in such schools. In
1955, a prayer virtually identical with the Regents' Prayer was presented to the Honorable
Edmund G. Brown, now the Governor but then the Attorney General of California .... Governor Brown ruled that the prayer presented to him was a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment .... ").
167. See supra notes 97, 152 and accompanying text.
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WHAT HAPPENED NEXT

Why, if Engel was so right, did it strike the country as so wrong? In this
Part, I offer an answer to that question. First, I discuss the nation's reaction to
Engel. Then I turn to the role of the media in tanking the decision, and the role
of the religious establishment in saving it. I end with a discussion of School
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, the 1963 decision that struck down
Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer in public schools. 168

A. "When We Won the Case, All Hell Broke Loose"
For the families who filed suit in Engel, the Supreme Court's ruling was a
brief moment of elation, 169 followed by a living nightmare. 170 For the Supreme
Court, it was only the nightmare-a "veritable avalanche" of fury and hate.17 1
Contemporary commentators described the public's reaction to Engel as an
"explosion of shock and resentment," 172 a "thunderclap of outrage." 173 The
count~ had not seen the decision coming, and the scale of the jo1t was enor·
mous. 74 In terms of sheer volume, the vitriolic attacks on Engel (and the Su·
preme Court for deciding it) were unlike anything the nation had ever seen. 175
The first seventy.two hours after Engel were especially intense. Writing for
the New York Times, Anthony Lewis reported that "[f]or several days all the
serious business of the Congress of the United States was put aside while

168. 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
169. Plaintiff Lawrence Roth's response when told the Supreme Court had ruled his
way in Engel was "Thank God." SHANE MOUNTJOY, ENGEL v. VITALE: SCHOOL PRAYER AND
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 104 (2007) (internal quotation mark omitted).
170. See DIERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 138 (discussing harassment of the plaintiffs after Engel, which included "a deluge of 'chilling' hate mail, snubs from erstwhile friends, and
telephone threats of job dismissal, arson, and kidnapping"). One plaintiff responded, "I have
a feeling of sadness because these are so-called godly people .... If their God teaches them
to wish my kids get polio and my house be bombed, then I think He hasn't done a very good
job with them." The Court Decision--and the Schoo/ Prayer Furor, supra note 16, at 44 (internal quotation marks omitted).
171. JULIA C. LOREN, ENGEL V. VITALE: PRAYER TN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 60 (2001).
172. Public Fears Diminish that Prayer Will Have Wide Impact, WALL Sr. J., July 6,
1962, at I.
173. The Court Decision--and the School Prayer Furor, supra note 16, at 43.
174. In part this was because of the longstanding view that nonsectarian prayers did not
raise Establishment Clause concerns, and in part it was because the country had just spent
the last decade embracing its religious heritage. See GORDON, supra note 107, at 86-87 (dis·
cussing both and observing that "[h]owever predictable the holdings may seem decades later,
they fell like a meteor into American society"); see also Kurland, supra note 162, at 17 (noting "the wide-eyed surprise with which [Engel v.] Vitale was greeted by its detractors"). For
an excellent discussion of the radical political and religious realignment that occurred when
Protestant organizations that had been championing the separation of church and state in order to curb Catholic power learned, much to their surprise, that the same arguments applied
to them, see GORDON, supra note 107, at 84-95.
175. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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members spent their time denouncing the Supreme Court." 176 Members of
Congress called Engel "the most tragic [decision] in the history of the United
States," 177 an "outrageous edict which has numbed the conscience and shocked
the highest sensibilities of the nation." 178 Engel was "the most serious blow
that has ever been struck at the Constitution," one congressman claimed, a
"bold, malicious, atheistic and sacrilegious twist." 179 Two former PresidentsHoover and Eisenhower-immediately denounced the decision, with Hoover
urging representatives to "at once submit an amendment to the Constitution"
(which they did). 180 Meanwhile, newspapers drowning in letters from angry
readers erupted in editorial hate. 181
The reasons varied. Many hated Engel for "'secularizing' national life,"
single-handedly destroying America's identity as a Godly nation. 182 "Court
Outlaws God," headlines blasted, 183 while congressmen declared, "[T]he Supreme Court has held that God is unconstitutional," 184 and accused the Justices
of a "deliberate design to subordinate the American people ... to a godless

176. Anthony Lewis, Op-Ed., Court Again Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, July I, 1962, § 4,
at 10.
177. Anthony Lewis, Both Houses Get Bills to Lift Ban on School Prayer, N .Y. TIMES,
June 27, 1962, at I (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Representative Frank J.
Becker of N cw York).
178. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Senator Hennan E. Talmadge of
Georgia).
179. 108 CONG. REC. 11,732 (1962) (quoting Representative L. Mendel Rivers of South
Carolina).
180. See Opinion of the Week: Prayers in School, supra note 20 (quoting former Presidents Hoover and Eisenhower); "To Stand as a Guarantee," supra note 97, at 8 ("Two former U.S. Presidents took issue with the court."); see also infra notes 209, 274-87 and accompanying text (discussing proposed amendments to overturn Engel).
181. "To Stand as a Guarantee," .rnpra note 97, al 7.
182. Alan F. Westin, Also on the Bench: 'Dominant Opinion,' N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,
1962, § 6 (Magazine), at 30; see also The Court Decision~and the School Prayer Furor,
supra note 16, at 43 ("[N]othingjolts many Americans more strongly than a challenge to the
religious feelings which are still bound up with their sense of national identity."); Opinion of
the Week: Prayers in School, supra note 20 (quoting Cardinal Spellman as stating that "[t]he
decision strikes at the very heart of the Godly tradition in which America's children have for
so long been raised").
183. See WARREN, supra note 151, at 315-16 ("I vividly remember one bold newspaper
headline saying, 'Court outlaws God.'"); see also LEVY, supra note 30, at 185 ("Newspaper
headlines screamed that the Court had outlawed God from the public schools .... "). For a
discussion of media coverage on Engel, see Part ILB below.
184. Lewis, supra note 176 (quoting Senator Sam J. Ervin of North Carolina); see also
Lewis, supra note 177 (quoting Representative L. Mendel Rivers of South Carolina as stating that the Supreme Court had "officially stated its disbelief in God Almighty" (internal
quotation mark omitted)); Editorial, Prayer and Hysteria, 195 NATION 2, 2 (1962) (quoting a
New York Daily Mirror article accusing the Supreme Court of"an attempt to expel God from
American life" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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state." 185 In ruling against God in the classroom, the Supreme Court had ruled
against God, "bringing untold glee to the capitals of the godless communistic
world." 186 Engel was the beginning of the end, "America's downfall." 187 And
the nation was not going down without a fight.
Others hated Engel for being patently undemocratic. "No longer does the
majority rule in our nation," 188 one letter to the editor claimed, while an editorial lamented "a tyranny of the weak over the strong." 189 Letters from citizens
exclaimed, "The views of the majority need to be protected too!" 190 In favoring
"some fancied rights of a minority of citizens," 191 the Supreme Court had
turned the core precept of democratic governance on its head, subjecting majority will to minority rule.
Still others hated Engel for what it wasn 't-a prayer worth getting worked
up about. "[T]t is possible that the Court has given life to quiescent forces which
will do more damage to our free institutions than the prayer ever did," 192 one
commentator wrote. Others, too, pointed to the innocuous nature of the Regents' Prayer, criticizing the Court for "grinding such small grist" and "absorb[ing] time and attention that should be devoted to the correction of evils
that afflict far more people far more grievously than a few minutes' lip-service

185. DtE.RENFI£LD, supra note 14, at 147 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting
Governor George Wallace of Alabama); see also 108 CoNG. REc. 11,734 (1962) (quoting
Congressman John Williams of Mississippi as stating that Engel was "a deliberate and carefully planned conspiracy to substitute materialism for spiritual values, and thus to communize America").
186. Editorial, supra note 184, at 2 (quoting Representative John Bell Williams of Mississippi); see afso Lewis, supra note 176 (quoting Representative L. Mendel Rivers of South
Carolina as stating, "I know of nothing in my lifetime ... that could give more aid and comfort to Moscow" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
187. OJERENFIELD, supra note 14, at l (paraphrasing a statement by David Barton, a
Texas Republican).
188. Letter to the Editor, COM. APPEAL (Memphis) (n.d.) (Hugo Lafayette Black Papers, Box 361 ).
189. See Gerald W. Johnson, Anise and Cummin, NEW REPUBLIC, July 9, 1962, at 8, 8;
see also A Loss ro Make Up for, TIME, June 28, 1963, at 13, 14 (quoting Billy Graham as
stating, "I don't believe that a small minority should rule the majority of the people").
190. Letter from Dorothy Sowers to Justice Hugo L. Black (Mar. I, 1963) (Hugo
LaFayette Black Papers, Box 356) (emphasis omitted); see also Letter from Cornelia 0.
Edington to Justice Hugo L. Black (n.d.) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) ("Is it the
opinion of the court that minority groups should rule the majority, if so please tell me why
this should be so?"); Letter from Anna Thurman Finch to Chief Justice Earl Warren (Mar. 2,
1963) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 356) {"The real issue is simple and fundamental.
Which shall prevail in the land-the wishes of the majority or the desire ofa minority?").
191. 108 CONG. REC. 12,227 (1962) (quoting Representative William Raleigh Hull, Jr.,
of Missouri).
192. Engel v Virale, supra note 93, at 5; see also Editorial, supra note 22 ("In part the
shock may be explained by the innocuous nature of the prayer.").
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given to anything." 193 Maybe the Court was right about a state-drafted prayer,
critics conceded, but the stakes were so small that it was "a stupid decision, a
doctrinaire decision" 194-the "Ultimate in Asininity." 195
And still others hated Engel just for the occasion it presented to hate, for all
that had come before it. Engel was the decision that Southerners in particu1ar
loved to hate, 196 a "heaven-sent opportunity" to defend God Almighty while
simu1taneously attacking the Supreme Court. 197 "They put the Negroes in the
schools, and now they've driven God out," went one oft-quoted refrain. 198 And
aside from the fact that "Negroes" weren't actually in those schools yet, 199 the
statement summed up the South's position perfectly. 200

193. Johnson, supra note 189, at 8; see also Pollak, supra note 98, at 63 (faulting the
Supreme Court for not "sav[ing] its scarce ammunition for a prayer that soared," spending it
instead on New York's "clay-footed pigeon").
194. Alexander Burnham, Court's Decision Stirs Conflicts, N.Y. TlMES, June 27, 1962,
at 1 (internal quotation mark omitted) (reproducing a forthcoming editorial in the Pilot, the
oldest Catholic paper in the United States).
195. An Ultimate in Asininity, ENQUIRER (Cincinnati), June 28, 1962, at 6.
196. Interestingly, a 1964 empirical study explored a number of variables thought to in·
fluence attitudes regarding the Supreme Court's school prayer and Bible reading decisions,
including church attendance, religious affiliation, age, sex, education level, urban/rural
commWiity, and geographic region in the United States. It concluded, "The most significant
result of the multiple regression analysis is the confirmation it gives to the influence of region, or more particularly to distinctiveness of the South." Way, supra note 90, at 193-203.
For an explanation of Southern exceptionalism on the issue of school prayer and how that
has translated to persistent noncompliance with the Court's edicts on religious observances
in school, see note 223 and accompanying text below.
197. Dierenfield, supra note 18, at 219.
198. Uproar over School Prayer-and the Aftermath, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July
9, 1962, at 42, 44 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Representative George W.
Andrews of Alabama); see Editorial, supra note 184, at 2 (paraphrasing same); see also
Lewis, supra note I 76 (quoting Senator Sam J. Ervin of North Carolina as stating, "I should
like to ask whether we would be far wrong in saying that in this decision the Supreme Court
bas held that God is unconstitutional and for that reason the public schools must be segregated against Him?" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
199. See SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 16, at 671 ("In l 964, ten years after Brown, only 1.2 percent of southern black children went to school with white children."
(italics omitted)).
200. See Kenneth Crawford, The Prayer Debate, NEWSWEEK, July 16, 1962, at 28, 28
("Some senators and representatives from the Deep South, who are still gunning for the
Court because of its school-desegregation ruling, found the school-prayer decision too good
an opportunity to resist."); Lewis, supra note 177 ("Southern members of Congress were
among the most prominent critics. Some punctuated their denunciations with references to
the racial segregation of schools."); Lewis, supra note 176 ("There were, first, those who
were delighted to find any excuse to assault the Supreme Court. This was the particular reaction of Southerners, who did their best to suggest that the prayer ruling only showed how
equally wrong the court had been to outlaw segregation in public schools.").
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That said, it wasn't just the Supreme Court's race-relations rulings that
drove the furor over Engel. It was obscenity_ 201 It was Red Monday. 202 It was
reapportionment. 203 It was search and seizure. 204 The hysteria that followed
Engel was a "caldron of criticism," 205 and as one commentator put the point,
"[t]he criticism became clamor" and "[t]he clamor became frenzy." 206 Engel
gave rise to a virtual feeding frenzy on the Supreme Court, a "national emotional binge" 207 of fury and hate.
With reaction to Engel so strong, action was sure to follow. Legislators
claimed something had to be done "to calm the power grab of these powerdrunken men" 208 and proposed a number of Court-curbing measures. Dominant
in the discussion were proposals to amend the Constitution to overturn Engel.
More than fifty such proposals were submitted within the first three days of the
decision, and by the time congressional hearings were held in 1964, nearly 150
proposed constitutional amendments had been submitted. 209 Legislators also

201- See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) (narrowing the definition of
obscenity while recognizing constitutional protection for nonobscene expression of sexual
ideas); DIERENF!ELD, supra note 14, at 151 (quoting one critic as saying, "The Court blesses
these rags peddling their photographs of nude male models, but makes a prayer to God a violation of the Constitution!" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Uproar over School Prayer-and the Aftermath, supra note 198, at 44 (quoting Representative August E. Johansen of
Michigan as saying, "The upshot [of the Court's decisions] seems to be: Obscenity, yes;
prayer, no" (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
202. Known as Red Monday, the Supreme Court issued four rulings on June 17, 1957,
that struck down various anti-Communist measures. See Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363,
365-68, 382 (1957) (invalidating the discharge of a foreign service officer in violation of
State Department regulations); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957) (interpreting the Smith Act as not prohibiting speech advocating the overthrow of the government in
the abstract); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249-50 (1957) (recognizing a claim
to academic freedom by a socialist college professor); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178, 215-16 (1957) (recognizing limits of congressional investigatory power); see also Westin, supra note 182, at 30 (quoting one critic as saying, "[I]t pays to be a Negro or a Communist if you want justice from the Warren Court").
203. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. I 86, 198-99 (1962) (holding legislative apportionment
to be a justiciable issue).
204. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (constitutionalizing the exclusionary
rule).
205. RICHARD M. JOHNSON, THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLIANCE: SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING FROM A NEW PERSPECTIVE 82 (1967) (internal quotation mark.s omitted).
206. CRAY, supra note 141, at 389.
207. Excerpts from Editorials on School Prayer DeciJ·ion, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1962,
at 11 (quoting an editorial from the Salt Lake Tribune). The editorial warned, "It will be unfortunate if a national emotional binge is set off. Irresponsible and demagogic criticism by
some members of Congress will not encourage needed thoughtful study of the decision and
its real effects." id.
208. SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 261 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Representative Thomas Abernathy of Mississippi).
209. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Jn Opposition to the School Prayer Amendment, 50 U. CHI.
L. REv. 823, 826 (1983); see also Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Establishment According to En-

512

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:479

called for the Justices' impeachment, 210 for jurisdiction-stripping legislation, 211 for the words "In God We Trust" to be inscribed above the Supreme
Court's bench, 212 and for federal funds to be appropriated to buy a Bible for
each of the Justices. 213 None of the proposed measures passed, but there could
be no doubt as to where Congress stood. The Justices that year reportedly received a smaller annual raise than anyone else on the federal bench, 214 and the
House of Representatives voted (unanimously, no less) to place the words "In
God We Trust" above the Speaker of the House's rostrum. 215 It remains there
today.
Outside Congress, people took action too. Protestors picketed the White
House with signs that read, "Remove Warren, Restore God," and the John
Birch Society added the words "Save Prayer" to its "Impeach Warren" billboards.216 Every governor in the nation, save one, endorsed a resolution condemning Engel and supporting a constitutional amendment to overturn it. 217

gel, 76 HARV. L. REv. 25, 50-51 {1962) (noting "fifty-odd proposals" immediately following

Engel, most "directed to the precise Engel situation"); Kenneth Crawford, Politics and Prayer, NEWSWEEK, May 25, 1964, at 36, 36 (noting that "[n]o less than 147 bills" proposing to
overturn Engel were introduced in the House).
210. See LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 2 (quoting Representative Alvin O'Konski of
Wisconsin as saying, "We ought to impeach these men in robes who put themselves up
above God" (internal quotation mark omitted)).
21 t. 108 CONG. REc. I 1,732 (1962) (quoting Representative L. Mendel Rivers of South
Carolina as arguing that unless other measures were taken, it was time "to drastically restrict
and limit the appellate jurisdiction of this court which flaunts its authority in our very faces
and it flaunts its authority because we have permitted them to run rampant over us").
212. See LYNDA BECK FENWICK, SHOULD THE CHILDREN PRAY?: A HISTORICAL,
JUDICIAL, AND POLITICAL EXAMINATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL PRAYER 130 (1989); see also
JACK HARRISON POLLACK, EARL WARREN: THE JUDGE WHO CHANGED AMERICA 262 (1979)
(noting that Chief Justice Warren wrote a letter that helped bury the bill).
213. See !08 CONG. REc. 14,360-61 (1962) (quoting Representative James A. Haley of
Florida as proposing to fund the purchase of a Bible "for the personal use of each justice").
The proposal was rejected by a vote of 66 to 47. Lours FISHER, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
AMERICA: POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS 127 (2002).
214. See POLLACK, supra note 212, at 262 ("In retaliation, the following March, House
members denied Justices a $3,000 annual pay raise on their $39,500 salaries, even though
they then voted $7,500 increases for themselves, Cabinet officers and all lesser Federal judges.").
215. See LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 3; see also 108 CONG. REc. 21,102 (1962) (quoting Representative William Randall of Missouri as justifying the move as "in a not so subtle
way our answer to the recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court order banning the regents
prayer from the New York State schools").
216. See DIERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 151-52; Dierenfield, supra note 18, at 219.
217. See Governors Seek Prayer Measure, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1962, at 1 (reporting on
the nearly unanimous Governors Conference resolution, with only Governor Rockefeller of
New York abstaining "because he thought the decision should be thoroughly studied before
any action was taken").
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And thirty-two state legislatures, just two short of the required two-thirds,
caileJ. for a constitutional convention. 218
Vows of open defiance were common. 219 "We will not pay any attention to
the Supreme Court ruling," 220 one Southern superintendent stated, with another
asserting that religious observances in school should continue "regardless of
what the Supreme Court says." 221 Governors urged schools to "kee~ right on
praying. " 222 And in the South, that is exactly what most of them did. 2 3

218.
219.

See SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 16, at 425 (italics omitted).
See The Court Decision-and the School Prayer Furor, supra note 16, at 45

("Twenty-four states expressly permit or require prayers in schools, and in many of these
areas, the judgment provoked open threats of defiance."); Nation Chooses Sides in Fight
over Prayer, supra note 17, at 64 ("[Fifteen] States have refused to give up devotional services in their public schools.").
220. The Court Decision-and the School Prayer Furor, supra note 16, at 45 (internal
quotation marks omitted) {quoting the Deputy Superintendent of Atlanta Public Schools);
see also School Prayers: What's Scheduled This Autumn, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug.
19, 1963, at 11, 11 (listing statements of defiance from various states).
221. Burnham, supra note 194 (internal quotation marks omitted) {quoting the Alabama
Superintendent of Education); see also William M. Beaney & Edward N. Beiser, Prayer and
Politics: The Impact of Engel and Schempp on the Political Process, 13 J. PUB. L. 475, 487
(1964) (quoting the Rhode Island State Commissioner of Education as stating that he did
"not now or in the future intend to prostitute the office of Commissioner of Education of
Rhode Island to further the cause of the irreligious, the atheistic, the unreligious, or the ag-.
nostic" (internal quotation marks omitted)). One school board president stated that the board
had "no intention of abolishing prayer. If we are compelled to ban it, then we'll devise an·
other prayer. A school without prayers is not a school." Theodore Powell, The School Prayer
Battle, SATURDAY REV., Apr. 20, 1963, at 62, 63 (internal quotation mark omitted).
222. See DELfATTORE, supra note 36, at 104 (quoting Governor George Wallace of Alabama). "I want the Supreme Court to know we are not going to conform to any such decision," Governor Wallace said. "I want the State Board of Education to tell the whole world
we are not going to abide by it." Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 486 (internal quotation
mark omitted); see also Seaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 487 (quoting Governor Ross
Barnett of Mississippi as saying that he was "going to tell every teacher in Mississippi to
conduct prayers and Bible reading despite what the Supreme Court says" (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Another Kind ofDefiance, TIME, Aug. 16, 1963, at 16, 16 (quoting Governor Terry Sanford of North Carolina as saying, "We will go on having Bible readings and
prayers in the schools of this state just as we always have" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
223. See KENNETH M. DOLBEARE & PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER
DECISIONS: FROM COURT POLICY TO LocAL PRACTICE 33 & tbl.8 (1971) {finding that 93% of
school districts in the East complied with Engel, but only 21 % of school districts in the
South did so); see also SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 310 (discussing a study showing that after Engel, 11 % of schools in the East still conducted prayer, 5% of schools in the West still
conducted prayer, but 64% of schools in the South still conducted school prayer). Frank
Soraufwrites,
Explanations for the Southern noncompliance [with Engel and Schempp] arc not hard to adduce-the conservative Protestant homogeneity, the general traditionalism of values, the reinforcement of noncompliance in other areas of constitutional decision, indeed the whole
complicated web of the Southern culture that relates religion to other social values and institutions.
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In short, Steven Engel remembered it right in saying, "When we won the
case ... all hell broke loose." 224 The Supreme Court thought it was protecting
the people from an overzealous, prayer-pushing state. But that point was lost on
the American people, who wanted protection from the Supreme Court instead. 225 There was a disconnect between what the Court said and what the
people heard, and a disconnect between what happened before Engel and what
happened after it. The question I explore next is why.
B. The Role of Media and Misunderstanding

Anyone who spends time with the historical record cannot help but notice
that the public discourse surrounding Engel was not about what the Supreme
Court actually held. The Justices themselves were partly to blame for that discourse. The rest of the responsibility lay with the media.
Turning first to the Justices, two wrote minority opinions in Engel, and
both turn out to be important in understanding the nation's reaction to the case.
As previously mentioned, Justice Stewart wrote a lone dissent in Engel. 226 Not
yet mentioned is the fact that Justice Douglas wrote a lone concurrence. 227

SORAUF, supra note 105, at 299. He goes on to explain that "[e]nforcement by court order
would have to be literally on a school-district-by-school-district basis, assuming the availapility of plaintiffs willing to come forward against the pressure of the community." Id. at
300.
Herein may lie a clue to the riddle of why the East readily complied with Engel and
Schempp while the South did not, even though religious observances in both areas were
equally entrenched. See id. at 297 tbl.12-5 (showing that in 1960, 68% of public schools in
the East and 77% of public schools in the South reported Bible reading, whereas in 1966,
only 4% of public schools in the East reported continued Bible reading compared with 50%
in the South). In the East, there may have been enough religious diversity to pose a realistic
threat of an enforcement action, whereas in the South, religious homogeneity and other factors contributing to community pressure may have been so strong that an enforcement action
was unlikely. This surmise would also suggest that it is more than mere coincidence that cases like Engel and Schempp came from the East rather than the South. For an excellent empirical study of factors contributing to such community pressure, see generally Kevin T.
McGuire, Public Schools, Religious Establishments, and the U.S. Supreme Court: An Examination of Policy Compliance, 37 AM. POL. RES. 50 (2009) (finding rural communities, less
educated communities, and communities with higher concentrations of conservative Christians, all characteristics that dovetail with the South, to be statistically significant factors of
noncompliance with the Supreme Court's school prayer decisions).
224. DIERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 138 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Steven Engel).
225. See Postcard from Mary F. Dickinson to Justice Hugo L. Black (June 18, 1963)
(Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 355) ("Our earnest prayer is: 'God save America from
the Supreme Court.'"); Note from Peggy Ann Louis to Justice Hugo L. Black (n.d.) (Hugo
LaFayette Black Papers, Box 355) ("God save us from the Supreme Court!").
226. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 444-50 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also supra note 129 and accompanying text (identifying Justice Stewart as the lone dissenter in Engel).
227. 370 U.S. at 437-44 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Both Justice Douglas and Justice Stewart argued that the prayer in Engel
was indistinguishable from the myriad of other aclc11owledgments of God by
the state; the only difference between the two was which way the argument cut.
Justice Douglas claimed that any commingling of church and state was constitutionally impermissible. 228 Thus, he agreed with the majority's ruling on
school prayer and pointed to other practices the Supreme Court could, and
should, strike down as well. 229 Justice Stewart took the opposite stance, arguing that school prayer was just as constitutional as everything else. "I cannot
see how an 'official religion' is established by letting those who want to say a
prayer say it," he wrote, pointing to "countless practices" that recognized religion and were sponsored by the state. 230
The majority in Engel answered both Justices' claims, explicitly rejecting
the premise upon which they were based-that school prayer and other references to God in government were indistinguishable. In characteristically confident style, the Engel opinion stated:
There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent
with the fact that school children and others are officially encouraged to express love for our country by reciting historical documents such as the Declaration of Independence which contain references to the Deity .... Such patriotic or ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to the unquestioned
religious exercise that the State of New York has sponsored in this in231
stance.

The line drawing was clear, but the statement was poorly placed. The majority
had relegated the passage to a footnote that most everyone overlooked, including critics and the popular press. 232 The New York Times, for example, reprinted the entire Engel opinion, along with parts of the concurrence and dissent, but
neglected to include the footnote that addressed those Justices' claims. 233 Critics decried Engel's broad, sweeping language, and chided the Supreme Court

228. See id. at 437 ("I think it is an unconstitutional undertaking whatever form it

takes.").
229. See id at 43 7 n. l.
230. Id. at 445-46 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 435 n.21 (majority opinion).
232. See RAYMOND J. CELADA, LIBRARY OF CONG. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERV., THE
SUPREME COURT OPINION IN THE SCHOOL PRAYER CASE (ENGEL V. VITALE); THE DECISION,

12 (1963) {"The Court attempted to indicate the narrow
limits of its holding in a significant but generally overlooked footnote to the opinion .... ");
FENWICK, supra note 212, at 133 ("Unfortunately, most people skip over footnotes, and
many of the published reports of the decision omitted any reference to this footnote. Intended to allay such fears as those expressed by religious leaders ... , the footnote was instead
ignored."); "To Stand as a Guarantee," supra note 97, at 9 ("Black's footnote was virtually
ignored in the public reporting of the decision .... ").
233. See Text of Opinions in Supreme Court Case Holding School Prayer Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1962, at 16.
THE REACTION, THE PROS AND CONS
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for its "failure to emphasize the limitations of the decision. " 234 In fact, those
limits were there. They just weren't where anyone would have thought to look.
In different ways, both the concurring and dissenting opinions in Engel
played a prominent role in the fury that followed the case. Justice Stewart's dissent fueled hyperbolic claims that in striking down school prayer, the Supreme
Court had told schoolchildren they could not pray even if they wanted to. "[TJo
deny the wish of these school children to join in reciting this prayer is to deny
them the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of our Nation," he
wrote. 235 Justice Stewart viewed Engel in free exercise terms, and in the public
discourse, his was the view that stuck. 236
Meanwhile, Justice Douglas's concurrence lent legitimacy to claims that
the Court would soon be taking aim at other aspects of God in public life. Time
and again, critics pointed to Engel's concurrence for the implications of the
case. 237 Indeed, on numerous occasions they quoted Engel's concurrence as
thou~h it was the holding in the case, leading many people to think it actually
was. 38 This was especially incendiary because unlike Justice Stewart, who had

234. lrving R. Kaufman, The Supreme Court and Its Critics, ATLANTIC, Dec. 1963, at
47, 50; see also Arthur Krock, Op-Ed., The Prayer Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1962, § 4, at
9 (describing Engel as "the latest in a series of high judicial rulings on the issue of churchstate separation that oontinue to supply no guide to the next one"); Lewis, supra note 135
(writing that the "sweeping language" of the opinion made it "impossible to draw ... any
conclusion on what the Supreme Court will or will not allow"); Anthony Lewis, Op-Ed.,
School-Prayer Issue in High Court Again, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1962, § 4, at 5 ("Th[e] limits
[of the Court's decision] have been difficult to set with any degree of confidence because
Justice Hugo L. Black's opinion for the court was so broadly and vaguely phrased. The lack
of boundaries in tum has doubtless served to heighten public agitation.").
235. See 370 U.S. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
236. See Powell, supra note 22 I, at 62-63 ("Much opposition arose out of the mistaken
impression that the decision was based on the 'free exercise' clause."); "To Stand as a
Guarantee," supra note 97, at 8 ("The Supreme Court last week based its ruling solely on
the 'establishment' clause, but many Americans got an impression that the court impaired
the free exercise of religion. This impression was fortified by Justice Stewart's dissent _... ").
237. See Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 479; see also The Court Decision-and
the School Prayer Furor, supra note 16, at 44 ("It was the concuning opinion, by Justice
William 0. Douglas, however, which gave the aroused critics of the decision their greatest
fears."); Editorial, In the Name ofFreedom, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1962, at 14 ("If the majority opinion prevails, however, it must logically require the excision of all those countless
other official references to God-such as in the Declaration of Independence, the Pledge of
Allegiance, [and] the Star-Spangled Banner .... Justice Douglas, concurring with the majority, seems to say it does and should apply to these and all the other official instances.").
238. See "To Stand as a Guarantee," supra note 97, at 8 ("Adding greatly to the confusion was Justice Douglas' concurring opinion-which was mistakenly understood by many
as having some force of law."); see also Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 485 ("[MJuch
of the bitter first commentary was uninformed, and frequently was based on sentences ripped
out of the context of the Court's opinion, or to be found only in the concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Douglas."); Chester A Newland, Press Coverage of the United States Supreme
Court, 17 W. POL. Q. 15, 25 (1964) ("Basis for the most extreme and unplausible public crit-
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lamented Engel's implications, Justice Douglas embraced them as right. 239
Writing in the l 962 Supreme Court Review, Philip Kurland described Engel as
a picture of the majority Justices "walking on eggs and of the two minority Justices stamping after them. " 240 It was an apt analogy, particularly in light of the
mess in their wake.
In fairness, neither of the minority opinions in Engel could have been fully
responsible for the hysteria that followed the decision, because the Supreme
Court came under attack well before anyone had time to read them. 241 Engel's
concurrence and dissent may have bolstered critics' claims, but they are just a
part of understanding the misunderstanding that marked the case. For the rest of
the story, one must leave the world of law altogether and enter the world of
journalism.
Within legal academia, Engel is a case study in Supreme Court decisionmaking (and on the doctrinal side, First Amendment law, of course). But within
journalism scholarship, Engel is a case study for an entirely different proposition-how the media's coverage of Court decisions can skew public opinion. 242 As is so often the case, the insights of an interdisciplinary perspective
enrich our understanding considerably.
From a journalistic viewpoint, the story begins with the Supreme Court's
announcement of Engel and the media race to report the ruling. 243 The first
wire service reports on Engel went out within five minutes of the decision's
announcement, feeding what would become the lead story in all news outlets
by the end of the day and front-page news the following morning. 244 Unfortu-

icisms of the majority opinion are to be found in the dissent by Mr. Justice Stewart; and Jus·
tice Douglas' unrestrained remarks in a concurrence provide equally ample fuel for critics.").
239. See Engel v Vitale, supra note 93, at 4 ("Mr. Justice Douglas concurring and Mr.
Justice Stewart dissenting both thought-the one approvingly, the other with regret-that all
sorts of invocations of the Deity associated with our public life are or will soon become un·
constitutional."); supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text (discussing the opinions of Justices Douglas and Stewart).
240. Kurland, supra note 162, at 13.
241. See Thomas M. Menglcr, Public Relations in the Supreme Court: Justice Tom
Clark's Opinion in the School Prayer Case, 6 CONST. COMMENT. 331, 337 (1989).
242.

See, e.g.,

DAVID L GREY, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NEWS MEDIA (1968);

Newland, supra note 238; William A. Hachten, Journalism and the Prayer Decision,
CowM. JOURNALISM R..Ev., Fall 1962, at 4, 4.
243. Engel was announced on June 25, 1962, along with fifteen other decisions.
Hachten, supra note 242, at 4. It was the only one to command immediate media attention.
See id. For a glimpse of history repeating itself, see Katherine Fung & Jack Mirkinson, Su·
preme Co!.irt Health Care Ruling: CNN. Fox News Wrong on Individual Mandate,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 28, 2012, 10:29 AM EDT), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012
/06/28/cnn-supreme·court·hcalth-care·individual·rnandate_ n_ 1633950. html (discussing the
media's mishandling of the Supreme Court's health care ruling in 2012).
244. See GREY, supra note 242, at 87-88 ("Justice Black started reading Engel at about
11:50 AM. on June 25, 1962 .... ln both Engel and Schempp, the AP and UPI were out
with bulletins within five minutes of the start of announcing the cases in the courtroom.");
Hachtcn, supra note 242, at 4 ("Wire-service reporters led their stories with [Engel], radio
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nately, none of the reports stressed the limited nature of the Court's ruling; indeed, the AP bulletin failed to note the state-sponsored nature of the prayer at
all. 245 Thus, from the start, media reports gave the impression that the Court
had forbidden prayer of any type~individual or state sponsored-in public
schools. 246 Newspapers sensationalized the ruling with headlines such as "No
Praying in Schools, Court Rules" and "Supreme Court Outlaws Prayers in Public Schools" that exaggerated the holding of the case and provided terse, oversimplified accounts of the decision that were at best incomplete. 247 Radio and
TV quickly followed suit. 248
Meanwhile, public officials likewise reacted to the AP and other wire service reports, quickly going on record to criticize Engel and take a stand in favor
of God, prayer, and the American way. 249 The commentary was uninformed

and television and afternoon newspapers used it prominently, and by the following morning
it had become the leading story in most newspapers."); see also Mengler, supra note 241, at
336 ("The response to the Engel decision was literally instantaneous and, consequently, uninformed.").
245. See GREY, supra note 242, at 88.
246. See JOHNSON, supra note 205, at 75 ("In no instance d[id] a headline ... indicate
that the banned prayer was one composed by state officials and prescribed by a school
board-both relevant considerations as far as the Court was concerned."); Hach ten, supra
note 242, at 5 ("The majority c;f newspapers appear to have kept 'prayer' in the singular, but
many failed to specify ... its official character .... "); A Loss to Make Up for, supra note
189, at 13 ("Misled by headlines, many thought that the court had all but ordered an end to
all ties between government and religion .... "); see also Excerpts from Editorials on School
Prayer Decision, supra note 207 (quoting the Evening Star as stating, "The real effect of the
Court's ruling is to prohibit children who might wish to do so from reciting the prayer"). Because the only prayer in schools at this time was state-sponsored prayer, one can readily see
how the media conflated the two.
247. Newland, supra note 238, at 29 (discussing these and similar headlines, including
"No Prayers in Schools, Supreme Court Orders" and "Possible End to Christian, Jewish Holy Day Activity in Public Schools as Court Bans N.Y. Prayer"); Hachten, supra note 242, at
5 (discussing similar headlines, including "Court Rules Out Prayers in Schools" and "High
Court Bans School Prayer"); see, e.g., Joseph Hearst, Supreme Court Bans School Prayers,
CHI. DAILY TR!B., June 26, 1962, at 1; School Prayer Ruled Out, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1962,
at l; see also LEO KATCHER, EARL WARREN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 422 (1967) C'[T]he
early newspaper treatment of the decision was incomplete, inaccurate, and intended to make
headlines rather than to report the facts."); Mengler, supra note 24 l, at 33 7-3 8 ("The press
caused perhaps greater damage through its incompetent interpretation of the decision and
aggressive attempts to fan the flames. Headlines the morning after the decision obscured the
narrowness of the Court's explicit holding ....").
248. See JOHNSON, supra note 205, at 84-85 ("Thus the radio and TV newscasts, with
their characteristic incisiveness and drive to report events 'as they happen,' conveyed an image of a much broader ruling than was actually handed down. In this regard their treatment
was similar to the early news stories.").
249. See Mengler, supra note 241, at 336 ("[C]ongressmen who spoke went on the record quickly and, sensing a political bonanza, almost uniformly criticized the decision.");
Lewis, supra note 176 ("The grotesque distortion of suggesting that the court had held God
unconstitutional was characteristic of many comments. The purpose was abuse, not rational
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and "not a little demagogic." 250 But with proposed constitutional amendments
flying, it was newsworthy, and papers quickly shifted frcm reporting on Engel
to reporting on the reaction to the case. 251 Here too the media fanned the
flames, focusing almost exclusively on the comments of extremists and following up with interviews to solicit the strongest sound bite reporters could get. 252
Surveying the scene, the New York Herald Tribune lamented "the sight of so
many otherwise responsible newspapers getting completely swept off their feet
by the tide of emotionalism." 253 Scholars reviewing the news re~orts agreed,
finding "serious distortions" in the media's reporting of the case 54 and concluding that there was "little question" that the way the news was handled contributed to the reaction against Engel. 255
All this points to a conclusion that several news magazines noted at the
time: En~el was hated "not so much for what it said as for what people thought
it said." 2 6 Time magazine was one of the first to make the point, stating:
discussion of the court's reasoning. And so these critics tended to denounce the motives of
the justices, terming them pro-Communist, atheistic, conspiratorial.").
250. Crawford, supra note 200, at 28; see also FENWICK, supra note 212, at 130 ("Yet
many of the people voicing the greatest outrage spoke out against [Engel] without having
read the opinion."); JOHNSON, supra note 205, at 91 ("The Educational Executives' Overview
was particularly outraged about the fact that so many 'pontificated so freely' about the decision without bothering to see what the Court had said.").
251. See JOHNSON, supra note 205, at 72-73, 74 tbl.2 (noting that "[s]ubsequent articles
appearing on the news pages ... were uniformly concerned with public reaction to the decision," and listing headlines, including "Prayer Decision Stirs Anger," "Prayer Ruling Stirs
Caldron of Criticism," "Lawmakers Seethe over Prayer Ban," "Local Religious Leaders Deplore Prayer Ban," and "Court Ruled Against God: Goldwater," among others); Newland,
supra note 238, at 27 ("Starting with day-two stories and throughout the remainder of the
week, however, reports drawn from wire services generally departed far from the Court's
action and stressed reaction instead.").
252. See Hachten, supra note 242, at 8 ("[T]he wire services obtained comment largely
from the angriest members of Congress."); see also Mengler, supra note 241, at 338 ("Arguably worse than its misinterpretation was the press' solicitation of uninformed criticism.
Starting immediately after the decision's announcement and continuing through the rest of
the week, the press departed from wire service interpretations of the decision and actively
sought good quotes."); Newland, supra note 238, at 27-28 ("On the Prayer case, wire reports
of national level reaction were numerous and often on extreme views, completely obscuring
the Court's opinion in most newspapers .... Solicited opinions of political and religious
spokesmen and ofuninfonned people in general dominated the news.").
253. Rockefeller Keeps His Head, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., July 5, 1962, at 18.
254. Newland, supra note 238, at 29.
255. Hachten, supra note 242, at 7 ("There seems little question but that the mechanics
of handling news contributed to the reaction."); see also GREY, supra note 242, at 92 ("[I)t is
hard to assess press responsibility for the uproar caused by the earlier decision. But, again at
minimum, it would seem that the press was one element in the Engel case."). For an explanation of why Engel's countennajoritarian narrative has persisted despite such evidence, see
text accompanying notes 272-73 and 400 below.
256. A Loss to Make Up for, supra note 189, at 13; see also Does Schoolroom Prayer
Require a New Amendment?, TIME, May 8, 1964, at 62, 62, 64 ("Much of the cry to 'Get
God Back in the Schools' reflects deep misunderstanding of what the court actually said.").
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Much of last week's controversy arose from confusion about what the Supreme Court ruled-and, perhaps more importantly, what it did not rule. All
too typical was the reaction of an Atlanta clergyman who called the decision
"the most terrible thing that's ever haf pened to us"-then admitted he did not
really know what the decision said. 25

Letters to the Justices confirmed it, 258 and surveys showed it in spades 259people viewed Engel just as newspapers had reported it, as banning any and all
prayer in public schools. Indeed, in one study, a whopping 78.8% of participants thought Engel said "prayer in the public schools was to halt," while just
10.5% thought the ruling banned "state-prescribed prayer ... but saw no impairment of prayer in general." 260 Inadvertently proving the point, the studr
then went on to conclude (wrongly) that most people had gotten Engel right 26
The Justices felt they had been burned. Justice Black privately stated that
Engel was "grossly misrepresented and misunderstood" and expressed hope

257. "To Stand as a Guarantee," supra note 97, at 8.
258. Some letters illustrated the confusion. See, e.g., Letter from Mary Kathryn Davis

to Members of the Supreme Court (Mar. 1, 1963) (Earl Warren Papers, Box 366) (expressing
distress "at the thought of not being able to say a simple prayer in the public school which I
attend" and accusing the Justices of '"trying to take away the privilege of being able to worship FREELY whenever and WHEREVER we wish"); Letter from Madeline Theresa
McLain to Justice Hugo L. Black (n.d.) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 355) ("Your
decision to outlaw God from public life is very bad."); see also Letter to Justice Hugo L.
Black (n.d.) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 355) (sharing a poem, titled "Prayer on the
Q.T.," that opens with the line, "Now I sit me down to school/ Where praying is against the
rule"); Petition (n.d.) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 355) (proposing a constitutional
amendment "to guarantee that nothing in this constitution shall be construed to prohibit the
voluntary expressions of belief in the existence and providence of God, or the voluntary saying of prayers addressed to God").
Other letters recognized the confusion. See, e.g., Letter from Fred Larkins to Justice
Hugo L. Black (July 11, 1962) {Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) {"I am really concerned because of the greatly distorted views taken by the press and many individuals of the
Prayer decision. The truth is that regarding it as prohibiting prayer in schools makes a much
better and more sensational news story than to merely refer to it as a prohibition of preparation and promulgation of prayers by public officials."); Letter from George Mills to Justice
Hugo L. Black (n.d.) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 355) ("Also, the uproar over your
decision on prayer in schools appears to me to indicate a serious lack of understanding .... ").
259. A 1968 survey asked, "In general, what has the Supreme Court said about prayers
in the public schools?" Illustrative responses included, "They are not supposed to say prayers
or mention God in school"; "They've just cut it out completely"; "It banned them, I think";
"I don't recall what they said but they took the prayer out of the schools"; "They ruled it
out"; "They made a ruling that there were to be none"; and "It ruled them out. I don't know
for what reasons .... [T]hat's what is wrong with our nation." Gregory Casey, Popular Perceptions of Supreme Court Rulings, 4 AM. POL. Q. 3, 9, l 0 & tbl. l n.a (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
260. See id. at I 0-11.
Vi I. See id. at 11.
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that in due time the truth about the ruling would come to light. 262 Chief Justice
Warren expressed similar views, stating in private correspondence that he
hoped that as Engel became "more clearly understood the hysteria concerning
the decision w[ould] subside." 263 Justice Brennan was slightly more pointed in
his views, publicly stating that those who criticize a decision of the Suf[eme
Court "should at least read the decision" to attempt to understand it first. 2
And Justice Clark was more to the point yet. At an American Bar Association meeting two months after Engel was decided, Justice Clark broke from judicial custom of not commenting on the merits of a case to explain the decision
to the public. 265 "Here was a state-written prayer circulated to state-employed
teachers with instructions to have their pupils recite it in unison at the beginning of each school day," he stated, faulting the press for writing stories that
were inaccurate and incomplete. 266 Afterward, Justice Clark observed that
[a]s soon as people learned that this was all the court decided-not that there
could be no official recognition of a Divine Being or recognition on silver or
currency of "In God We Trust", or public acknowledgement that we are a religious nation-they understood the basis on which the court acted. 267
Ironically, his comments received little attention in the popular press. 268

As to whether such attempts to clarify Engel made much difference, the evidence is mixed. One researcher concluded, "As the volume of informed com-

262. Letter from B.W. Simmons to J.A. Fortner (Jan. 17, 1963) (Hugo LaFayette Black
Papers, Box 354) ("I talked with Justice Black .... [He) stated that the textual content of the
decision was grossly misrepresented and misunderstood and that he hoped in time the real
efficacy of the opinion and its objectives would be disseminated to the public."); see also
Letter from Justice Hugo L Black to Tom Murphy, Minister to Students, Auburn Univ. (July
3, 1962) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 358) ("Enclosed is the copy of all the opinions
of the Court in the case involving the New York Regents' official public school prayer. 1 can
readily understand how difficult it has been ... for you to know what the Court decided in
this case from much of the newspaper publicity about it.").
263. Letter from Earl Warren to Thomas J. Cunningham, Vice-President & Gen. Counsel, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley (Oct. 15, 1962) (Earl Warren Papers, Box 365).
264. High Court Found Imperiled by Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1963, at 13 (internal
quotation mark omitted) (quoting Justice Brennan); see also id. ("He cited the decision banning ritual prayers in the public schools as an example of decisions that produced criticism
by persons unfamiliar with what the Court said.").
265. See Hachten, supra note 242, at 4; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 157, at 442
(discussing Justice Clark's "almost unprecedented step of publicly defending" a Supreme
Court decision). For Justice Black's view of the propriety of speaking to the press about Engel, see Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Paula Fraser (July 9, 1962) (Hugo LaFayette
Black Papers, Box 358) ("Thanks for your interesting note of June 27th about our judgment
and opinion in the New York Regents' official state prayer case. Your suggestion that I talk
about the case on the radio or television is interesting, but I could [n]ot do this.").
266. Hachten, supra note 242, at 4 (internal quotation mark omitted).
267. id.
268. See Newland, supra note 238, at 29.
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ment grew, the reaction [to Engef] continued to subside," 269 and letters to Justice Black confirmed that at least some who took heed to actually read the decision did in fact change their view. 270 But at the end of the day, Engel remained
a staunchly unpopular decision, with substantial majorities favoring school
prayer (at least according to the results of most polls). 271 Scholars blamed the
media for not publishing follow-up stories to correct erroneous reports promptly, concluding that by the time the decision was clarified, initial misperceptions
had "hardened into the perception offact." 272 The public had made up its mind
about Engel, and was not open to changing it. 273

269. Hachten, supra note 242, at 7; see also Paul G. Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools
and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1031, 1031-32 (1963) ("Moreover, much of the
initial criticism was dissipated when the Court's full opinion was read and understood.").
270. See Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Roland Frye (July 17, 1962) (Hugo
LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) ("In recent days I have also had a number of communications from people whose views have changed since they became familiar with what the
Court decided. The quality of thought expressed in these communications has demonstrated
that the capacity for thinking has not been lost in this country."); Letter from Margaret Hopkins Worrell, Exec. Sec'y, Nat'! Shrine Comm'n, to Justice Hugo L. Black (Dec. 6, 1962)
(Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) (expressing changed view upon reading the decision); see also NEWMAN, s1'pra note 158, at 523 ("Many people wrote to say they changed
their minds about the decision once they read it .... ").
271. See 30 Years After the Supreme Court's School Prayer Decision, AM. ENTERPRISE,
Mar./Apr. 1992, at 102, 102 (reporting results of a September 1964 Gallup poll in which
77% of those asked said they would "[f]avor a constitutional amendment to legalize prayers
in public school"); id at 104 (reporting results of a June 1988 Gallup poll in which 70% of
those asked said they "[f]avor[ed] prayer in public schools").
Interestingly, although support for the concept of school prayer is strong, the polling results look much different when the question is concrete. Since the mid-1980s, support for
"Christian prayer" in schools has hovered around 10%, support for "general prayer" (like the
prayer in Engel) has hovered around 20%, and support for "silent prayer" has hovered
around 50%. See Alison Gash & Angelo Gonzales, School Prayer, in PUBLIC OPINION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 62, 68-70 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008) (comparing
results of polls asking about support for school prayer in general with polls starting in the
mid-l 980s asking about support for specific categories of prayer).
272. SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 263; see also FJSHER, supra note 213, at 126 ("The
public impression never recovered from these irresponsible readings."); GREY, supra note
242, at 95 ("[A]bscnt was any full-fledged drive by the wire services, especially, to speed
their clarifications .... [M]uch of the news coverage of the Engel decision failed to meet a
demanding standard of adequacy."); Hachten, supra note 242, at 9 ("Yet there should be a
point in the development of a story where speed gives way to reflection. For much of American journalism, this point came too late in the school-prayer case. And for one segment, it
never came at all.").
273. See William C. Adams, American Public Opinion in the 1960s on Two ChurchState Issues, 17 J. CHURCH & ST. 477, 479 (1975) ("A remarkable 97 percent of that large
majority favoring school prayers said that their minds were made up. Furthermore, 90 percent of those opposing school prayers had no doubts about their stance. This degree of certainty may explain the striking similarity between the 1964 and the 1968 data on the school
prayer issue.").
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That said, there is another indication of what an informed public might
have thought about Engel, and it comes from an unlikely source: the congressional hearings to overturn it. By the time of those hearings in 1964, some 150
proposals to amend the Constitution had been submitted by 115 members of
Congress. 274 Observers thought an amendment stood a good chance of passing
if it could make it out of the House Judiciary Committee, and a ma!ority of the
Judiciary Committee members reportedly supported it at the outset. 75 Even so,
a discharge petition to spring the amendment from committee and bring it
straight to the House floor had 167 votes at the start of the hearing processjust 51 short of the necessary 218. 276 At the time, pressure to ~ass some sort of
constitutional amendment was considered "nearly irresistible." 77
But the hearings changed everything. Supporters of the amendment process
had taken a simplistic view: "The people want prayers in schools; the Court
took them away; we, on behalf of the people, must restore them." 278 The hearings showed just how complex the issue actually was. What would the prayer
look like? Proponents of an amendment yielded to the inclusion of the words
"nondenominational" or "nonsectarian" in the proposed amendment's text, but
then the question became what those words meant, and who would get to define
them. 279 The best supporters could do was propose that local school boards decide what was appropriate for each school, but that led to questions about what

274. See DELFATTORE, supra note 36, at 116. The Senate Judiciary Committee held two
days of hearings in July 1962, but because the Justices recognized jurisdiction in Schempp
shortly thereafter, the amendment process was deemed premature and no action was taken.
See Steven K. Green, Evangelicals and the Becker Amendment: A Lesson in Church-State
Moderation, 33 J. CHURCH & Sr. 541, 551-52 (1991). Even after Schempp was decided, the
amendment process initially stalled because the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee was
opposed to an amendment. See id. at 557.
275. See Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 497 (noting that in early 1964, opponents
of the amendment thought that it "had an excellent chance of receiving the approval of a majority of the Judiciary Committee, that if reported out favorably it was likely to pass easily in
the House, and that while the Senate might delay passage of the bill, it would eventually pass
there as well"); id. at 502 {noting that at the beginning of the committee hearings, observers
estimated that the amendment "would easily win a majority in the committee"); Nation
Chooses Sides in Fight over Prayer, supra note 17, at 64 {"Sentiment in the House at this
time appears to favor passage of an amendment if the Judiciary Committee can agree on language and get a resolution to the floor.").
276. See Nation Chooses Sides in Fight over Prayer, supra note 17, at 64.
277. LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 84; see also ALLEY, supra note 17, at 123 ('The mood
was such that the Religious News Service offered the opinion, 'Congress will take action
before fall to submit such an amendment to the states for ratification.'").
278. Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 501.
279. LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 73; see also Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 500
("Which version of the Bible would be used? Would the Koran qualify under the amendment? Who would decide which prayers to say? Could the 'Ave Maria' be employed? And
again and again they returned to the basic theme: 'thou shalt not touch the Bill of Rights."').
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that would look like too. 280 Would each school district have a dominant religion, with the expectation being that people would move to the religious area of
their choice? Or were school districts expected to be able to accommodate numerous interests, if that was even possible? And what about the divisiveness,
and litigation, that would inevitably ensue if the hard questions were punted to
localities to work out on their own?
These questions and more filled three thick volumes of House Judiciary
Committee records, encapsulating 2774 pages of testimony by 197 witnesses
over the course of eighteen days. 281 Observers noted that proponents of the
amendment "fre~uently seemed annoyed by the complexities of issues framed
by opponents." 2 2 Reporting on the hearings in 1964, Ne:wsweek summed up
the glitch: "Everybody admits the difficulty of writing a proper amendment or
even an acceptable school prayer. Nothing is as simple as it once seemed." 283
As the hearings progressed, the tide turned on support for a constitutional
amendment. Congressmen reported a change in the constituency mail they were
receiving, noting that correspondence once running twenty-to-one in favor of
an amendment was now running just as strongly the opposite way. 284 Some
who had been among the first to call for an amendment now opposed it, and
others who had signed the amendment's discharge petition were prepared to
take their names off should the total start to approach the number necessary to
get to the House floor. 285 The Wall Street Journal reported that calls to amend
the Constitution had "trailed off to a whisper" and that only eight of the House
Judiciary Committee's thirty-five members still supported an amendment. 286
The proposal died quietly in committee. 287
280. See LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 73-74. Indeed, the Judiciary Committee's staff
study report raised so many questions about the practicalities of school prayer that several
members of the Committee strenuously objected to its release. See Beaney & Beiser, supra
note221, at498.
281. Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 499.
282. Id. at 501; see also DELFATTORE, supra note 36, at 120 ("Supporters of the
amendment were infuriated by questions about how this process would work for the same
reason that its opponents kept asking them: they shone a spotlight on contentious issues that
Becker would have preferred to finesse .... ").
283. Crawford, supra note 209, at 36.
284. See A Tide Reversed, TIME, June 19, 1964, at 60, 65.
285. See LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 85 ("Congressman Leggett, one of the first sponsors of a prayer amendment, had changed his mind and was urging the committee to reject
the Becker proposal."); Beancy & Beiser, supra note 221, at 502 ("It was apparent that the
drive for a discharge petition had passed its crest; not only could it not gain the necessary
218 signatures, but members who had signed the petition were prepared to remove their
names should the total approach 210.").
286. Joseph W. Sullivan, Support Fades for Change in Constitution to Allow Bible
Reading. Prayers in Schools, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1964, at 3.
287. See id ("[T]he prevailing disposition on the House committee is to bury the prayer
issue as quietly as possible. 'The only reason its obituary notice hasn't gone out already is
that we still don't know how to write it without risking another furor,' confides one committee leader."). Interestingly, later attempts to restore school prayer by constitutional amend-
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But the postscript to the story is, for present purposes, almost the best part.
In the process of responding to objections during the hearing process, the text
of the proposed amendment was repeatedly edited, bringing it closer and closer
to the Supreme Court's position in Engel. 288 In the end, the amendment that
died in committee became a plank in the 1964 Republican Party Platform,
which declared support for
a Constitutional amendment permitting those individuals and groups who
choose to do so to exercise their religion freely in public places, provided religious exercises are not prepared or prescribed by the state or political subdivision thereof and no person's participation therein is coerced, thus preserving
the traditional separation of church and state. 289

The messaging was better, but the substance was the same. What the Republicans wanted was no different from what the Supreme Court in Engel had actually held.
In short, it is anything but clear that Engel was a decision the public hated
on the merits, or even disagreed with at all. Misunderstanding played a massive
role in tanking the case. 1 turn next to the role that the religious establishment
played in saving it.
C. The Role of Religious (and Other) Elites
Lest the discussion thus far give the wrong impression, the hostility that
met Engel was bitter, loud, and overwhelming-but it was not unanimous. A
number of voices came to the Supreme Court's defense, and they too played a
critical role in the narrative of the case. Education elites-high-echelon education officials, the organizations they belonged to, and the professional publications they read-uniformly supported Enget. 290
ment failed for the same reason: once congressmen had to grapple with what school prayer
would actually look like on the ground, the drive for a constitutional amendment lost support. See infra note 388 and accompanying text (describing legislators' attempt to restore
school prayer by constitutional amendment in the 1980s).
288. The original text of the amendment read, "Nothing in this Constitution shall be
deemed to prohibit the offering, reading from, or listening to prayers, or biblical scriptures, if
participation therein is on a voluntary basis, in any governmental or public school, institution, or place." School Prayers: Hearings on Proposed Amendments to the Constitution Relating to Prayers and Bible Reading in the Public Schools Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 236 (1964) [hereinafter Hearings}. But the language softened as the
hearings progressed. See id. at 2320 (considering language to set aside time for "silent prayer
by any individual or group on a voluntary basis"); id. at 2358 (considering language to protect a parent's right to have "children engage in voluntary religious exercise"); see also
LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 151 ("But the more the texts were modified to meet the
acknowledged objections, the more they resembled the Supreme Court's own position in the
Engel and Schempp cases.").
289. LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted) (reproducing a
resolution adopted at the 1964 Republican Convention).
290. See BOLES, supra note 31, at 315 (discussing support for Engel among high-level
educators); JOHNSON, supra note 205, at 91-93 (discussing support for Engel among educa-
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President Kennedy also supported Engel, which was no surprise given the
fact that he had touted the principles underlying Engel two years before the Supreme Court decided it. 291 At a press conference shortly after Engel was decided, Kennedy stated:
I think that it is important for us if we are going to maintain our constitutional
principle that we support the Supreme Court decisions even when we may not
agree with them.
In addition, we have in this case a very easy remedy and that is to pray
ourselves. And I would think that it would be a welcome reminder to every
American family that we can pray a good deal more at home, we can attend
our churches with a good deal more fidelity, and we can make the true meaning of prayer much more important in the lives of all of our children. 292

Kennedy's comments were careful, measured, politic. But that sort of support
made sense in light of the fury that followed Engel; Kennedy was a politician.
That said, the support that mattered most in Engel came from what might
seem a surprising source: the nation's religious establishment. 293 In statement
after statement, leaders of the largest denominations took the Supreme Court's
side, and the reason was most always the same-Engel was a "blow against
fonnalism," 294 invalidating a prayer that was "of necessity so neutral, so interdenominational, so nonsectarian that it was simply not a religious utterance

tion specialty magazines appealing to a well-educated readership); Opinion of the Week:
Prayers in School, supra note 20 (quoting the U.S. Commissioner of Education as supporting Engel); Prayer Ban Backed by Education Aides, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1962, at 26 (discussing support for Engel by the President of the National Education Association and the
Secretary of the Educational Policies Commission).
291. See supra text accompanying note 85.
292. The President's News Conference, 1 PUB. PAPERS 509, 510-11 (June 27, 1962). To
see the press conference, and how President Kennedy used intonation to communicate support for Engel, see British Pathe, President Speaks on Prayer Banning in US. Schools
(1962), YouTusE (Apr. 13, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FOsPUpj7Fac.
293. One might have thought that the religious establishment would support school
prayer because it was prayer, especially in light of the ecumenical nature of the Regents'
Prayer. In addition, one might have thought that whatever fears the public had about the implications of Engel for religion in American society, the religious establishment would have
felt them tenfold.
294. Paul A. Friedrich, A Sermon (n.d.) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) (underlining omitted). "The prayer sounds like a Boy Scout oath," the Executive Secretary of
the Synagogue Council of America said. "It's a downgrading prayer." The Court Decisionand the School Prayer Furor, supra note 16, at 45 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Hearings, supra note 288, at 659 (quoting Edwin H. Tuller, General Secretary of the
American Baptist Convention, as stating, "It is because ofa deep respect for religion, and the
recognition that prayer is essential and should be a vital encounter between man and God,
that Baptists oppose devotional exercises that are more rote than worship"); Emmet John
Hughes, Schoolrooms and Prayers, NEWSWEEK, July I, 1963, at 15, 15 ("None of the nation's 83 larger religious bodies would confess that the vigor of its faith depends on the rather perfunctory recitation of a schoolroom prayer. And many a religious leader sensibly
views such routine rituals as more likely to blur than to focus religious feeling.").
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worthy of the name." 295 That kind of prayer wasn't good for prayer, religious
leaders stated, and in a pluralistic society, there was no other kind it could be.
"When the positive content of faith has been bleached out of prayer," said one
church spokesman, "I am not too concerned about retaining what is left." 296
Others agreed, 297 including the nation's two leading Protestant magazinesone liberal, one conservative. 298 Within two months, the National Council of
Churches, which purported to speak for thirty-one Protestant denominations
and forty million members, weighed in on Engel, praising the Supreme Court
for "guard[ing] against the development of 'public school reli~ion' which is
neither Christianity or Judaism but something less than either." 29
Within the religious establishment, that left just Catholics and Southern
evangelicals against Engel-and their denunciation of the decision was
fierce. 30 Catholics in particular were among Engel's most vehement critics. 301

°

295. Ruling on Prayer Upheld by Rabbis, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1962, § 1, at 48 (quoting
Rev. Dr. Joseph H. Lookstein).
296. See The Court Decision-and the School Prayer Furor, supra note 16, at 45 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the President of the Lutheran Church in America).
297. For example, the New York Times quoted Presbyterian Life, "the official magazine
of the 3,260,000-member United Presbyterian Church," as saying, "If you have faith-in·
general, you have no faith to speak of. Faith has to be in something-in-particular. A nondenominational prayer is doomed to be limited and circumscribed. If prayer starts soaring, it
starts to be controversial, which is one thing a nondenominational prayer dares not be."
Prayer Ban Wins Church Backing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1962, at 35 (internal quotation
mark omitted); see also Ruling on Prayer Upheld by Rabbis, supra note 295 (quoting one
rabbi as saying that ''nothing is more likely to rob prayer of its most profound purpose than a
prescribed and uninspired invocation" (internal quotation mark omitted)).
298. See On Second Thought ... , TIME, Aug. 24, 1962, at 40, 40 ("Church magazines
as different as the liberal Christian Century and the conservative Christianity Today have
backed the court ruling."); see also id. (quoting Presbyterian Life as supporting Engel, stat·
ing that the Regents' Prayer "was really a rather limited, circumscribed prayer directed to a
limited, circumscribed God" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
299. Alexander Burnham, Edict Is Called a Setback by Christian Clerics~Rabbis
Praise It, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1962, at 1 (quoting the Director of the National Council of
Churches' Department of Religious Liberty); see also Crawford, supra note 209, at 36 (noting membership numbers and approval of Engel by the National Council of Churches).
300. See Kirk W. Elifson & C. Kirk Hadaway, Prayer in Public Schools: When Church
and State Collide, 49 PUB. OPINION Q. 317, 319 {1985) (describing Southern evangelicals as
"those who are most vocal in pushing for constitutional amendments," and noting that they
"favor allowing prayer in public schools by a margin of94 to 6 percent"); Jeffries & Ryan,
supra note 26, at 323 ("The coalition of Protestants, Jews, and secularists produced a remarkable array of elite opinion in favor of the Supreme Court's school·prayer and Bible
reading decisions. This coalition left out conservative evangelicals-who were then less numerous, less well organized, and far less influential than today-and Roman Catholics."
(footnote omitted)).
301. See Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 482 ("Roman Catholic spokesmen were
extremely critical of the Court .... [T]he Jesuit weekly America used the adjectives 'asinine,' 'stupid,' 'doctrinaire,' and 'unrealistic."' (quoting Kurland, supra note 162, at 2 n.5));
Kurland, supra note 162, at 2 ("The Catholic hierarchy and its spokesmen were almost unan-
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Indeed, reports of religious opposition to Engel almost always quoted Catholic
leaders to prove the point. 302 Given the fact that Catholics had historically decried religious observances in public schools, and even drove much of the litigation to enjoin such practices, 303 the question is why. Why did Catholics condemn Engel when they had complained for so long about school prayer?
As a number of contemporary commentators observed, the answer almost
certainly had more to do with financial aid to parochial schools than school
prayer per se. 304 As Catholics came into their own, their priorities shifted from
wanting (Protestant) religion out of public schools to wanting public funding
for religious schools of their own. 305 Engel undercut that position in two ways.
First, it took away Catholics' chief complaint-that religious observances made
public schools inhospitable for children of the Catholic faith. 306 Second, it added another brick to the wall of separation between church and state-culturally,

imous in condemnation of the Court in most vehement terms."); Burnham, supra note 194
("Roman Catholic opinion was particularly strong in opposition to the court's decision.").
302. See, e.g., Buroham, supra note 194 (quoting multiple cardinals opposed to Engel);
Burnham, supra note 299 (same); George Dugan, Clergy Is Divided on School Prayer, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 1962, at 51 (discussing Roman Catholic opposition); School Prayer Ban
Scored at Red Mass, supra note 154 (discussing a Jesuit priest's remarks); Spellman Renews
Attack on Court's Decision, N. Y. TIMES, June 28, 1962, at t 7 (discussing Cardinal Spellman's vigorous attack on the Supreme Court's school prayer ruling).
303. See BOLES, supra note 31, at 220 ("When examining the attitudes of Roman Catholics regarding Bible-reading practices in the public schools, one fact in particular stands
out: Most of the litigation seeking to enjoin such exercises has been brought by Catholic and
Jewish citizens."); SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 319 (stating that the Roman Catholic
Church's opposition to Engel was "a reversal of the position it held for a century"); Gordon,
supra note 66, at 1216 ("Engel and Schempp created a new fault line when Catholics, who
had long complained that reading the King James Bible was hardly an ecumenical approach
to religion, rallied around the concept of prayer as key to education in a democracy.").
304. See, e.g., The Court Decision-and the School Prayer Furor, supra note 16, at 45
("[An attorney] added that the decision 'makes it clear that Federal funds may not be used to
finance parochial-school education.' The ruling may mean no such thing, but, judging from
their heated response, the point was not lost on Catholic leaders, who favor church-school
aid."); Lewis, supra note 234 ("The critics may have reacted as bitterly as they did because
they felt the decision did foreshadow rulings against [parochial school] assistance."). Similarly, the New York Times quoted the New York Post as writing, "The indignation of the
Catholic hierarchy is understandable. It is prompted, we suspect, not by the prohibition of a
prayer which many churchmen would agree had little religious value, but by the potential
impact of the decision on the aid-to-education battle." Excerpts from Editorials on School
Prayer Decision, supra note 207. Indeed, a Catholic was on the interdenominational committee that wrote the Regents' Prayer. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
305. See BOLES, supra note 31, at 228 (noting Catholic preference for a "system oftaxsupported parochial schools" to overcome the various drawbacks to religious education in
public schools); GREEN, supra note 31, at 83 (noting a tum in the wake of the Philadelphia
"Bible Riots" from "seeking to resolve the Bible reading issue in the public schools" to "creating parochial schools to serve the growing number of Catholic children").
306. In fairness, this was a minor point, as Engel provided a new claim to make: public
schools were secular, and that was inhospitable for Catholics too.
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politically, jurisprudentially. 307 In short, Catholics genuinely hated Engel, but
not because they loved school prayer. Catholics hated Engel because of what it
meant for them.
As time passed, however, the religious landscape shifted. By the start of
the congressional amendment hearings in the spring of 1964, mainstream
Protestant support for Engel had hardened and was virtually unanimous. 308
And the Catholic position on Engel had moved from vehement opposition to
"guarded approval." 309 Even Southern evangelicals had split, with some supporting efforts to amend the Constitution and others concluding that the Supreme Court had been right. 310 In the end, almost every mainstream denomination in the United States went on record in favor of Engel, with over thirty
presenting testimony before Congress. 311 The consensus was clear~prayer that
was "more rote than worship" was not prayer worth praying, 312 and in a world
of religious pluralism, that was all that was left.
With the religious establishment's testimony in Congress, momentum to
amend the Constitution first slowed, then went the other way. 313 To be fair,
others played a part too; a petition signed by 223 law professors, for example,
was thought to have had sway (at least among law professors). 314 But it was

307. See Berg, supra note 65, at 126-27 ("While the bishops clearly supported public
school prayer itself (which had become less Protestant and more ecumenical over the years),
they almost certainly were looking beyond the issue: their chief concern lay in establishing
church-state 'cooperation' rather than separation as the rule for future school aid disputes.").
308. See A Tide Reversed, supra note 284, at 62 ("Almost every Protestant denomination-ranging from the Seventh-day Adventists to the Episcopal National Council-has
gone on record endorsing the decisions.").
309. Id. Perhaps Justice Brennan's concurrence in Schempp made a difference. See infra notes 349-52 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan's stated intent to use
his concurrence to speak to the Catholic Church); see also James O'Gara, Prayer in School,
80 COMMONWEAL 442, 442 (1964) (discussing results of a po\1of48 Catholic editors, 35 of
which opposed an amendment overturning Engel, and listing the reasons given as
"[r]cluctance to resort to constitutional amendment; concern over weakening of chances for
aid to parochial schools should the amendment be enacted; the view that public school devotions with proper concern for all involved are a practical impossibility; and the fear that
many parents would consider school prayers as adequate religious instruction for their children" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
310. See Green, supra note 274, at 564. For a discussion of how Engel fundamentally
realigned the traditional Protestant-Catholic split, creating a new coalition of conservative
Protestants and Catholics, see Gordon, supra note 66, at 1210-19.
311. See GoLD, supra note 48, at 126.
312. Hearings, supra note 288, at 659 (quoting Edwin H. Tuller, General Secretary of
the American Baptist Convention); see also LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 54, 78, 81 (quoting
congressional testimony opposing a constitutional amendment to allow nonsectarian prayer
on the grounds that such prayer was inherently "routine, casual, and indiscriminate, in the
same category with algebra and spelling," "a theological caricature at best or a theological
monstrosity at worst," and a "trivial inconvenience" to get out of the way before getting to
the important work of the day {internal quotation marks omitted)).
313. See A Tide Reversed, supra note 284, at 60, 62, 65.
314. See Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 500.
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church opposition to state-sponsored religion that formed the cornerstone of the
anti-amendment position and religious support for Engel that ultimately won
the day. 315
In part, church testimony was important because it made people think
about what nonsectarian prayer looked like in a religiously diverse society; in
part, it was important just for the signal it sent. Members of Congress confided
that before church leaders testified, it would have been political suicide to oppose calls for an amendment. 316 The question had been framed as "whether one
is for prayer or against it," and the answer to that was easy, especially in an
election year. 317 What religious leaders showed was that the question was not
that sim~le, and it was also not true that only the godless opposed God in public
schools. 18 Once backed by the religious establishment, congressmen could respectably oppose school prayer if they wanted. And they did.
What the support of religious (and other) elites in Engel might tell us about
the nature of Supreme Court controversies more broadly is a question I explore
below. For now, suffice it to say that elites played a distinctly educative role in
Engel, and it was critical in preserving the case. For the Supreme Court's at-

315. See id. (describing religious opposition as "the major factor which tipped the balance against the [pro-amendment] forces"); Sullivan, supra note 286 ("Church opposition to
a state-sponsored 'homogenized' religion has been the cornerstone of the case against other
prayer amendment proposals.").
316. See BOLES, supra note 31, at 299 ("A number of congressmen privately confided
to this author that if the discharge petition had been successful the amendment would have
passed the House of Representatives since many members of the House felt it was impossible politically to oppose the amendment despite personal views to the contrary."); Heaney &
Beiser, supra note 221, at 496 (quoting an unnamed "powerful Southern committee chairman" as saying, "I have been somewhat silent on the subject matter, waiting for the hysteria
to subside," and noting that "Congressman Becker put additional pressure on his colleagues
by threatening to come into the district of every congressman who failed to support his
amendment and actively campaign against him in the forthcoming election" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
317. BOLES, supra note 31, at 254 (paraphrasing testimony of the Executive Director of
the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs); see also Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at
496 ("In an election year, no Congressman wanted to be placed in a position of appearing to
vote against God, which was exactly the role into which supporters of the Court were being
forced."). As one Representative, an opponent of an amendment, said, "[T]he question before us now is, 'Do we want to change the First Amendment?' It must be discussed without
any suggestion that those who seriously question any change are somehow anti-God, or
antichildren or antimother." New Uproar over School Prayers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
May 4, 1964, at 12, 12 (internal quotation mark omitted).
318. See DELFATTORE, supra note 36, at 115-16 ("Above all, [amendment opponents)
were determined to neutralize the perception that a vote against the amendment would be a
vote against God .... [T)his activism encouraged anti-amendment members of Congress to
speak out, since they could refute the charge of ungodliness by pointing to all the religious
leaders and legal experts who shared their view."); see also Beaney & Beiser, supra note
221, at 497 (noting that "the most important function" that the religious establishment served
at the hearings was "to make it 'respectable' and 'safe' for Congressmen to oppose the
Becker proposal").
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tempt to play an educative role of its own, I tum to its 1963 decision in School
District ofAbington Township v. Schempp.
D. The Supreme Court Responds: School District of Abington Township
v. Schempp
The Supreme Court's 1963 decision in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 319 which struck down Bible reading and recitation of the
Lord's Prayer in public schools, is typically viewed as a continuation of the
Court's countennajoritarian streak in Engel. Not only did the Justices decide
Engel, but in its wake, they did the most bold, brave thing they could do: they
took another school religion case and again invalidated religious observances in
public schools. 320 So stated, Schempp doubles down on Engel's counterrnajoritarian narrative, showcasing the Court's capacity to stand firm even as threats
of a constitutional amendment were hurled against it. Yet here again, the historical record reveals a different reality.
The story starts with the Supreme Court's decision to take Schempp in the
first place--or, more accurately, its lack thereof. Missed in most of the commentary on Schempp is the fact that the case was a direct appeal from a threejudge district court panel, a mechanism that at the time conferred mandatory
jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court. 321 Thus, while it is true that the Court decided Schempp in Engel's wake, the reality is that it had no choice. 322

319. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
320. ALLEY, supra note 17, at 120 ("In the midst of this public uproar the Court assembled for the fall and straight away agreed to hear appeals of two cases involving prayer and
Bible reading in public schools .... "); PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT 411 (2006) ("The justices could easily have denied review in Abington Township v.
Schempp, which differed from Engel only in the text of the classroom prayer. Most likely,
they wanted to tell the politicians who demanded a constitutional amendment to reverse Engel that the Court stood firm in the face of pressure."); Lewis, supra note 234 ("Few Supreme Court decisions in recent years have aroused so much public anguish as the case of
the New York Regents prayer. ... Now, as one of the first acts in their new term, the justices
have agreed to take a fresh look at the broad problem of religion in the public schools.").
321. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 371 U.S. 807 (1962), noting prob.
juris. in 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1962). For a history of the three-judge district court,
which was established to hear claims against the state for injunctive relief on constitutional
grounds, and a discussion of the mandatory appellate jurisdiction that came with it, see Michael E. Solimine, Congress. Ex Parte Young. and the Fate of the Three-Judge District
Court, 70 U. Pm. L. REV. 101 (2008).
322. The Schempps continued to have children in school throughout the litigation, so
not even taxpayer standing, which had provided the Justices an out in other early school religion cases, was available. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 206 (noting that two of the Schempp
children were current students and that another was originally a party but graduated and thus
was voluntarily dismissed from the suit); supra note 119 (citing dismissal of Doremus for
lack of standing). Not even Alexander Bickel's "passive virtues" could have helped the Justices avoid Schempp, as jurisdiction in the case was mandatory. See Alexander M. Bickel,
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In fairness, the Supreme Court did have a choice in taking Murray v.
Curlett, 323 the companion case to Schempp. The plaintiffs in that case were
William J. Murray III and his mother, Madalyn Murray-an outspoken and
controversial atheist who would later become known as "The Most Hated
Woman in America." 324 In the wake of Engel, just the fact that the Court
granted certiorari in Murray suggests some modicum of bravery.
But not much. Although Murray arrived at the Supreme Court first, the
Justices did not grant certiorari in the case until the day they recognized jurisdiction in Schempp. 325 Even then, there was substantial discussion among the
Justices as to whether both cases could be summarily disposed of under En326
gel.
Ultimately, they decided against summary disposition because the state
in Schempp and Murray had not actually composed the religious observances at
issue. 327 The cases would need to be considered on the merits, and "[b~ecause
of the striking similarity in the facts and the identity of the basic issue," 28 they
would need to be considered together.
Yet even as a companion case, the Justices' treatment of Murray is telling.
Murray's case number at the Supreme Court came before Schempp's, which
should have resulted in the consolidated cases being styled under the caption of
Murray v. Curlett. 329 But that is not what the Justices did; they gave Schempp
the lead case name instead. Indeed, the first draft of the Court's opinion did not
mention the name "Murray" at all, referring to the case by its case number and
to the Murrays as "petitioners" instead. 330 The move was, to borrow from journalism professor Stephen Solomon, "like overlooking a town fireworks display

The Supreme Court 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 4042 (1961) (discussing passive virtues in light of the 1960 Supreme Court term).
323. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
324. Jane Howard, 'The Most Hated Woman in America,' LIFE, June 19, 1964, at 91, 91
(internal quotation marks omitted). Ironically, her son William later became an evangelical
Christian and picketed her public appearances. See DlERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 186. For
an in-depth discussion of Madalyn Murray and her challenge of school religious observances, see id at 163-86.
325. Murray's petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on May 15, 1962. The Justices
granted certiorari on October 8, 1962, the same day they recognized jurisdiction in Schempp.
Compare Murray v. Curlett, 371 U.S. 809 (1962), granting cert. to 179 A.2d 698 (Md.
1962), with Schempp, 371 U.S. 807 (noting probable jurisdiction).
326. Chief Justice Warren, along with Justices Brennan and Douglas, thought the cases
should be decided summarily under Engel. See SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 265-67 (relating
discussion among the Justices as to how the two Bible reading cases should be handled).
327. See id.
328. Tom C. Clark, Draft Opinion at 3, Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, No.
142 (May 1963 ), available at http://tar\ton.law.utex.as.edu/clark/view_ doc.php'!id=al 43-10
-01. Both cases challenged Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer. Id at 3 n.3.
329. Murray's docket number was 119; Schempp's was 142. See Mengler, supra note
241, at 339 (discussing Murray and Schempp in light of the Court's custom of using the lowest docket number as the style for consolidated cases).
330. See Clark, supra note 328.
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taking place on your front lawn." 331 But for a Court under attack, it made
sense. Having determined they could not ignore Murray, or summarily dispose
of it and Schempp, the Justices did the next best thing they could: they downplayed Madalyn Murray as much as humanly possible. Whereas the facts of
Schempp spanned seven pages (beginning with the introduction of the named
plaintiffs as devout Unitarians), the facts of Murray were relef ated to two short
paragraphs, appearing almost as an afterthought in the case. 33
On the law, Schempp was easy. In fact, a number of the Justicesincluding Justice Stewart-recognized that the daily devotionals at issue in the
companion cases were even more of an Establishment Clause violation than the
state-written prayer in Engel. 333 Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's
Prayer were unequivocally sectarian, and the state was sponsoring their use. 334
"Unless we reverse [Engel] we must reverse here," Chief Justice Warren stated
in conference, and only Justice Stewart disagreed. 335 Justice Stewart thought
that between the two religion clauses, "[t]he free exercise clause is the important one." 336 As long as individuals had room to go their own way, he argued, what the state did (or did not do) by way of daily devotionals was not
constitutionally significant. Once again, he was the lone dissenter. 337
Although on the law Schempp was easy, the public relations aspect of the
case made it hard. "This issue is a heated one," Justice Goldberg stated in conference, noting that the public would need to be "reassured." 338 And that is exactly what the Justices in Schempp set out to do.
The Justices' efforts at reassuring the public in Schempp started with who
was assigned to write it: Tom Clark. Unlike Justice Black, Justice Clark was
one of the Warren Court's core conservatives, a man who could be counted on
to write a careful, centrist opinion that minimized misunderstanding and emphasized the limits of the case. 339 In addition, Justice Clark's hardline anti331. SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 288.
332. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205-13 (1963).
333. In the conference on Murray, Chief Justice Warren stated, "This case is stronger
than that case was. This is a violation of the establishment clause." SUPREME COURT IN
CONFERENCE, supra note 16, at 425. Justice Stewart stated, "This is more of an establishment
clause case than [Engel v.] Vitale. This is sectarian." Id. at 426. And in the conference on
Schempp, Justice Goldberg stated, "[T]his is a much more religious prayer than the one in
Vitale." Id.
334. Once again, the State essentially conceded the point. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 210
(noting that the State's expert testified that the Bible was nonsectarian but upon further questioning "stated that the phrase 'non-sectarian' meant to him non-sectarian within the Christian faiths").
335. See SUPREME COURT JN CONFERENCE, supra note 16, at 425-26 (quoting Chief Justice Warren).
336. Id. at 426 (quoting Justice Stewart).
337. See id. at 425-26; see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 308-20 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
338. SUPREMECOURTINCONFERENCE,supra note 16, at426 (quoting Justice Goldberg).
339. Justice Black would have been the obvious choice for the assignment to write
Schempp; he had authored not only Engel but also Everson and McCollum-two of the three

534

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:479

Communist efforts while Attorney General made it harder for critics to claim
that the Supreme Court was subvertin~ democracy in favor of atheistic Communists, as they had in Engel's wake. 40 Justice Clark was an ideal choice for
yet another reason as well: he had been deeply disturbed by the press corps'
handling of Engel and was certain to be attentive to the public relations aspect
of the case. 341 In the aftennath of Engel, that was (almost) the entire point.
The difference was palpable. If any one line of the opinion in Schempp
captured its overridiny theme, it was this: "The place of religion in our society
is an exalted one." 34 And in Schempp, the Supreme Court's nod to religion
was not just abstract. It was punctuated with references to religious practices in
public life-oaths of office, legislative prayer, military chaplains, the Court crier's announcement at the beginning of each session of the Supreme Court-all
of which were cited with reverence. 343 By design, the opinion in Schempp left
no doubt about the Court's respect for religion and no room for an overly broad
interpretation of the case.
A close second by way of overarching themes in the Schempp opinion was
the importance ofreligious freedom in a religiously diverse society. Here again,
the opinion made abstract ideals concrete, providing data on religious diversity
and explaining how respect for pluralism was a core component of the religious
freedom that marked the American way. 344 And whereas Engel had not cited a
single case, Schempp referenced a veritable catalog of Supreme Court precedent, citing case after case to bolster its point. 345 The Constitution required
"strict neutrality," the Supreme Court explained, not because it was against religion, but because the First Amendment was for it. 346
Rounding out the majority's o~inion in Schempp were three concurrences-one each by Justices Douglas, 47 Brennan, 348 and Goldberg. 349 For purposes of the present discussion, Justice Brennan's seventy-page concurring
opinion is most worthy of note, if only because he asked the other Justices not
prior school religion cases. See SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 284-85 (discussing the tactical
assignment of the Schempp opinion to Clark); supra note 134 {listing the three school religion cases prior to Enge{); see also POWE, supra note 14, at 359 (noting that Justice Clark
was assigned the Schempp opinion in part because he was "a conservative, not a crazy").
340. See SOLOMON, 1mpra note 31, at 285.
341. See supra notes 265-68 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Clark's public
comments about Engel).
342. 374 U.S. at 226; see also Lewis, supra note 157 ("[The Justices in Schempp] bent
over backwards to praise the role of religion in this country. They made clear-as they had
not entirely done a year ago-that a ban on the use of the public school classroom for devotional exercises did not mean the rooting out of other religious elements from public life.").
343. See 374 U.S. at 212-13.
344. See id. at 214-15.
345. See id. at 215-21.
346. See id. at 225.
347. id at 227 (Douglas, J., concurring).
348. Id. at 230 (Brennan, J., concurring).
349. id at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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to join it. 350 Justice Brennan wanted to appeal to a Catholic audience as a
Catholic, and for that he feit the opinion needed to be his and his alone. 351
There could be no doubt as to where he stood. "[N]ot every involvement of religion in public life violates the Establishment Clause," Justice Brennan explained, noting that Schempp said nothing about church-state issues such as
"the propriety of certain tax deductions or exemptions which incidentally benefit churches and religious institutions." 352 One could almost hear the Catholic
sigh of relief.
The difference between the Engel and Schempp decisions was not lost on
the media, which credited the Justices for having "learned a bit about public relations" since 1962. 353 In every part of the Schempp opinion-from its caption,
to its recitation of the facts, to its recognition of religion's importance, to its
celebration of religious diversity-the Court communicated with the public in
mind. Even the fact that a Protestant, a Catholic, and a Jew each wrote an opinion in the case sent a signal of religious solidarity that did not go unnoticed. 354
As Thomas Mengler has noted, Schempp was nothing if not a public relations
exercise; "[r]eading the Schempp decision as an ordinary example of Court reasoning, therefore, misses the point" of what the Justices were trying to do. 3 55

350. See SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMrEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LJBERAL CHAMPION 173
(2010) ("Brennan showed the seventy-page final product to his fellow justices in May 1963
after two and a half months of effort. He made clear to his colleagues that he wished this to
be his statement alone. He would accept no offers to join the opinion.").
351. See CRAY, supra note 141, at 407 ("Brennan, the sole Catholic on the court, asked
that no one else join him. He was, in effect, appealing as a communicant to the hierarchy of
the Catholic Church in America and to influential laymen for their support."); STERN &
WERMIEL, supra note 350, at 173 ("Brennan specifically sought to explain to a Catholic audience what justified his breaking with what he viewed as the Church's position.").
352. 374 U.S. at 294, 301 (Brennan, J., concurring).
353. A Loss to Make Up for, supra note 189, at 13; see also K.aufinan, supra note 234,
at 50 (noting that Schempp was "[w]ritten much more with an eye toward public perusal and
in anticipation of public criticism"); Lewis, supra note 157 ("The Court, for its part, has seldom shown awareness of public opinion more plainly than in its handling of the new prayer
cases that came down this week."); Editorial, Moral Heritage and the Law, LIFE, June 28,
t 963, at 4, 4 (noting that the Schempp opinion "show[ed] that the Court has deeply pondered
the public fears as well as the legal arguments surrounding the case"); CBS Reports: Storm
over the Supreme Court Part Ill; Bible Reading in the Public Schools (CBS television
broadcast June 19, 1963) ("[T]he Court itself has taken a lesson from last year's reaction,
and has pitched the several opinions to the attitude of the public in full awareness, in fuller
awareness, indeed, than a year ago, of the delicacy of this issue in the public mind." (quoting
Harvard Law School professor Paul Freund)).
354. Church and State, supra note 153, at 48 ("Justice Clark, a Protestant, was supported by the opinions of Justice William 0, Douglas, Justice William J. Brennan, the Court's
only Roman Catholic, and Justice Arthur Goldberg, the Court's only Jew."); Anthony Lewis,
2 Cases Decided, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1963, at 1 ("It was particularly noted by courtroom
observers that the voices of a Protestant, a Catholic and a Jew on the Court spoke up for the
principle of church-state separation,").
355. See Mengler, supra note 241, at 345.
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To some extent, it worked. Despite the "shudder of apprehension" that
marked the Supreme Court's consideration of Schempp, 356 and the fact that the
Court's ruling had a far broader reach than Engel, reaction to Schempp was decidedly mild. 357 Headlines were mostly favorable. 358 Media outlets quoted the
portions of the opinion that recognized the importance of religion and limitations of the decision. 359 And the same newspapers that had taken an editorial
position against Engel in 1962 now favored Schempp. 360 Indeed, one study of
185 editorials written in the aftermath of Schempp revealed that sixty-one percent supported the Supreme Court's decision. 361
Not surprisingly, most religious leaders also supported Schempp. By I 963,
many mainstream Protestants had come to the conclusion that Bible reading,
like school prayer, led to "indoctrination or meaningless ritual," 362 and as such,
had issued statements against the practice even before the Supreme Court issued its ruling. 363 As with Engel, Jews were strong supporters of Schempp,
356. Westin, supra note 182, at 30.
357. See Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 483 ("A careful observer concluded that
'the reaction in the total American community to the ruling was markedly more positive than
it had been to the Court's decision in the Regent·,.,. Prayer case one year earlier."' (quoting
Memorandum from Arnold Forster, Dir., Civil Liberties Div., Anti-Defamation League, to
All ADL Regional Offices I (July 11, 1963))); Kaufman, supra note 234, at 51 ("Public
commentary, on the whole, was more moderate in tone."); Congress Reacts Mildly to Ban;
Some Ask Amendment to Kill It, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1963, at 27 (noting that congressional
reaction to Schempp "was much milder today than it was after a similar decision a year
ago"); A Loss to Make Up for, supra note 189, at 13 ("Last week, when the Supreme Court
issued a far broader ban on religious observances in schools, the reaction was relatively
mild."). Indeed, a mild public reaction was anticipated even before Schempp was announced.
See Anthony Lewis, High Court Ruling on School Prayer ls Expected Today, N.Y. TIMES,
June 17, 1963, at 1 ("The initial public reaction to the prayer decision a year ago was highly
critical. However, opinion has evidently shifted to a significant extent.").
358. See JOHNSON, supra note 205, at 81 tb!.4, 82 (noting a "qualitative difference between these headlines and those of the year before" and providing a table of newspaper
headlines on Schempp, including "Religious Freedom Protected by the Court," "Jefferson
Sustained," "Court Decision Draws Mild Reaction," "Congressional Court Critics Less Angry," and "Church Reaction to Court Decision Mostly Favorable").
359. See id. at 80 (discussing newspaper coverage of Schempp in detail and concluding
that "news services, then, were quick to pick up the portion of Clark's dicta which explicitly
stated the limits of the ruling and which acknowledged the traditional place of religion in
American society").
360. See id. at 82 ("The change in tenor was perhaps even more pronounced on the editorial pages. In 1962 all the newspapers which took an editorial position opposed the Engel
ruling, while in 1963 the same newspapers ... favored the Schempp decision.").
361. See Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 483.
362. Green, supra note 274, at 553 (quoting articles published in Christianity Today and
Presbyterian Life in 1963).
363. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 284 n.61 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting the May 1963 issue of the Episcopalian as stating that
"prayer and Bible reading are too sacred to be permitted in public schools"); id. at 284-85
(quoting the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs as stating, "When one thinks of prayer as sincere outreach of a human soul to the Creator, 'required prayer' becomes an absurdi-
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while Catholics and fundamentalists were strong opponents. 364 Even so, Catholic criticisrri of Schempp was more restrained than it had been of Engel, 365 and
by 1963, some of Engel's critics had changed their minds. "Unlike last
year, ... when I reacted emotionally, illogically, and non-intellectually," one
church spokesman told the press, "this decision doesn't disturb me." 366
This is not to say Schempp was popular by any stretch. Members of Congress submitted almost twice as many proposals for a constitutional amendment
as they had in response to Engel. 367 Southerners renewed vows of noncompliance.368 And public opinion polls continued to show overwhelming support for
religious observances in school, 369 although there was some indication that the

ty" (quoting Editorial, Religion Sponsored by the Stale, 4 J. CHURCH & ST. 141, 144 (1962))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 286 n.65 (quoting a May 1963 draft policy statement of the National Council of the Churches of Christ that "neither true religion nor good
education is dependent upon the devotional use of the Bible in the public school program"
(quoting Susanna McBee, Bible Use in Schools Criticized, WASH. POST, May 25, 1963, at
Al)); SORAUF, supra note 105, at 302 (noting a June 7, 1963, resolution passed by the National Council of Churches by a vote of 65 to 1 opposing religious observances in public
schools).
364. See George Dugan, Churches Divided, with Most in Favor, N.Y. TlMES, June 18,
1963, at l; see also Billy Graham Voices Shock over Decision, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1963, at
27; Rabbis Acclaim Prayer Decision, N.Y. T!MES, June 23, 1963, § 1, at 65.
365. See Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 484 ("Whereas expressions ofopinion by
Catholic leaders after Engel had been almost uniformly critical, several Catholic Bishops and
Archbishops now issued statements calling for restraint."); see also Editorial, The Court Decides Wisely, 80 C!IR.ISTIAN CENTURY 851, 851 (1963) (discussing a joint statement of twenty-five Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish leaders supporting Schempp).
366. Church and State, supra note 153, at 48 (internal quotation marks omitted).
367. That said, congressional commentary on Schempp was likewise relatively mild.
See Congress Reacts Mildly to Ban; Some Ask Amendment to Kill ft, supra note 357; see also Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 492-93 (comparing the number of amendments submitted after each decision and noting "an interesting paradox: popular reaction to Engel was
much greater than the outcry after Schempp; yet at the same time positive political action
was much more significant after Schempp than it had been a year earlier").
As to the reason for the disconnect, Bcaney and Beiser arc likely right: politicians were
gearing up for the elections of 1964. See Seaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 492-93; see
also id at 496 (noting that Congressman Becker, chief proponent of the school prayer
amendment, "put additional pressure on his colleagues by threatening to come into the district of every congressman who failed to support his amendment and actively campaign
against him in the forthcoming election"). Interestingly, the Supreme Court's school prayer
rulings did not play a part in the 1964 presidential elections. See id at 503 ("But little was
made of the prayer issue in the [1964] Presidential campaign save as a small part of a broadside attack on the Supreme Court.").
368. The Schools and Prayer, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 9, 1963, al 82, 82 ("The greatest bitterness has developed in Southern states. In Alabama, there was open defiance .... 'We are not
going to conform,' [Governor Wallace] said. 'Ifthe courts rule that we can't read the Bible
in some school, l 'm going to that school and read the Bible myself.' In Arkansas, State Attorney General Bruce Bennett advised the schools to continue devotional exercises.").
369. See 3 GALLUP, supra note 19, at 1837 (reporting that seventy percent of respondents in a 1963 poll disapproved of the Supreme Court's ruling "that no state or local gov-
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intensity of the public's preferences had faded. Whereas the Justices had received more than 5000 letters in the first month after Engel, they received just
100 in Schempp' s wake. 370
What to make of the generally more muted response to Schempp is hard to
say. Perhaps the Supreme Court's opinion made a difference. Or perhaps in the
year following Engel, the public had come to understand (or at least accept) the
decision on its own. Perhaps the country was more mentally prepared for the
mling, 371 or the Court's popularity on other issues had insulated it somewhat. 372 Or perhaps those who were most opposed to the decision had come to
understand that low-level noncompliance-business as usual until sued-was
the way to go. 373
Whatever the explanation, the result was a less inflamed public-but for
the Justices, enough was enough. It would be almost another twenty years before the Supreme Court would strike down another school religious observance
under the Establishment Clause, 374 leaving Engel and Schempp as bookends of
the Court's foray into the saga of school prayer. The question that remains is
what a deeper understanding of that saga might tell us about Supreme Court
decisionmaking in general, the Court's countermajoritarian capacity in particular, and the role of judicial review.

emment may require the reading of the Lord's Prayer or Bible verses in public schools" (italics omitted)).
370. See GREY, supra note 242, at 83. Schempp was nevertheless Justice Clark's most
controversial opinion during his fourteen-year tenure on the Supreme Court. DIERENFIELD,
supra note 14, at 178. For thoughts about why Congress cared more about Schempp when
the people cared less, see note 367 above.
371. See School Prayer ls Out, CHI. TRJB., June 18, 1963, at 18 ("After the decision a
year ago which ruled that it was unconstitutional for the New York state board of regents to
prescribe a noncompulsmy form of prayer for the schools, the latest decision was predictable."); cf supra note 17 4 and accompanying text (noting that Engel came as a surprise).
372. The Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), on
March 18, 1963, recognizing the right to counsel for indigent felony defendants. It was one
of the most popular cases of the entire Warren Court era. See Corinna Barrett Lain,
Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court's Role in the Criminal
Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 1361, 1391-93 (2004) (discussing Gideon's
popularity among the public and in the popular press, as well as the best-selling novel that it
inspired in 1964, Gideon's Trumpet).
373. See supra note 223 (discussing the persistence of religious observances in Southern schools despite the Supreme Court's school prayer rulings, and barriers to enforcement
actions there).
374. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40, 61 (1985) (invalidating a law authorizing
teachers to set aside one minute at the start of the school day for a moment of meditation or
silent prayer); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 39, 42-43 (1980) (per curiam) (invalidating a
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in classrooms); see also Stein v.
Oshinsky, 382 U.S. 957 (1965), denying cert. to 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965) (dismissing a
suit against a grade school that ordered its teachers to stop having children say grace before
eating).
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WHY IT MATTERS

Having reconstructed the story of Engel, I now turn to why it matters. First
I consider, and reject, the heroic, countermajoritarian narrative for which Engel
is famous. Then I tum to three other areas of constitutional law in which a reconstructed narrative of Engel has purchase. Engel adds a new strand to a
growing body of work on the power of social movements to generate constitutional change. It presents a rare glimpse of the Justices explicitly engaging in
the dialogic function of judicial review. And it exposes qualitative differences
in the way popular constitutionalism might play out in practice, with implications for the theory itself.
A. The Reality a/Engel's Heroic, Countermajoritarian Narrative

Engel is a canonical case because by conventional wisdom, it shows that
the notion of our Supreme Court defending unpopular minorities against powerful majorities is not just some pointy-headed theory. It actually happens. It
happened in Engel.
Here I consider the reality of that heroic, countennajoritarian narrative, but
before beginning, I pause for a moment to clarify the terms of the debate. When
we talk about the Supreme Court's countermajoritarian capacity, what sort of
countermajoritarianisrn is at issue? And what sort of evidence is fair game in
assessing it?
As to the first question, what is not at issue is any doubt about whether the
Supreme Court protects unpopular minorities from local majorities. Surely the
Court did so in Engel, as it has in countless other cases. But even Congress can
do that-witness the Civll Rights Act of 1964. 375 What is at issue in the current
debate about Supreme Court decisionmaking and the role of judicial review is
the Court's capacity to stand strong against a national majority, not a local
one. 376 That is the sort of countermajoritarian capacity that only Article llI
provides, and it is the sort of countermajoritarian capacity that undergirds most
every normative theory of judicial review. 377
The second question-what sort of evidence is relevant in determining majority will in the first place-is trickier. Public opinion poll data, the position of
elected representatives and other institutional players, treatment by the popular
press-these and other markers of majority will can be skewed (as Engel shows
all too well), and yet each is vital to understanding the larger sociopolitical context in which the Supreme Court operates. Each plays a part in gauging the pre375. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (cl)dified as amended in scattered sections of 28
and 42 U.S.C.).
376. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE. L.J. 153, 174-76 (2002) (discussing the
historical roots of using a national majority as the relevant baseline).
377. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I; Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84
TEX. L. REV. 257, 279 (2005).
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vailing view. 378 Thus, in considering the reality of Engel's heroic, countermajoritarian narrative, l do just as I have in reconstructing its history: I consider
whatever helps capture the zeitgeist of the moment in which the Court's ruling
was made.
Turning now to the merits of Engel's heroic, countermajoritarian narrative,
the historical record reveals three truths that controvert our canonical understanding of the case. First, the Justices had absolutely no idea that they were
taking on majority will, and indeed all indications are that if they had known,
they would not have taken Engel in the first place. Second, the nation's vitriolic
reaction to Engel, which forms the foundation for its countermajoritarian narrative, was based on a massive misunderstanding of the case. And third, the sociopolitical context in which Engel was decided was remarkably supportive of
the decision on the merits; that is, not only did the Justices believe that the rul~
ing was in line with public opinion, but there is reason to think it actually was.
As to the first point-the Justices' inadvertent heroism in the case--one
might wonder why it matters. Why does the Supreme Court have to know that
it is taking on a national majority in order to do it? The answer is in what the
Court's acts of heroism are supposed to show. We cling to cases like Engel because they assure us that the Supreme Court will protect minority rights even in
the face of strong majoritarian pressure the opposite way. This is what Michael
Klarman calls the "psychological imperative" of a countermajoritarian Court,
and it is powerful indeed. 379 We need to know that the Court has the courage to
take a stand against clamoring majorities, that it is brave enough to protect the
unpopular and weak. Countermajoritarianism by accident does not get us there.
What the Court does when it thinks the country is behind it says nothing about
what the Court will do when it knows it stands alone.
This is the first problem with Engel. Engel is not a story of the Supreme
Court bravely standing up to a national majority in the name of minority rights.
Engel is the story of a Court that thought its ruling was eminently agreeableso agreeable that it was almost unanimous, so agreeable that it called for little
discussion in conference, so agreeable that it did not strike the Court as needing
to cite a single case. Indeed, even after the decision, the Justices steadfastly

378. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113, 118
(2012) ("[l]dentifying majority will is notoriously difficult. Public-opinion-poll data can be
skewed, depending on how questions are asked. Institutional support can reflect elite, rather
than popular, opinion. The same can be said of the popular press. Yet each of these measures
is vital to understanding the larger sociopolitical context in which the Supreme Court operates .... ").
379. See Klarman, supra note 26, at 23-24 (discussing "the psychological imperative
for believing in the Court's countermajoritarian heroics"). This psychological imperative
goes to the heart of most every nonnative justification of judicial review. Why have an unelected branch making decisions in a representative democracy? Because the Court can (in
theory) stand up to tyrannical majorities. Indeed, we have empowered it to do so by constitutional design. See supra note 377 and accompanying text.
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maintained that Engel was a ruling with which few could disagree (at least once
properly understood).
It could have been different. Tf the Supreme Court had struck down school
prayer a decade earlier, when the Cold War was at its peak, its decision would
have exemplified the judicial bravery that lies at the heart of our countermajoritarian conception of judicial review. But the Justices had two opportunities to invalidate religious observances in school during that time, and they declined them both. 380 Only after Cold War religiosity had passed, only after
Kennedy was elected President, and only after the edifice of Protestantism had
fallen did the Supreme Court deem the minority rights at issue in Engel worthy
of protection. Indeed, every scrap of the historical record suggests that if the
Justices had known just how unpopular Engel would be, they would have been
much less willing to step into the fray in the first place.
That brings me to a thought about why the Justices might have been willing to step into the fray with Engel, and the possibility of yet another connection between Engel and Schempp. As it turns out, the Justices knew that
Schempp was coming their way on direct appeal. We know the~ knew because
Schempp had already come their way on direct appeal in 1960. 81 At that time,
the Justices remanded Schempp on a procedural f:oint that they knew as well as
anyone would make no difference in the case. 3 2 Schempp was coming back.
So if the Justices knew Schempp was coming back, as they surely did, why take
Engel? Why take the oddball case in which the state wrote the prayer when the
Justices were going to have to rule on the more mainstream practice of Bible
reading and recitation of the Lmd's Prayer in the next year or two?
The answer is necessarily speculative but makes sense: the Supreme Court
took Engel to ease the nation into Schempp. 383 Engel was in many ways low-

380. See supra notes l 18-19 and accompanying text.
381. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 364 U.S. 298 (1960) (per curiam).
For a discussion of why Schempp came to the Supreme Court on direct appeal, see note 321
and accompanying text above.
382. Schempp initially raised a Free Exercise Clause claim as well as an Establishment
Clause claim because there was no provision under Pennsylvania law for children to be excused upon request. On the way to the Supreme Court the first time, the state statute was
amended to allow excusal. As the district court noted on remand, this did nothing to the Establishment Clause claim that had been alleged from the start. See Schempp v. Sch. Dist. of
Abington Twp., 201 F. Supp. 815, 817-18 (E.D. Pa. 1962), ajf'd, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (discussing the procedural posture of the case and the Establishment Clause claim on remand). I
even wonder if the Court's remand was an attempt to buy time so that it could dismiss the
case on taxpayer standing, as it had done in Doremus in 1952. See supra note 119 (discussing the Doremus case); see also supra note 322 (discussing why dismiss.al based on taxpayer
standing was not an option for the Supreme Court in Schempp).
383. At least one contemporary commentator also recognized this possibility. See Pollack, supra note 98, at 63. If our speculation is right, then my colleague Kevin Walsh is also
right: those who hated Engel because of its implications (at least for Bible reading) were on
to something, and the Justices' mistake was in thinking that they could sneak one by them. I
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hanging fruit. The prayer was written by the state, so it was a particularly easy
Establishment Clause case. It was sui generis; there was not another prayer like
it in the country. It was so watered down that even the religious establishment
hated it. And it did not take sides in the longstanding Catholic-Protestant war
over Bible reading. So viewed, Engel is not unlike the cautious steps the Supreme Court often takes when entering into a new doctrinal area-except, of
course, that it backfired. The nation's reaction was not what the Justices expected, which brings me to my second point.
The second problem with Engel's heroic, countennajoritarian narrative is
what we can make of the nation's reaction to the case, which is not much. Engel's counterrnajoritarian narrative rests entirely on the nation's hostile reaction
to the ruling, but that reaction was mired in misunderstanding over what the
Justices actually said. The papers portrayed Engel as a decision that forbade
schoolchildren from praying in school, even if they wanted to, even if they did
so on their own, and claimed that the Justices were taking aim at all civic references to God next. No doubt these stances were wildly unpopular, but they
were not a fair representation of what Engel held.
Evidence abounds that the misunderstanding mattered. Contemporary
commentators recognized it. The Justices lamented it. And Congress's attempt
to undo Engel with a constitutional amendment that said the same thing as what
Engel held only makes sense in light of it. Even the public opinion poll data on
Engel was based on questions that failed to mention that it was a state-written
prayer that the Supreme Court had invalidated. 384 Given that this was key to
the Court's holding, it is difficult to make much of the polling data, as strong as
it is, 385 or to ignore the possibility that the polls themselves may have contributed to the misunderstanding that swallowed the case.
That said, the historical record reveals that there were two types of understanding that the public lacked in Engel, not one. To see what I mean, consider
for a moment why religious and other highly educated cultural elites supported
Engel. The conventional explanation-which is also the conventional explanation as to why the Justices decided Engel the way they did-is elite policy pref-

thank Kevin Walsh for our conversations on this and other points, which have made this Article better.
384. Indeed, the 1964 Gallup poll about Engel asked about support for "a constitutional
amendment to legalize prayers in public schools," again framing the issue in free exercise
terms. See supra notes 19, 271 (providing the text of questions asked in 1962 and 1964 Gallup polls).
385. More recent polls have demonstrated the tremendous importance of how the question is asked. See Gash & Gonzales, supra note 271, at 68 (noting that in the school prayer
context, "question wording and survey methodology can have a dramatic effect on results,
leading to differences that exceed 30 percentage points between surveys conducted within a
relatively brief span of time"); supra note 271 (noting polls showing that support for school
prayer in the abstract hovers around 70%-80%, while support for "Christian prayer" hovers
around 10% and support for "general prayer," like the prayer in Engel, hovers around 20%).
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erences. 386 The Justices are highly educated cultural elites, so the story goes,
and highly educated cultural elites tend to take a separatist stance on issues like
school prayer. 387 And that much is true.
But what the historical record shows is that elites may have supported Engel not because they had elite values, but because they understood it in a way
the public did not. The demagogues in Congress did not have "elite values" (at
least not of the sort that supported Engel from the start). They started out hellbent on overturning Engel, then changed their minds. What moved them was an
appreciation for the intractable problems associated with school prayer in a pluralistic society, an appreciation gleaned only because the amendment process
had forced them to think about the issue in concrete terms. 388 This was the understanding that religious and educated elites had from the start and the one that
rank-and-file members of the public largely lacked. 389 It was an understanding
not only of what Engel held, but why.

386. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 264-65 ("Yet it also is possible that the justices obtained a skewed picture of the public's likely reaction or were more likely to misjudge in this
instance. Opposition to school prayer tends to be highest among the better educated and
more well-to-do in society."); POWE, supra note 14, at 358 {"There was a dominant view
shared by the well-educated-and therefore the justices of the Court-that religion was a
private matter, best left to the homes and the churches."); Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 26, at
326 (''Not surprisingly (and not for the last time), the justices championed the dominant
views of the nation's elite as against popular opinion."); Smith, supra note 26, at 1015 ("Engel and Schempp imposed a view generally accepted in elite culture but widely rejected in
more popular culture.").
387. See Gash & Gonzales, supra note 271, at 66 (discussing quantitative studies on
support for school prayer, which "find that those supporting school prayer tend to be older,
less educated, and politically and socially conservative"); see also Adams, supra note 273, at
482-83 (same).
388. See supra notes 278-87 and accompanying text (discussing growing appreciation
for the complexity of the issue as the amendment hearings progressed); see also Hearings,
supra note 288, at 597 {quoting Representative George Meader as saying that he didn't like
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment, but that "[w]e have not found
the proper language to [overturn it], I admit"); BOLES, supra note 31, at 328-29 (discussing
the changed views of Representative Robert L. Leggett as illustrative of the phenomenon,
noting that he had been one of the first to introduce a proposed amendment in Congress but
by the end of the hearings urged the Judiciary Committee against it, noting "the absence of
an understanding of facts which characterized some who supported the amendment").
Interestingly, the same sort of learning process played out in the 1980s, in the wake of
President Reagan's call for a constitutional amendment to restore school prayer in 1982.
Senator Jeff Bingaman was quoted as stating, "If those arguing about this issue in the Chamber cannot themselves agree, then what sort of chaos is going to be visited on every school
board, teacher, and child in this country?" FENWfCK, supra note 212, at 154. Senator John
Heinz similarly stated, "What we have gone through these past 2 weeks is proof of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of permitting group, vocal prayer without transgressing our strong
tradition of religious tolerance and freedom." 130 CONG. REc. 5899-900 (1984). The attempt
to pass a school prayer amendment again failed. See FENWICK, supra note 212, at 165.
389. Further support for this thesis comes from polling data that compare support for
school prayer in general with support for "Christian prayer" or "general prayer"--questions
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In the wake of Engel, contemporary commentators credited "careful study"
of the school prayer issue as the reason most religious leaders favored Engel
when most other people did not. 390 Social science research at the time largely
agreed, concluding that the Supreme Court's ruling impacted "the mass public
whose capacities for differentiation are lower than those of the attentive
elite." 391 When elite opinion differs from that of the public, maybe the difference reflects elite values, but Engel is a reminder that it may reflect differences
in the infonnation, and inclination, people have to think through issues instead. 392 Research shows that public opinion is highly susceptible to media influence, and that issue framing is a primary means by which this influence occurs. 393 Highly educated elites are subject to media influence too, but research
shows that they are more inclined to critically assess information than the average Joe, less subject to undifferentiated emotional views, and better equipped to
resist distortions from the media. 394 That's elitist, you say. And it is. But what
if it is true?

that make the public think about the issue in concrete terms. See supra note 271 (comparing
support across different polling questions).
390. A Tide Reversed, supra note 284, at 62 (quoting the United Presbyterian Stated
Clerk).
391. Casey, supra note 259, at 14-17.
392. The death penalty is another issue in which these sorts of differences appear to
matter. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 369 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (discounting public opinion polls showing support for the death penalty and "[a]ssuming" that
with "knowledge of all the facts presently available regarding capital punishment, the average citizen would, in my opinion, find it shocking to his conscience and sense of justice");
Dwight Aarons, The Marshall Hypothesis and the Rise of Anti-Death Penalty Judges, 80
TENN. L. REV. 381, 391-96 (2013) (reporting substantial empirical support for Marshall's
claim); Austin Sarat & Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth
Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 Wrs. L. REV. 171, 171-97 (same).
393. See Stephen M. Engel, Frame Spillover: Media Framing and Public Opinion of a
Multifaceted LGBT Rights Agenda, 38 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 403, 406 (2013) (reviewing the
literature and concluding that "variation in public understanding of and agreement with a
judicial ruling can, to some extent, be gauged by identifying variation in how news media
framed the ruling"); id. at 411-12 ("[S]ince citizens' knowledge of the Court is heavily filtered through media coverage, public opinion on legal decisions may be highly susceptible to
media influence .... News media bombard the viewing, listening, and reading public with
different frames, or ways of organizing and emphasizing facts into a coherent story, on a particular subject, thereby creating competing perceptions of the same event." (citations omitted)); Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent": Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct
Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 132 (1995) ("The mass media are widely regarded as 'the
primary source of information about public affairs received by most citizens.' Thus, they
have formidable powers to frame and shape not only political campaigns, but 'public opinion' more generally." (footnotes omitted) (quoting Michael Margolis & Gary Mauser, Public
Opinion as a Dependent Variable: An Empirical and Normative Assessment, in
M ANIPULATlNG PUBLIC OPINION: ESSAYS ON PUBLIC 0rJNION AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE

365, 366 (Michael Margolis & Gary A. Mauser eds., 1989))).
394. See Casey, supra note 259, at 6-7 (noting that elites are more attentive to information gathering and also have "better developed cognitive skills" for critically considering
the infonnation they have); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic
Principles in the Global Arena, 51 V AND. L. REV. 217, 264 (1998) (arguing that "elites are
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The point has implications well beyond Engel and goes to the heart of our
counlennajoritarian conception of judicial review. Is a decision still countermajoritarian if it is really just misunderstood? What level of understanding matters, and how do we gauge understanding in a world where partisan media
dominates the discourse? I do not pretend to have the answers to these questions, but I do think they should be part of the conversation. At the very least,
Engel attests to the importance of looking beyond the standard majoritarian
markers and recognizing the role that media and information deficits can play
in shaping the public's views. 395
That leaves a third, and final, problem with Engel's heroic, countermajoritarian narrative: the sociopolitical context of 1962. When the Supreme
Court decided Engel, the notion of public secularism was so widely accepted
that John F. Kennedy touted the principle in his successful 1960 presidential
campaign. 396 Contemporary observers talked about a "broad public consensus"
that religion was a private matter, 397 and in much of the country, religious observances in public schools had already died out on their own. 398 Even the
Board of Regents that wrote the prayer in Engel had issued a statement maintainin~ that the religious inculcation of children was best left to the church and
home. 99 In short, not only did the Justices think that Engel was well in line
with popular opinion at the time, but there is ample reason to conclude that it
actually was.
Upon reflection, this should come as no surprise. Supreme Court Justices
are a part of contemporary society; thus, we can and should expect their
decisionmaking to be influenced by the dominant societal norms of their time.
Indeed, the real surprise is that Engel's countermajoritarian narrative has persisted for fifty years despite an easily accessible historical record to the contrary. Why has Engel's reality been so hard to see? The answer, I believe, is a
mindset that routinely fails to consider the indelible historical context in which

themselves heavily influenced by the media," although "politically sophisticated elites tend
to treat media coverage more critically than does the mass electorate"). interestingly, the advent of biogs, Internet news, and other media sources has not changed elites' information
advantage. See Ilya Sornin, Originalism and Political Ignorance, 97 MINN. L REV. 625, 643
(2012) ("Although the cost of acquiring information has declined thanks to modern technology, ... the key constraint on political knowledge is not the availability of information, but
citizens' willingness to spend time and energy learning and understanding it.").
395. For a modem account of how, as in Engel, the media's focus on a Supreme Court
decision's implications impacted public opinion on the more limited holding of the decision
itself, see Engel, supra note 393, at 404-30 (discussing the media coverage of Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and its implications for gay marriage, finding a negative spillo·
ver effect on public support for the more limited ruling in Lawrence itself).
396. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 153.54 and accompanying text (quoting contemporary news mag·
azines noting the "widely agreed upon" view that religious instruction was best left to the
church and home and a "broad public consensus" that religion was a private matter).
398. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text
399. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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the Supreme Court operates. When we ignore the cauldron of cultural forces
that influence the Justices' inclination to protect minority rights, we get a distorted image of the countermajoritarian capacity of judicial review. 400
In the end, Engel's heroic, countermajoritarian narrative is largely fiction.
This is problematic not only because the dominant conception of Engel is inaccurate, but also because it has eclipsed other conversations in constitutional law
in which Engel has purchase. Engel has a much richer, multidimensional story
to tell than what we see in the countermajoritarian narrative-a story about social movements generating constitutional change, about the dialogic function of
judicial review, and about popular constitutionalism. To those conversations
the discussion turns next.
B. The Influence of Culture in Generating Constitutional Change
Over the past decade, one of the most significant contributions to the constitutional law literature has been legal history work showing the powerful influence of culture in general, and social movements in particular, in generating
constitutional change. Thus far, this burgeoning body of scholarship has featured the civil rights movement, the women's movement, the labor movement,
and the gay rights movement, showing each to have had a tremendous impact
on the development of constitutional law. 401 Not yet recognized is that the
1950s ecumenical movement is also an example of this phenomenon, and Engel
another thread in a tapestry of constitutional meaning forged by larger societal
change. 402

400. This distorted image might well be viewed as a Platonic "noble lie," a psychological imperative that feeds not only the public's need for protection from democracy's worst
excesses, but also the Supreme Court's need for legitimacy in a land of majority rule. See
supra notes 377, 379 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
countennajoritarian capacity as the basis for most every normative theory of judicial review
and the psychological imperative of a countermajoritarian Court).
401. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social
Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case ofAffirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062 (2002); Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127 (2013);
James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: labor and the
Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. I (2002); Reva B.
Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The
Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL!!'. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
402. Others have recognized the ecumenical movement's impact in the civil rights arena, just not in the place it is closest to home---our understanding of the First Amendment's
religion clauses. For a history of the ecumenical movement's involvement in the struggle for
racial equality, see generally JAMES F. FINDLAY, JR., CHURCH PEOPLE TN THE STRUGGLE: THE
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES AND THE BLACK FREEDOM MOVEMENT, 1950-1970 (1993).
For a discussion of the 1950s ecumenical movement, see notes 80-83 and accompanying text
above.
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Although it has been almost entirely overlooked in the law review literature, 403 the 1950s ecumenical movement played a powerful role in Engel in
three ways. First, and most obviously, it produced the ecumenical Regents'
Prayer at issue in the case. Second, and more broadly, it created a compromise
position for those who wanted to keep religious observances in school but also
accommodate religious diversity, a middle ground between traditional (i.e.,
Protestant) observances and none. Third, and most importantly, it showed the
futility of that move, further fueling the impetus for change realized in Engel.
A brief review of the conundrum of school prayer illustrates the point. One
option for states responding to the pressures of religious pluralism in the context of school religious observances was to simply stop those observances altogether. As previously discussed, this response was a prominent feature of the
sociopolitical landscape when Engel was decided, particularly in the West and
Mid west. 404
A second option, and one that was also prominent at the time Engel was
decided, was for schools to do nothing-to ignore the pressures of pluralism
altogether. This was the dominant response in the East and South, where deep
colonial customs and Bible Belt practices rendered religious observances in
schools particularly well entrenched and resistant to change. 405 Still, one gets
the sense that even here, the status quo could hold out for only so long. By the
mid-twentieth century, Catholics and Jews were no longer outsiders; they were
insiders, and increasingly demanded to be treated as such. 406 As the pressures
of pluralism mounted, states that wanted to keep religious observances in
school would have to find another way. It was quickly becoming no longer
enough to excuse religious minorities; states would need to find a way to include them. 407
That brings us to the third option-the compromise position illustrated by
the ecumenical prayer in Engel. For states that wanted to retain religious observances in school but make the content more amenable to religious minorities,
the ecumenical approach seemed the ideal way to go. Except it wasn't. Experi403. My own search has revealed only one law review article about the ecumenical
movement's impact on the Establishment Clause. See Robert C. Casad, The Establishment
Clause and the Ecumenical Movement, 62 MICH. L. REv. 419 {1964).
404. See supra notes 86-88, 92 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
406. See MORGAN, supra note 77, at 81-82 ("Roman Catho lie consciousness of itself as
a minority, set apart from the mainstream of American culture and community life, evaporated. Laity and hierarchy alike, the Catholic conununity emerged from the Second World
War newly confident, and eager to exert its influence on a culture which it now perceived as
its own .... ");see also supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (discussing the dominance
of the ''three great faiths" and "Judeo-Christian" tradition by the mid-1950s).
407. See People ex rel. Ring v. Bd. of Educ., 92 N.E. 251, 256 (Ill. 1910) ("The exclusion of a pupil from this part of the school exercises in which the test of the school joins,
separates him from his fellows, puts him in a class by himself, deprives him of his equality
with the other pupils, subjects him to a religious stigma and places him at a disadvantage in
the scboo I .... ").
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ence showed that no one was happy, and the harder one tried to devise a prayer
that pleased everyone, the closer one came to an empty formality that offended
the religious and irreligious alike.
It was a lesson that was likely to replay elsewhere. States that were determined to keep religious observances in school but felt the need to bend to the
realities of religious diversity were going to do what the school board in Engel
did-move toward a more inclusive, ecumenical prayer. And that was going to
prove unsatisfactory. And that was going to add even more pressure to just get
rid of such practices altogether.
In an early draft of Engel, the Supreme Court recognized this conundrum
explicitly. Even the most seemingly innocuous prayer would never please everyone, the Court wrote. 408 The pressures of religious pluralism were propelling
the nation toward constitutional change, and the ecumenical movement was
fueling that momentum with the strong sense that there was no other way.
Thus far, I have discussed Engel's contribution to the literature on social
movements as an engine of constitutional change, but Engel also has purchase
for "court and culture" scholarship more generally. Recall that by the late
1880s, most states had enacted prohibitions against sectarian education in publicly funded schools. 409 At the time, these provisions were viewed as having
nothing to say about Bible reading and school prayer because the prevailing
(i.e., Protestant) view was that such practices were not sectarian. It was not until the fall of Protestantism in the early to mid-twentieth century that the country began to take a different view, recognizing that the ban against sectarian
practices included Protestant practices too. 410
So stated, the Supreme Court in Engel can be viewed as just holding the
nation to a standard it had long embraced on its own. Indeed, in that sense, Engel was a good seventy-five years late. The reason it did not feel that way is a
lesson Engel teaches with stunning clarity: it was not the law that mattered, but
our cultural conception of the law.
The point is important not only for "court and culture" scholars, but also
for those writing in the area of law and religion. Although Sarah Gordon,
Thomas Berg, Steven Green, and others have done important work on the extralegal narrative of the law in this area, 411 there remains a striking paucity of
discourse on the extralegal forces that drove the Justices' decisionmaking in

408. See supra text accompanying note 152.
409. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
410. The first state to ban Bible reading from public schools-Ohio in 1869-did so
well before the fall of Protestantism as the nation's de facto religious establishment, but it
too proves the point. See GREEN, supra note 31, at 93-135 (discussing the "vibrant religious
diversity" that led educators, and ultimately the Ohio Supreme Court, to view Bible reading
as a sectarian practice).
41 L See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 107; Gordon, supra note 66; Berg, supra note 65;
Berg, supra note 34; GREEN, supra note 31; Green, supra note 49.
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Engel, a marquee "law and religion" case. 412 This paucity is all the more stunning in light of the lack of conventionai sources that can plausibly explain the
constitutional change that Engel wrought. 413 To understand Engel, one must
look beyond the Framers and original intent; the only way the decision makes
sense is as a response to, and reflection of, larger societal forces of change.

C. A Rare "Strong Form" of the Dia logic Function ofJudicial Review
The notion that judicial review functions as a dialogue with the coordinate
branches and the American public is hardly new. Back in 1962, Alexander
Bickel described the Supreme Court's use of judicial review as a '"continuing
colloquy" with the people and their representatives in which constitutional
meaning is "evolved conversationally" rather than declared unilaterally. 414
Since then, a number of scholars have shown that, far from the juricentric
world of constitutional law that first-year law students study, the Supreme
Court is but a part of an ongoing conversation about constitutional meaning that
continues over time until some sense of consensus is reached. 415 Recent work
on the role of nonjudicial actors in determining constitutional meaning (of
which "court and culture" scholarship is a part) has only heightened scholarly
interest in the dialogic function of judicial review.
Within this geme of scholarship, Engel has appeared as an example of how
dialogic judicial review can go wrong-and rightly so. 416 The majority's failure to set forth the limits of the Court's holding in the text as opposed to a foot-

412. I have found just four sources in the legal literature that undertake such an inquiry
in more than passing fashion. See supra note 26 (listing sources). Why the underdeveloped
discourse? It may be because Engel is now fifty years old and, over time, has come to stand
for an ideal that scholarship has then built upon in analyzing later doctrinal developments. I
credit with gratitude Paul Horwitz for this insight.
413. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 26, at 281 ("In terms of the conventional sources
of 'legitimacy' in constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
decisions are at least very venturesome, if not completely rootless."); Klarman, supra note
26, at 47 ("Neither doctrinal logic nor changes in Court composition can explain the dramatic departure effectuated by the Court in its post-1945 Establishment Clause decisions.
Only an external account, focusing on deep political, social, and ideological forces, can plausibly explain this scachange in constitutional doctrine .... Inexplicably, this sort of social
and political history of the transformation of Establishment Clause doctrine remains largely
unwritten.").
414. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 240, 244 {2d ed. 1986).
415. For particularly prominent examples, see LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (1988); and Barry Friedman, Dialogue
and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. R.Ev. 577 (1993).
416. See FISHER, ~·upra note 415, at 181; see also Paul G. Kaupcr, The Warren Court:
Religious Liberty and Church-State Relations, 67 MICH. L. REV. 269, 288 (1968) ("A large
part of the public furor aroused by Justice Black's blunt opinion in Engel might well have
been avoided if the Court had given thought to the public impact of the decision and dealt
more discreetly with the issue-as Justice Clark did in the later Schempp opinion.").
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note, and its curt, conclusory opinion devoid of a single citation, has to be one
of the more wanting exercises of dialogic judicial review in Supreme Court history. 417 Meanwhile, the concurring and dissenting opinions in Engel show how
minority voices on the Court can contribute to confusion over the holding of a
case. To the extent Engel was the opening salvo in a dialogue with the American people, little wonder the public's reaction was akin to a certain hand gesture in response.
That said, the Justices' opinions in Engel are in my mind the least interesting aspect of the decision for dialogic theory; the hidden gem of Engel lies in
everything that happened after the decision was announced. That begins with
Justice Black answering letter after letter of hate mail on the case. Justice Black
told people to read the Engel opinion, and he often told them to write back if
after reading it, they still disagreed with what the Supreme Court had done. 418
In so doing, he took the notion of a dialogue with the American people to a
whole new level-a literal one.
Justice Clark did essentially the same thing, and he did it in two ways.
First, he broke from longstanding tradition against commenting on the merits of
a case to clarify Engel while speaking at a national convention. Second, he
wrote the majority opinion in Schempp. Every aspect of the Schempp opinfonfrom its styling, to its recitation of the facts, to its rich assurances of the exalted
status of religion, to its explanation of why religious diversity rendered daily
devotionals in school untenable-was written with the public in mind. Throw
in Justice Brennan's insistence upon writing separately so he could talk to a
Catholic audience, and it is hard to imagine a stronger example of the dialogic
function of judicial review.
So viewed, dialogic theory simply looked away too soon. The Supreme
Court decided Engel. The people reacted. And the Justices reacted to that reaction in letters, speeches, and their opinions in Schempp. This is not to say they
did so in the way dialogic scholars have theorized. Although dialogic theory
417. One might wonder why, if the Justices took Engel to ease the nation into Schempp,
they were not more attentive to the Engel opinion. While speculative, my sense is that the
answer lies in the fact that the Justices saw Engel as a ruling so obvious they could not imagine the country taking a different view. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 220-21 (1963) (describing Engel as resting on principles "so universally recognized" that the Court ruled "without the citation ofa single case").
418. A number of these letters were quite direct. See, e.g., Letter from Justice Hugo L.
Black to Lois Wilson (July 2, 1962) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 358) ("In order that
you may know what the Court actually decided, I am sending you a copy of the opinion to
which you referred. You will note that the Court decided that no State could prescribe official prayers through its politicians or officials. After you have read the opinion of the Court,
I think you will find that there is not one word in it that puts a single obstacle in the way of
any person in the United States who genuinely wants to pray his own prayer in his own way
to the God he worships."). On the letter was written the annotation, "Lois Wilson was a famous movie actress (HLB)," id (underlining omitted), which she was, perhaps explaining
why this letter was more detailed than most. See Lois Wilson, SILENT ERA, http://www
.silentera.com/people/actresses/Wilson-Lois.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). For other examples of Justice Black's correspondence, see note 159 and accompanying text above.

March 2015]

RECONSTRUCTING ENGEL

551

generally posits that the Court will moderate its position in response to sustained democratic dissent, 419 Engel's aftermath shows there are other possibilities as well. Sometimes the Court will respond in dialogic fashion not by moderating its position, but by clarifying, limiting, or simply selling it better ininstead.
Whatever the response, scholars thus far have theorized what one might
call a weak form of dialogic judicial review: dialogue is something that happens by virtue of the actions and reactions of various actors, whether they are
thinking about it as dialogue or not. 420 What Engel and Schempp show is that
the dialogic function of judicial review can exist in strong form too. Sometimes
the Supreme Court is actually trying to talk to the American people. That is,
sometimes the Court is dialogic not only in what it does, but also in what it
means to do.
This conception of the Supreme Court is dramatically different from that
for which Engel and Schempp are famous. Engel's countennajoritarian narrative is the story of a Court fiercely independent from the sway of public opinion, with Schempp a story of the Justices doubling down on that stance. Yet the
reality of both cases flips those narratives on their heads. The Justices' actions
in the wake of Engel, and their subsequent opinions in Schempp, reveal a Court
that cared deeply about the public's perception of its rulings. Nowhere is that
more apparent than in the exercise of explicitly dialogic judicial review.
D. Not All Popular Constitutionalism Is Created Equal

Having discussed the dialogic function of judicial review, I tum now to one
aspect of that dialogue-the voice of the people and their representatives. Over
the past decade, the notion that the people and their representatives should play
an active role in determining constitutional meaning has catapulted to the cen·
ter stage of constitutional theory under an umbrella of work dubbed "popular
constitutionalism." 421 This genre of scholarship is notoriously elusive as to
what the tenn means, 422 but the central animating theory is that ours is a gov419. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 382 (discussing the moderating influence of dialogic judicial review).
420. See Friedman, supra note 415, at 653-58.
421. For a sampling of this work, see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR CONSTlTUTlONALlSM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TuSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTJON AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular
Constitutionalism. Nostalgia, and the Troe Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J.
897 (2005); and Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutiona!ism, Departmentalism,
and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L REV. 1027 (2004).
422. See Gewirtzman, supra note 421, at 900 ("The problem begins with 'the People,' a
term popular constitutionalists invoke with some regularity but are reluctant to define. To the
extent there is a shared definition, it apparently refers to any participant in constitutional interpretation who is not a federal judge." (footnote omitted)); Larry Alexander & Lawrence
B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REY. 1594, 1618 (2005) (reviewing
KRAMER, supra note 421) ("But as articulated by Kramer, 'popular constitutionalism' lacks
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emment "of the people, by the people, for the people," 423 and as such, the people and their representatives should be the ultimate arbiters of constitutional
law.424
By and large, Engel has not played a role in this discourse, although Lucas
Powe has discussed it as an overlooked example of modem popular constitutionalism. 425 By Powe's account, attempts to override Engel by constitutional
amendment may have failed, but in the end the peof:le won. Even today, school
prayer remains a feature of some Southern schools. 26
In my mind, Powe was right in citing Engel as a vastly underappreciated
example of popular constitutionalism, but Engel's contribution to the literature
in this area is even greater than Powe recognizes in two ways. First, Engel
shows the variety of forms that popular constitutionalism might take, exposing
qualitative differences in the way democratic dissent fosters constitutional discourse. Second, Engel shows that even popular constitutionalists have reason to
celebrate judicial review: popular constitutionalism may not exist without it.
As to the first point, one cannot help but think of one of the earliest works
on popular constitutionalism-Mark Tushnet's Taking the Constitution Away
from the Courts 427 -when thinking about the congressional amendment hearings to overturn Engel. When the hearings began, supporters of an amendment

even the articulation and relatively sharp definition of a cumulus cloud in the lower atmosphere."); L.A. Powe, Jr., Are "the People" Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?,
83 TEX. L REV. 855, 857 (2005) (reviewing KRAMER, supra note 421) ("Kramer's interpretation of what constitutes popular constitutional ism may be so elusive that only he can apply
it.").
423. President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: THE GETTYSBURG ADDRESS AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 14, 14 (Leo Paul
S. de Alvarez ed., 1976).
424. See KRAMER, supra note 421, at 107 ("In a world of popular constitutionalism,
government officials are the regulated, not the regulators, and final interpretive authority
rests with the people themselves."); Gewirtzman, supra note 421, at 898-99 (naming various
popular constitutionalists and noting that "[e]ach argues that the People and their elected representatives should-and often do---play a substantial role in the creation, interpretation,
evolution, and enforcement of constitutional norms"); Powe, supra note 422, at 895 ("Popular constitutionalism's core idea [is] that all citizens have the right to interpret the Constitution for themselves .... ").
425. See Powe, supra note 422, at 866, 875-77.
426. See McGuire, supra note 223, at 60, 62 ("The ban on organized prayer-the
Court's longest standing policy on devotional activities in public schools-is fully enforced,
at least outside the South. Almost one quarter of southern students, though, report that these
prayers remain a regular part of their education, despite the Court's long-established policy
to the contrary .... Because latitude decreases in a southerly direction, the negative coefficient confirms that the further south a school is located, the more recalcitrant it will be when
it comes to adhering to the Court's mandates on school prayer."); Powe, supra note 422, at
876- 77.
427. TUSHNET, supra note 421.
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had a majority in the Judiciary Committee and a majority in the House. 428 The
Constitution was theirs for the taking.
Then something unexpected happened. In the process of taking the Constitution away from the Supreme Court, committee members were forced to engage with the school prayer issue in concrete tenns, as it would play out on the
ground. When they did, most all of those congressmen decided that the Court
had done alright after all (or at least came to understand that there was no other
way).429
In my mind, the sort of deliberative process that played out in Congress is
qualitatively different from the acts of outright defiance and low-level noncompliance that Powe cites as examples of popular constitutionalism in the wake of
Engel. Indeed, it strikes me as qualitatively different from most everything that
the people and their representatives did to register their dissent, and Engel
shows us the gamut. Public denunciations. Billboards and picketing. Letters
and editorials. Resolutions and legislation. Vows of defiance and resolute noncompliance. Calls to amend the Constitution, impeach the Justices, strip their
jurisdiction, buy them Bibles, and inscribe the words "In God We Trust" above
their bench. Engel puts flesh on the bones of what popular constitutionalism
might look like, offering an opportunity to think about whether we like what we
see.
Thus far, those who champion popular constitutionalism have focused on
the word "popular" in popular constitutionalism, assuming, it appears, that as
long as the people are the ones doing the deciding, the ideals of civic republicanism have been realized. 430 Engel shows that is simply not true. There is another, critical component to civic republicanism, and it is reflected in the notion
of deliberative democracy-an authentically discursive process in which arguments are marshaled, information gleaned, and the merits of competing positions fully considered. 431 That is the quality that the amendment hearings had,
and it is the quality that backlash politics largely lack.

428. See supra notes 275-77 and accompanying text Some were already predicting the
timing of when the amendment would be ready for ratification by the states. See supra note
277.
429. See supra note 388 (quoting members of Congress involved in the 1964 amendment process and the 1982 amendment process, in which the same sort of learning process
played out).
430. See supra note 422; see also Powe, supra note 422, at 890-91 ("Popular constitutionalism embraces our modern notions of civic republicanism and the romantic ideal of an
engaged citizenry."). For a primer on civic republicanism, see lSEULT HONOHAN, CIVlC
REPUULICANISM (2002).
431. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Where Civic Republicanism and Deliberative Democracy
Meet, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 12, 13. For insightful discussions of deliberative democracy and the clements that define it, sec DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS
ON REASON AND POLITlCS (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997); AMY GUTMANN &
DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); and AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS
THOMPSON, WHY DEL!BERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004).
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In Engel, the difference mattered, and it should matter to popular constitutionalists too. If the point of popular constitutionalism is for the people to decide the Constitution's meaning for themselves, then we ought to care how
much thouri-t goes into doing it. After all, this is the Constitution they are expounding. 4 2 Popular constitutionalism that entails some modicum of deliberation is one thing; popular constitutionalism that amounts to little more than giving the middle finger is something altogether different. 433 That's not even close
to deliberative democracy. That's just defiance.
That brings me, briefly, to my second point-the importance of judicial review for popular constitutionalism, with Engel as a prime example. Despite the
fragility of the status quo before Engel, the propriety of religious observances
in public schools did not capture the nation's attention until 1962, when the Supreme Court struck down school prayer. It was Engel that launched a national
conversation about the rights of religious minorities, Engel that triggered the
democratic dissent that lies at the heart of popular constitutionalism, and Engel
that led to the deliberative democracy at work in the amendment hearings.
In galvanizing debate, Engel democratized the Constitution, jump-starting
civic engagement about the content of constitutional rights. Contemporary
commentators recognized it. 434 Justice Black wrote about it. 435 And ~opulist
calls to arms illustrated it, albeit often in less than respectful fashion. 43 At the
risk of stating the obvious, none of the acts of democratic dissent in Engel's
wake would have happened without Engel. As scholars rally to take the Constitution from the Court, Engel is a vivid reminder that popular constitutionalism
without Supreme Court decisions may mean no popular constitutionalism at all.

432. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) ("[W]e must
never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.").
433. This is not to deny that even unreasoned outrage can serve a useful pmpose, only
to say that it is a poor basis for constitutionalism. For an example of how even bigoted mob
violence can play a productive part in the dialogic function of judicial review, consider the
violence that followed Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), which
denied protection to Jehovah's Witnesses, and the Supreme Court's response in Wesl Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 ( 1943), which overruled Gobitis. For
an excellent account of the violent public reaction to Gobitis and the seeds it sowed for
Barnette, see generally SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS
PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2000).
434. See Kaufman, supra note 234, at 51 (applauding "the widespread public dialogue
touched off by the Court's opinions" in Engel and Schempp).
435. See Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Fred Larkins (July 6, 1962) (Hugo
LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) ("Although one never knows, I have an idea that the loyalty of the people for the principles of the First Amendment may emerge from this widespread discussion with more strength in the hearts of the people than they had.before.").
436. "Wake up, America!" Representative Philip Philbin of Massachusetts declared.
"Do not sit by while Communists, atheists, agnostics, materialists, bleeding hearts, and their
unwitting dupes tamper with and imperil the very foundation stones, sacred beliefs, and
shrines of our great majestic Na~ion." 109 CONG. REC. 19,278 (1963) (statement of Rep.
Philbin).
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Here, then, lies one of the many ironies of Engel. The case famous for
working against democratic values in fact played a key role in fomenting them.
And those who set out to take the Constitution away from the Supreme Court
instead gave it back at the end of the day. It is hard to imagine a higher form of
popular constitutionalism than that.
CONCLUSION

A robust, historically accurate understanding of Engel v. Vitale is important
not only because it shows the decision's strong countennajoritarian narrative to
be inaccurate, but also because it shows us all that we have missed. As today's
cutting-edge constitutional law scholarship continues to explore the varied
ways in which constitutional meaning is generated by forces outside the Supreme Court, Engel stands as a vivid reminder that the lessons of legal history
are for yesterday, today, and tomorrow. Understanding the Court in the past
helps us know it in the present, and our conception of the Court in the present~how it responds to cultural forces, how it communicates with the American public, how it democratizes issues and jump-starts civic engagementgives us some sense of its dynamic, decidedly democratic potential going forward. For the past fifty years, we have not understood Engel well enough to see
all that it has to offer. Now we do.

***

